

Institute of Women Studies

معهد دراسات المرأة

مفاهيم وقضايا النوع الاجتماعي والتنمية

Concepts and Issues in Gender and Development

د. نداء أبو عواد

2011

dehka
2810437

learners dictionary

Concepts and Issues in Gender and Development (GLAD 630) September 2011

Instructor: Nida Abu Awwad

Time: Saturday 2:00-5:00pm Place: WS 401

Office hours: Saturday I2: 00- 2:00pm (Institute of Women's Studies)

This course aims at developing student's conceptual, analytical and writing skills. The course is organized around a number of important themes necessary to an understanding of the field of Gender and Development. These include: *Globalization, Liberalism and Empowerment.* Various definitions of debates about, theories and approaches to these different concepts will be addressed through an analysis of different readings. The aim is for students to become acquainted with the meaning of these concepts and then capable of analyzing their application indifferent contexts and disciplines of knowledge. Each concept will be tackled through students undertaking a series of analytical exercises. The main student project for the course will be the writing of an analytical literature review on an issue linked to one of the three main themes. All of the reading materials for the course will be in English in order for students to develop their language comprehension skills for future courses in the GAD Program.

Thus, this is a research-oriented course. The main goal is to enhance one's ability to comprehend, analyze and critique any written text. The course will rely on a seminar format: student participation is at its core --either through bringing in examples, discussing articles or homework exercises. The overall course structure and material will be built around the following;

Comprehend, analyze and critique some basic concepts in gender and development.

Bring different ways of studying and looking at the different concepts.

Present article reviews to develop the skill of reviewing texts.

Enhance the skill of essay writing.

A particular emphasis will be put how to do a literature review -how to develop a homogenous, logical, readable text.

I. introducing Globalization in all its aspects (W eek 1-3)

In this part. we will take up the issue of globalization. Firstly we will look at definitions of globalization and find ways to categorize them analytically. Then we will look at the theoretical debates around globalization what are tile different stands and approaches to the

issue? Finally, students will select a case study that looks at a specific aspect of globalization and will analyze it either in relation to the definitions or debates around globalization that we have addressed.

Assignment: Bring three different written definitions of globalization to class. Make sure that your reference them correctly.

Definitions and Debates:

David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton. *Global Transformations; Politics, Economics. Culture.* Stanford University Press: Stanford. 1999 (summary)

Leslie Sklair. "Competing Conceptions of Globalization", *Journal of World System's Research.* Vol. 2. summer 1999. pp.143-163

Case studies:

-Valentine Moghadam. "Transnational Feminist Networks; Collective Action in an Era of Globalization". *International Sociology.* Vol. 15 (I). March 2000.

-Saskia Sassen. "Women's Burde»: Counter-Geographies of Globalization and the Globalization of Survival", *Nordic Journal of International Law.* 71.2002. pp-255 -274

-Shirin Madden. "Information-Based Global Economy and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Bangalore", *The Information Society,* Vo UJ. 1997. pp . 227-243.

Assignment: An article Review of one of the Case studies putting the review in the context of definitions and debates about globalization.

II. Practical Skills How to Do a Literature Review (Classes 4-8)

This section of the course will provide a practical overview of the steps to doing a literature review in the social sciences. A literature review is a fundamental aspect of undertaking any form of research, What are the major works, or themes or theories that have been built up around a particular research issue" How are they organized into different theoretical or conceptual schools or areas of thematic interest? How do we go about finding these" How do we organize then into a systematic and coherent overview in our review'? How do we cite an article or use a quote'? What constitutes plagiarism'). All of these issues will be addressed through practical exercises that will be the start for students to start undertaking their own literature review project for the course.

Readings :

Class handout on doing a literature review

Cases of Literature Reviews:

-Sandra Acker. Feminist Theory and the Study of Gender in Education, International Review of education. Vol. XXXII l. 1987. ppA19-43S

-Jerry Jacobs. "Gender Inequality and Higher Education". *Annual Review of Sociology Vol-*22. 1996.pp.153-85.

Exercises and Assignments:

1_Using references:

a-distinguishing between plagiarism, paraphrasing or analytically', critically using a source.
b-referencing: writing citations and bibliography.

2. Analyzing Literature Reviews: Analyze Acker and Jacobs articles in terms of the organization of their reviews.

III. Introducing Liberalism as a Philosophy (Week 9-10)

Here we will look at the history and development of the philosophical tradition called Liberalism. Liberalism began as a philosophy of human society and then has become a dominant framework across different aspects of human reality and different academic disciplines. In this first section of liberalism we will focus on its intellectual origins and importance as a as philosophy and the critiques of it.

Liberalism and Rights:

Bielefeldt, Heiner. 1998. "Carl Schmitt's critique of Liberalism: Systematic Reconstruction and Counter criticism". In Dyzenhaus, David (ed.). *Low as Politics.* Durham & London Duke University Press pp-23-3 6

Scaler. Steven and Schimdtz, David. 2002. "State. Civil Society and Classical Liberalism". In Rosenblum, Nancy and Post, Robert (eds). *Civil Society and Government.* Princeton & Oxford; Princeton University Press.. Pp 26-47

Assignment: writing an essay on Schmitt's critique of liberalism and Bielefeldt's counter arguments.

IV. Liberalism and Development (classes 11-12)

This section builds on Section 1. Liberalism as a Philosophy. Here we will look at liberalism as it 118s been translated into two dimensions or 'development; Neo-liberal economic policy, in the form of Structural Adjustment and Women and Development (WID),the school of liberal feminist thought in development theory.

a. Structural Adjustment: Sparr, Pamela (ed). 1994. "What is Structural Adjustment')" in *Mortgaging Women 's Lives: Feminist Critiques a/Structural Adjustment.* London & New Jersey: Zed Books. Pp 1-57.

b. Women in Development:

Kate. Young. 1994. Planning development with Women; making a World of Difference. London: Macmillian pp.24-44.

v. Introducing the Concept of Empowerment (Week 13-14)

Empowerment is neither a *phenomena* like globalization or structural adjustment, nor a *philosophy* like Liberalism, nor a theory like liberal feminism. Instead, empowerment is a *concept that is linked to undertaking analysis in order to promote change,* Thus there are many different and often over-lapping conceptions of what empowerment is based on, composed of and how it should be undertaken as well as measured.

Empowerment has been used in a be wildering variety of ways, from the mundane to the profound, from the particular to the very general. Empowerment is seen to occur at a number of different levels, to cover a range of different dimensions and to materialize through a variety of different processes. However, central to the idea of empowerment is the idea of power. This is the starting point for clarifying how the notion of empowerment will be used in this part. One way of thinking about power is in terms of ability to make choices: to be disempowered, therefore, implies to be denied choice. The notion of empowerment is thus in escapable bound up with disempowerment and refers to the processes by which those who have been denied the ability to make choices acquire such an ability. In other words, empowerment entails a process of change. People who exercise a great deal of choice in their lives may be very powerful, but they are not empowered in this sense, because they were never disempowered in the first place. The following readings will cover this part:

Readings:

Kabeer, Naila. (1999). Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurements of Women's Empowerment, Discussion Paper 108. August 1999.United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNDP), Geneva, Switzerland.

Abu Nahlah et. al. Women's Empowerment: Concepts and Praxis, paper presented to the Ministry of Women's Affairs, :2003 (In Arabic).

Assignment: use Kabeer's theorization of Empowerment to review from a critical point of view the measurements for empowerment used in different cases, through given case studies.

Assessment:

The course will be assessed as follows:

Attendance

Take Home Exam

Written Assignments

Written Argument and Literature Review

[illegible] سوق العمل [illegible]

كل القضايا [illegible]
[illegible] الشركات [illegible]

Global Transformations

by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton

What is Globalization?

1. Introduction

- Globalization - the 'big idea' of the late twentieth century - lacks precise definition. More than this, it is in danger of becoming, if it has not already become, the cliché of our times.
- Nonetheless, the term globalization captures elements of a widespread perception that there is a broadening, deepening and speeding up of world-wide interconnectedness in all aspects of life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the environmental. At issue appears to be 'a global shift'; that is, a world being moulded, by economic and technological forces, into a shared economic and political arena.
- Behind the rhetoric of globalization - rhetoric found in public as well as academic debate - lie three [illegible]d accounts of the nature and meaning of globalization today, referred to here as the hyperglobalist, the sceptical, and the transformationalist views.
  - Hyperglobalists argue that we live in an increasingly global world in which states are being subject to massive economic and political processes of change. These are eroding and fragmenting nation-states and diminishing the power of politicians. In these circumstances, states are increasingly the 'decision-takers' and not the 'decision-makers'.
  - The sceptics strongly resist this view and believe that contemporary global circumstances are not unprecedented. In their account, while there has been an intensification of international and social activity in recent times, this has reinforced and enhanced state powers in many domains.
  - The transformationalists argue that globalization is creating new economic, political and social circumstances which, however unevenly, are serving to transform state powers and the context in which states operate. They do not predict the outcome - indeed, they believe it is uncertain - but argue that politics is no longer, and can no longer simply be, based on nation-states.

- What is to be made of these different positions? Are we, or are we not, on the edge of a global shift with massive political, economic and cultural implications?

2. What is Globalization?

- Globalization can usefully be conceived as a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power.
- It is characterized by four types of change:

- First it involves a *stretching* of social, political and economic activities across political frontiers, regions and continents.

- Second, it suggests the *intensification*, or the growing magnitude, of interconnectedness and flows of trade, investment, finance, migration, culture, etc.

- Third, the growing extensity and intensity of global interconnectedness can be linked to a speeding up of global interactions and processes, as the evolution of world-wide systems of transport and communication increases the velocity of the diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital, and people.

- Fourth, the growing extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions can be associated with their deepening impact such that the effects of distant events can be highly significant elsewhere and even the most local developments may come to have enormous global consequences. In this sense, the boundaries between domestic matters and global affairs can become increasingly blurred.

In sum, globalization can be thought of as the widening, intensifying, speeding up, and growing impact of world-wide interconnectedness. By conceiving of globalization in this way, it becomes possible to map empirically patterns of world-wide links and relations across all key domains of human activity, from the military to the cultural.

- From the pre-modern, through to the early modern (1500-1800), modern (19th to early 20th century), to the contemporary period, distinctive patterns of globalization can be identified in respect of their different systemic and organizational features - uneven as they often are. These patterns constitute distinctive historical forms of globalization. By comparing and contrasting these changing historical forms, it is possible to identify more precisely what is novel about the present epoch.
- Accordingly, to advance an account of globalization it is necessary to turn from a general concern with its conceptualization to an examination of the key domains of activity and interaction in and through which global processes evolve.

Back to Top

3. People on the Move

- Human beings have been migrating, journeying and travelling for millennia, across great distances. It is only in this millennium that New Zealand and many Pacific Islands were finally reached by humans.
- For most of recorded history migrations have taken three main forms. Elite migrations from the core of empires to their periphery in acts of conquest and conversion followed by settlers; elite and mass migrations to imperial cores and cities from the hinterlands and the countryside in search of work; the

expansion and contraction of nomadic societies. Most of these have been regional in scope, though the early Islamic and later Mongol Empires had a global reach.

From the sixteenth century onwards the shape of global migration was transformed by the European conquest of the Americas and then Oceania as well as more tentative colonial expansion in Africa and Asia.

The first great wave of early modern migrations involved the forced movements of the transatlantic slave trade which shifted around 9-12 million people by the mid-nineteenth century. By comparison, the more regional Arabic slave trades and the early modern European emigration to the New World were minor.

- From the mid nineteenth century onwards, the slave trade was dwarfed in extent by an extraordinary outpouring of Europe's poor to the New World, overwhelmingly the USA. This was accompanied, beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, by a series of Asian migrations (predominantly of indentured labourers) to the USA, Canada and European colonies. Over 40 million people moved in this way in the quarter century before the First World War.
- During the First World War, international migration plummeted. Although the war triggered some forced migrations, of Armenians and Greeks from Turkey for example, international migrations within Europe almost ceased. North America closed its borders, creating the first set of systematic border controls and immigration legislation in the modern era.
- The bitter struggles and ethnic violence of the Second World war led to unprecedented levels of forced migrations, refugee and asylum movements. Ethnic Germans fled the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Jews headed for Israel, Pakistan and India exchanged millions and Koreans flooded south.
- Economic migration and the rebirth of Western European economies in the 1950s and 1960s drove a renewed epoch of global migration. Despite the oil shocks of the 1970s and the closure of many European immigration programmes, Western Europe's foreign population and ethnic mix have grown as family reunions, unpoliceable borders and sheer demand for labour have driven migration from the European peripheries (Turkey, North Africa) as well as the most distant outposts of old European empires (Southern Asia, East and West Africa etc.) to the continent.
- In the 1970s these waves of migration were accompanied by a take-off in legal and illegal migration to the USA and Australasia, enormous flows to the oil-rich and labour-scarce Middle East and new patterns of regional migration within Africa, Latin America, Oceania and East Asia. In the late 1990s, the USA in particular has been experiencing levels of migration that are comparable to the great transatlantic push of the late nineteenth century.
- Moreover, recent economic migration has been accompanied by an astronomical rise in asylum seeking, displaced persons and refugees from wars of state formation (and disintegration) in the developing world.
- For OECD states, the current era is characterised by high levels of global and regional migration, borders that are difficult to police, a range of migrations and travellers that are hard to control and in Europe, in particular, unprecedented levels of ethnic diversity. Over 10% of Swedes are foreign born for example.
- Attempts at international regulation of migratory flows have met with limited success. Many states find it very difficult to mobilise internal support for tracking illegal migrants and are in some cases highly dependent economically on their labour. Simultaneously, all states are having to reassess the meaning and practice of national citizenship in an era of increasing heterogeneity. Dual nationality is on the rise.

4. The Fate of National Cultures

- The globalization of culture has a long history. The formation and expansion of the great world religions are one of the best examples of the capacity of ideas and beliefs to cross great distances with decisive social impacts. No less important are the great pre-modern empires which, in the absence of direct military and political control, held their domains together through a shared and extensive ruling class culture.
- For most of human history these extensive ruling cultures passed through a fragmented mosaic of local cultures and particularisms - little stood between the court and the village. It was only with the emergence of nation-states and national cultures that a form of cultural identity coalesced between these two extremes.
- With the rise of nation-states and nationalist projects, the globalization of culture was truncated. Nation-states took control of educational practices, linguistic policies, postal and telephonic systems, etc. However, from the eighteenth century onwards as European empires began to entrench themselves and as a series of technological innovations came on stream (regularised mechanical transport and the telegraph most notably), new forms of cultural globalization emerged. These were accompanied by new private international institutions like publishing houses and news agencies, but their impact on more local and national cultures remained limited.
- The most important ideas and arguments to emerge out of the West in the era of its expansion were science, liberalism and socialism. Each of these modes of thought and the practices that came with them transformed the ruling cultures of almost every society on the planet. They have certainly had a more considerable impact on national and local cultures than contemporary popular cultures.
- In the period since the Second World War, however, the extensity, intensity, speed and sheer volume of cultural communication at a global level are unsurpassed. The global diffusion of radio, television, the Internet, satellite and digital technologies, and so on, has made instantaneous communication possible, rendered many border checks and controls over information ineffective, and exposed an enormous constituency to diverse cultural outputs and values. While linguistic differences continue to be a barrier to these processes, the global dominance of English provides a linguistic infrastructure that parallels the technological infrastructures of the era. In contrast to earlier periods in which states and theocracies have been central to cultural globalisation, the current era is one in which corporations are the central producers and distributors of cultural products.
- The vast majority of these cultural products originate within the USA and certain key Western societies. However, the evidence available in support of a crude thesis of 'cultural imperialism' is thin. National and local cultures remain robust, national institutions continue in many states to have a central impact on public life, foreign products are constantly read and reinterpreted in novel ways by national audiences.
- Those states which seek to pursue rigid closed-door policies on information and culture are certainly under threat from these new communication processes and technologies, and it is likely that the conduct of economic life everywhere will be transformed by them as well.
- Cultural flows are transforming the politics of national identity and the politics of identity more generally.

5. The Territorial State and Global Politics

- Conventional maps of the political world disclose a very particular conception of the geography of political power. With their clear-cut boundary lines and unambiguous colour patches, they demarcate territorial areas within which there is assumed to be an indivisible, illimitable and exclusive sovereign state with internationally recognized borders. At the beginning of the second millennium, this cartography would have appeared practically incomprehensible; even the most well-travelled civilisations would have been able to make little sense of the details of the known world today.
- Two fundamental transformations have affected the shape and form of modern politics. The first of these involved the development of territorially based political communities. The second has led to an era of emerging multilayered regional and global governance.
- The first transformation was marked by the growing centralization of political power within Europe, the sedimentation of political rule into state structures, the territorialization of politics, the spread of the interstate order, the development of forms of accountability within certain states and, at the same time, the denial of such accountability to others through colonial expansion, the creation of empires and war.
- The second transformation by no means replaced the first in all respects, although it was correlated with the final demise of empires. It has involved the spread of layers of governance both within and across political boundaries. It has been marked by the internationalization and transnationalization of politics, the deterritorialization of aspects of political decision-making, the development of regional and global organizations and institutions, the emergence of regional and global law and a multilayered system of global governance, formal and informal.
- This second transformation can be illustrated by a number of developments including the rapid emergence of international agencies and organizations. New forms of multilateral and global politics have been established involving governments, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and a wide variety of transnational pressure groups and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). In 1909 there were 37 IGOs and 176 INGOs, while in 1996 there were nearly 260 IGOs and nearly five and a half thousand INGOs. In addition, there has been an explosive development in the number of international treaties in force, as well as in the number of international regimes, such as the Nuclear Non -Proliferation regime.
- To this pattern of extensive political interconnectedness can be added the dense web of activity of the key international policy-making fora, including the UN, G7, IMF, WTO, EU, APEC, ARF and MERCOUSUR summits and many other official and unofficial meetings. In the middle of the nineteenth century there were two or three interstate conferences or congresses per annum; today the number totals over four thousand annually. National government is increasingly locked into an array of global, regional and multilayered systems of governance - and can barely monitor it all, let alone stay in command.
- The substantial growth of major global and regional institutions should be highlighted. In the context of state history the latter are remarkable political innovations. While the UN remains a creature of the interstate system, it has, despite all its limitations, developed an innovative system of global governance which delivers significant international public goods - from air traffic control and the management of telecommunications to the control of contagious diseases, humanitarian relief for refugees and some protection of the environmental commons.

- At the regional level the EU, in remarkably little time, has taken Europe from the disarray of the post Second World War era to a world in which sovereignty is pooled across a growing number of areas of common concern. Despite its contested nature, the EU represents a highly innovative form of governance which creates a framework of collaboration for addressing transborder issues. There has also been an acceleration in regional relations beyond Europe: in the Americas, Asia-Pacific and, to a lesser degree, in Africa. While the form taken by this type of regionalism is very different from the model of the EU, it has nonetheless had significant consequences for political power, particularly in the Asia-Pacific (ASEAN, APEC, ARF, PBEC, and many other groupings). Furthermore, there has been a growth in interregional diplomacy as old and new regional groupings seek to consolidate their relationships with each other. In this respect, regionalism has not been a barrier to changing forms of political globalization - involving the shifting reach of political power, authority and forms of rule-- but, on the contrary, has been compatible with it.
- There has, moreover, been an important change in the scope and content of international law. Twentieth century forms of international law - from the law governing war, to that concerning crimes against humanity, environmental issues and human rights - have created the basis of what can be thought of as an emerging framework of 'cosmopolitan law', law which circumscribes and delimits the political power of individual states. In principle, states are no longer able to treat their citizens as they think fit. Although, in practice, many states still violate these standards, nearly all now accept general duties of protection and provision, as well as of restraint, in their own practices and procedures.
- Global politics today is anchored not just in traditional geopolitical concerns, but also in a large diversity of economic, social and ecological questions. Pollution, drugs, terrorism, human rights are amongst an increasing number of transnational policy issues which cut across territorial jurisdictions and existing political alignments. These require, and will continue to require, international cooperation for their effective resolution.

6. The Globalization of Organized Violence

- War, military force and organized violence have been central to the globalization of human affairs for much of history, especially in the modern epoch and more recently in the Cold War era.
- By comparison with previous epochs, contemporary military globalization is remarkably extensive and intensive (measured , for instance, in terms of military diplomatic links, arms sales and global military production) for an era distinguished by the absence of empires, great power conflict and interstate war.
- Since the end of the Cold War there has been a continuing institutionalisation and (albeit uneven) regionalization of military and security affairs to the extent that a majority of states are now enmeshed in multilateral arrangements or multilateral fora for military or security matters, and neutrality no longer appears a credible defence posture.
- In comparison with previous epochs, there has been over the course of the last fifty years a rapid world-wide proliferation of unprecedented military capability and the capacity to project military power across increasing distances, including the capacity to produce and utilise weapons of mass destruction, which is both transforming the pattern of stratification in the world military order and creating new global and regional risks which require multilateral action.

- Even though the end of the Cold War has undermined the logic of the global arms dynamic, the Cold War itself ensured the accelerated diffusion of military-technological innovation across the world's major regions such that, for instance, whereas it took two centuries for the gunpowder revolution to reach Europe from China in the middle ages, it took less than five decades for India to acquire its existing nuclear capability.
- In comparison with earlier periods there has been a significant shift in the organization of defence production in the direction of more extensive and intensive transnationalization through licensing, co-production agreements, joint ventures, corporate alliances, sub-contracting, etc. Few countries today, including the US, can claim to have an autonomous military production capacity.
- The same infrastructures which facilitate global flows of goods, people and capital have generated new potential security threats for states, in the form of cyber-war, international terrorism, eco-terrorism and transnational organized crime, which are no longer primarily external or military in character and which require a combination of multilateral and domestic policy responses.
- Despite the ending of the Cold War, global arms sales (in real terms) have remained above the level of the 1960s and since the mid 1990s have continued to increase, whilst the number of countries manufacturing arms (40) or purchasing arms (100) is probably greater than at any time since the 1930s, an era of regional and global crises.
- In the post Cold War period all major arms producers have become increasingly reliant upon export markets; the imperatives driving defence industrial restructuring have intensified to the extent that regional and transregional production arrangements are being strengthened. Few states can realistically continue to aspire, as in previous periods, to an autonomous defence industrial base. This is especially so as key civil technologies, such as electronics, which are vital to advanced weapons system production, are themselves the products of highly globalized industries.

7. The Global Economy

Trade

- International trade has grown to unprecedented levels, both absolutely and relatively in relation to national income. In comparison with the late nineteenth century - an era of rapid trade growth - export levels today (measured as a share of GDP) are much greater for OECD states. As barriers to trade have fallen across the world, global markets have emerged for many goods and, increasingly, services.
- During the post-war period an extensive network of trade emerged in which most countries became locked into a multiplicity of trade relationships. Although there are major trading blocs in Europe, North America and Asia-Pacific, these are not regional fortresses; on the contrary, they remain open to competition from the rest of the world. Through the 1980s and 1990s, developing and transition economies have become significantly open to trade. Their shares of world trade, particularly of manufactures, have risen correspondingly.
- The growing extensity and intensity of trade has led to the increasing enmeshment of national economies with each other. A new global division of labour in the production of goods is emerging. The stages of the production process are being sliced up and located in different countries, especially in developing and emerging economies. Thus not only do countries increasingly consume goods from abroad, but their own production processes are significantly dependent on components produced overseas. The impact of this

is that economic activity in any one country is strongly affected (through trade networks) by economic activity in other countries.

- Intra-industry trade, particularly amongst OECD economies, now forms the majority of trade in manufactures. This has intensified competition across national boundaries. Trade competition has also intensified because a greater proportion of domestic output is traded than in the past. Trade activity is now deeply enmeshed with domestic economic activity. This does not mean, however, that countries' fortunes are simply determined by their 'competitiveness': countries still specialize according to comparative advantage and cannot be competitive in everything or nothing. National economies can gain overall from increased trade. Nevertheless, the distribution of gains from trade are uneven. Increased trade with developing countries, for example, adversely affects low skilled workers in developed countries whilst increasing the incomes of higher skilled workers. There are clear winners and losers from trade.
- Social protection and the welfare state play an important role in ameliorating the impact of structural change arising from trade. However, increased demands on and costs of the welfare state tend to be resisted by employers in the tradable industries vulnerable to global competition.
- Although markets may be global, regulation remains largely national. Differences in regulation are causing international friction, as the EU versus USA banana dispute illustrates, whilst the World Trade Organization (a powerful advocate of de-regulation and trade liberalization) is in its infancy in harmonizing national regulatory regimes. Further, if market failures and externalities exist, they may be expected in global markets. However, we largely lack international systems of regulation to correct for these failures.

Finance

- World financial flows have grown exponentially since the 1970s. Daily turnover on the foreign exchange markets exceeds $1.5 trillion and billions of dollars of financial assets are traded globally, particularly through derivative products. Most countries today are incorporated into global financial markets, but the nature of their access to these markets is highly uneven.
- International banking, bond issues and equities trading have risen from negligible levels to historically significant levels measured in relation to world or national output respectively. The level of cross-border transactions is unprecedented. Transactions are almost instantaneous with 24 hour global financial markets. Where once international financial markets operated to finance trade and long term investment, much of this activity is now speculative. The annual turnover of foreign exchange markets stands at a staggering 60 times the value of world trade.
- Levels of speculative activity can induce rapid and volatile movements in asset prices which increase risks to financial institutions, as the 1998 crisis at the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund showed. Countries' long term interest rates and exchange rates are determined within global financial markets. This does not mean that financial markets simply set the terms of national economic policy, although they can radically alter the costs of particular policy options. Perhaps the key difficulty for policy makers is the uncertainty surrounding, and the volatility of, market responses. This tends to induce a distinctly risk averse approach to economic policy and thus a more conservative macro-economic strategy.

- Financial flows to developing countries rose in the early 1990s, although they have fallen back since. This period saw heavy flows to East Asia, which later proved disruptive to these economies since they were often channelled into speculative activity. The outflows since the 1997 crisis have turned these economies from 'show cases' to 'problem cases', with their currencies falling heavily in excess of any real economic imbalances. The crisis highlighted the shifting balance between public and private power in global financial markets, as well as the limitations of the existing global financial regime (the IMF, BIS, etc.) in preventing global financial turmoil. It also demonstrated how enmeshed national fortunes have become as the collapse of the Thai baht triggered global financial disruption and highlighted the vulnerability of OECD economies to developments on the periphery.
- The 1990s exchange rate crises suggest that fixed exchange rates are ceasing to be a viable policy option, with countries facing a choice increasingly between floating rates and monetary union (notably EMU and discussion of dollarization in Latin America).

Production

- In 1997 there were 53,000 MNCs world-wide with 450,000 foreign subsidiaries selling $9.5 trillion of goods and services across the globe. Today transnational production exceeds the level of global exports and has become the primary means for selling goods and services abroad.
- Multinational corporations have grown relative to the world economy and now account, according to some estimates, for at least 20 per cent of world production and 70 per cent of world trade. Further, they are developing relationships increasingly with smaller national firms, linking these into transnational production chains. MNCs are central to global trade, with between a quarter and a third of world trade estimated to be intra-firm trade between branches of MNCs. They are fundamental to the generation and international transfer of technology.
- Although MNC activity is concentrated in developed countries and a small number of developing ones, it is extensive since almost all countries have some inward foreign direct investment. Restrictions on MNC activity have been substantially reduced in the 1980s and 1990s. FDI flows to (and from) developing countries have taken an increasing share of the global total. MNCs' investment and production in Central and East European transition economies and China are growing rapidly. Although MNCs typically only account for a minority of national production, this tends to understate their strategic importance. For they are often concentrated in the most technologically advanced economic sectors and in export industries. Especially in developing countries, even where independent firms produce for export, MNCs often control global distribution networks.
- MNCs have both created, and are subject to, global competition in a range of industries. They have developed transnational networks of production to take advantage of differences in national cost conditions. Production has to take place somewhere and the costs of shifting production internationally vary between industries and firms. Nevertheless, the exit power of MNCs has increased over time, although they are by no means 'footloose'.
- Transnational production can have an important impact on national prosperity. Not only do MNCs play a key role in diffusing technical knowledge, they are finding their home base increasingly insufficient to generate competitive advantage. As a result, there has been a significant growth in transnational corporate alliances and investment in foreign innovation clusters. There has also been a phenomenal expansion in transnational mergers and acquisitions, e.g., Chrysler-Daimler. In the past technological

advantages might be largely realised in their country of origin and shared amongst various national stakeholders. Transnational production restricts such sharing and can undermine national social bargains. It also limits the options for effective national industrial strategies (such as national champions) and generates significant pressure for the transnational harmonization of corporate practices, tax and business regimes.

- MNCs' increased power relative to national governments is reflected in the widespread provision of subsidies to inward investment. MNCs (and associated transnational production networks) are now critical to the location, organization and distribution of productive power in the world economy.

8. Globalization and the Environment

- The globalization of environmental affairs takes a number of forms, including: the encounters between previously separated ecological systems from different parts of the planet; the pollution and degradation of the global commons (such as the oceans and the atmosphere); the overspill of the effects of environmental degradation from one state to another (environmental refugees); transboundary pollution and risks (nuclear power, acid rain); the transportation and diffusion of wastes and polluting products across the globe (toxic waste trade, global relocation of dirty industries); and, finally, the formation of global institutions, regimes, networks and treaties that seek to regulate all these forms of environmental degradation.
- For most of human history, the main way in which environmental impacts circulated around the earth was via the unintentional transport of flora, fauna and microbes, of which the great plagues are the sharpest example.
- The globalization of environmental affairs took a distinct leap with the European colonisation of the New World and the unequal exchange of flora, fauna and microbes across the Atlantic. Within a generation a substantial majority of the indigenous populations of the Caribbean, Mexico and other parts of Latin America had been wiped out. Over the following centuries, the ecosystems, landscapes and agricultural systems of these societies were transformed by European agriculture, flora and fauna.
- The early history of colonialism also threw up new forms of environmental degradation driven by consumer demand in Europe and America. This led to the intensive exploitation of Sumatran and Indian forests, the extinction of some species of whale, the over-hunting of seals.
- However, until the mid twentieth century, most forms of environmental degradation - at least the degradation that could be perceived - were overwhelmingly local.
- In the post Second World War era, the globalization of environmental degradation has been massively accelerated by a number of factors: fifty years of extraordinary resource-intensive, high-pollution growth in the OECD; the industrialisation of Russia, Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet states; the breakneck industrialisation of many parts of the South; and a massive rise in global population. In addition, we are now able to perceive risk and environmental change with much greater depth and accuracy.
- Humankind faces an unprecedented array of truly global and regional environmental problems, the reach of which is greater than any single national community (or generation) and the solutions to which cannot be tackled at the level of the nation-state alone; these include, most obviously, global warming, ozone depletion; destruction of global rainforests and loss of biodiversity; oceanic and riverine pollution; global level nuclear threats and risks.

- Over the twentieth century these transformations have been paralleled by the unprecedented growth of global and regional environmental movements, regimes and international treaties. However, none of these institutions has as yet been able to amass sufficient political power, domestic support or international authority to do more than limit the worst excesses of some of these global environmental threats.

9. Conclusion

- Contemporary patterns of globalization mark a new epoch in human affairs. Just as the industrial revolution and the expansion of the West in the nineteenth century defined a new age in world history so today the microchip and the satellite are icons of a new historical conjuncture.
- By comparison with previous periods, globalization today combines a remarkable confluence of dense patterns of global interconnectedness, alongside their unprecedented institutionalisation through new global and regional infrastructures of control and communication, from the WTO to APEC. Driven by interrelated political, economic and technological changes, globalization is transforming societies and world order.
- Contemporary patterns of globalization are associated with a multilayered system of governance, the diffusion of political power, a widening gap between the richest and poorest countries, and the further segmentation of societies into 'winners' and 'losers'. As a consequence, globalization has become increasingly politicised and contested. Competing national and transnational social forces struggle, within and outside prevailing structures of global and regional governance, to resist, promote, manage or direct its impulses. This is evident in, amongst other things, the contemporary debates about reforming global finance, ensuring universal human rights and regulating the trade in genetically modified crops and organisms.
- Sandwiched between global forces and local demands, national governments are having to reconsider their roles and functions. It is frequently alleged that the intensification of regional and global political relations has diminished the powers of national states. It is also sometimes asserted that the national state is as robust and integrated as it ever was. However, while regional and global interconnectedness are transforming state power and the nature of political community, any account of this as a simple loss or the diminution of national powers distorts what is happening - as does any suggestion that nothing much has changed. While on many fundamental measures of state power (from the capacity to raise taxes and revenues to the ability to hurl concentrated force at enemies) states are, at least throughout most of the OECD world, as powerful if not more powerful than their predecessors, it is also the case that the demands upon them have grown rapidly as well.
- Increasingly, the nurturing and enhancement of the public good requires co-ordinated multilateral action (e.g. to prevent global recession). At the same time, the resolution of transboundary issues (e.g. responsibility for acid rain) may often impose significant domestic adjustments. In this respect, politicians are witnessing a reconfiguration of state power and political authority. This is articulated most visibly in the shift from government to multilevel governance as states have become embedded within global and regional regimes. In essence, in a more complex transnational world, states deploy their sovereignty and autonomy as bargaining chips in negotiations involving coordination and collaboration across shifting transnational and international networks.

- The power, authority and operations of national government are, accordingly, altering, but not all in one direction. The entitlement of states to rule within circumscribed territories - their sovereignty - is not on the edge of collapse, although the practical nature of this entitlement - the actual capacity of states to rule - is changing its shape. A new regime of government and governance is emerging which is displacing traditional conceptions of state power as an indivisible, territorially exclusive form of public power. Far from globalization leading to 'the end of the state', it is stimulating a range of government and governance strategies and, in some fundamental respects, a more activist state. In this context, it makes more sense to speak about the transformation of state power.
- These developments pose very significant questions for democracy since the expanding scale on which political and economic power is exercised frequently escapes effective mechanisms of democratic control. Democracy remains rooted in a fixed and bounded territorial conception of political community. Yet globalization disrupts this neat correspondence between national territory, sovereignty, political space and the democratic political community; it enables power to flow across, around and over territorial boundaries. Globalization therefore generates new political tasks:
  Intellectual - recasting established notions of social justice, equality, and liberty into a coherent political project which is robust enough to confront a world in which power is exercised on a transnational scale. This involves reconstructing the principles which underpin the democratic political community and citizenship for an epoch marked by transboundary politics and overlapping communities of fate.
  Institutional - combining the institutions and practices of democracy with the effective governance of globalization within regional and global (public and private) authorities.
- Globalization is not, as some suggest, narrowing or foreclosing political options and discussion; on the contrary, it is reilluminating and reinvigorating the contemporary political terrain.

Back to Top

× مع اكتشاف امريكا للاسبان والبرتغال استكشف من اوروبا امريكا الفلاميزيات ومستعمرات الانكليز والهولنديا
والنظام تكون من صيغة تلك البلاد مثلاً امريكا اللاتينيا اصبحت ناطقة كلها في الاسبانية ، هذه لكن لم يكن موجود
عندهم العبيد ولذا لا كان هناك مقاومة في احتلالهم.

Global Transformations – Introduction

by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton

Globalization is an idea whose time has come. From obscure origins in French and American writings in the 1960s, the concept of globalization finds expression today in all the world's major languages (cf. Modelski, 1972). Yet, it lacks precise definition. Indeed, globalization is in danger of becoming, if it has not already become, the cliché of our times: the big idea which encompasses everything from global financial markets to the Internet but which delivers little substantive insight into the contemporary human condition.

Clichés, nevertheless, often capture elements of the lived experience of an epoch. In this respect, globalization reflects a widespread perception that the world is rapidly being moulded into a shared social space by economic and technological forces and that developments in one region of the world can have profound consequences for the life chances of individuals or communities on the other side of the globe. For many, globalization is also associated with a sense of political fatalism and chronic insecurity in that the sheer scale of contemporary social and economic change appears to outstrip the capacity of national governments or citizens to control, contest or resist that change. The limits to national politics, in other words, are forcefully suggested by globalization.

Although the popular rhetoric of globalization may capture aspects of the contemporary zeitgeist, there is a burgeoning academic debate as to whether globalization, as an analytical construct, delivers any added value in the search for a coherent understanding of the historical forces which, at the dawn of the new millennium, are shaping the socio-political realities of everyday life. Despite a vast and expanding literature there is, somewhat surprisingly, no cogent theory of globalization nor even a systematic analysis of its primary features. Moreover, few studies of globalization proffer a coherent historical narrative which distinguishes between those events that are transitory or immediate and those developments that signal the emergence of a new conjuncture; that is, a transformation of the nature, form and prospects of human communities. In acknowledging the deficiencies of existing approaches, this volume seeks to develop a distinctive account of globalization which is both historically grounded and informed by a rigorous analytical framework. The framework is explicated in this introduction, while subsequent chapters use it to tell the story of globalization and to assess its implications for the governance and politics of nation-states today. In this respect, the introduction provides the intellectual foundation for addressing the central questions which animate the entire study:

- What is globalization? How should it be conceptualized?
- Does contemporary globalization represent a novel condition?

- Is globalization associated with the demise, the resurgence or the transformation of state power?
- Does contemporary globalization impose new limits to politics? How can globalization be 'civilized' and democratized?

As will soon become apparent, these questions are at the root of the many controversies and debates which find expression in contemporary discussions about globalization and its consequences. The subsequent pages offer a way of thinking about how these questions might be addressed.

The Globalization Debate

Globalization may be thought of initially as the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide ...connectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the ...iritu... That computer programmers in India now deliver services in real time to their employers in Europe ... while the cultivation of poppies in Burma can be linked to drug abuse in Berlin or Belfast, ...he w...s in which contemporary globalization connects communities in one region of the world to ...ther continent. But beyond a general acknowledgement of a real or perceived intensification ...necte...ness there is substantial disagreement as to how globalization is best conceptualized, ...about its causal dynamics, and how one should characterize its structural consequences, if ...e on these issues has developed in which it is possible to distinguish three broad schools of ...will refer to as the *hyperglobalizers, the sceptics* and the *transformationalists*. In essence ...ools may be said to represent a distinctive account of globalization - an attempt to

understand and explain this social phenomenon.

For the hyperglobalizers, such as Ohmae, contemporary globalization defines a new era in which peoples everywhere are increasingly subject to the disciplines of the global marketplace (1990; 1995). By contrast the sceptics; such as Hirst and Thompson, argue that globalization is essentially a myth which conceals the reality of an international economy increasingly segmented into three major regional blocs in which national governments remain very powerful (1996a; 1996b). Finally, for the transformationalists, chief among them being Rosenau and Giddens contemporary patterns of globalization are conceived as historically unprecedented such that states and societies across the globe are experiencing a process of profound change as they try to adapt to a more interconnected but highly uncertain world (Giddens, 1990, 1996; Rosenau, 1997).

Interestingly, none of these three schools map directly on to traditional ideological positions or worldviews. Within the globalist's camp orthodox neoliberal accounts of globalization can be found alongside Marxist accounts, while among the sceptics conservative as well as radical accounts share similar conceptions of, and conclusions about, the nature of contemporary globalization. Moreover, none of the great traditions of social enquiry - liberal, conservative and Marxist - has an agreed perspective on globalization as a socio-economic phenomenon. Among Marxists globalization is understood in quite incompatible ways as for instance, the extension of monopoly capitalist imperialism or, alternatively, as a radically new form of globalized capitalism

(Callinicos et al., 1994; Gill, 1995; Amin, 1997). Similarly, despite their broadly orthodox neoliberal starting points, Ohmae and Redwood produce very different accounts of, and conclusions about, the dynamics of contemporary globalization (Ohmae, 1995; Redwood, 1993). Among the hyperglobalizers, sceptics and transformationalists there is a rich diversity of intellectual approaches and normative convictions. Yet, despite this diversity, each of the perspectives reflects a general set of arguments and conclusions about globalization with respect to its

- conceptualization
- causal dynamics
- socio-economic consequences
- implications for state power and governance
- and historical trajectory.

It is useful to dwell on the pattern of argument within and between approaches since this will shed light on the fundamental issues at stake in the globalization debate.[1]

The hyperglobalist thesis

For the hyperglobalizers, globalization defines a new epoch of human history in which 'traditional nation-states have become unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy' (Ohmae, 1995, p. 5; cf. Wriston, 1992; Guéhenno, 1995). Such a view of globalization generally privileges an economic logic and, in its neoliberal variant, celebrates the emergence f a single global market and the principle of global competition as the harbingers of human progress. Hyperglobalizers argue that economic globalization is bringing about a 'denationalization' of economies through the establishment of transnational networks of production, trade and finance. In this 'borderless' economy, national governments are relegated to little more than transmission belts for global capital or, ultimately, simple intermediate institutions sandwiched between increasingly powerful local, regional and global mechanisms of governance. As Strange puts it, 'the impersonal forces of world markets ... are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong ... the declining authority of states is reflected in a growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations, and to local and regional bodies' (1996, p. 4; cf. Reich, 1991). In this respect, many hyperglobalizers share a conviction that economic globalization is constructing new forms of social organization that are supplanting, or that will eventually supplant, traditional nation-states as the primary economic and political units of world society.

Within this framework there is considerable normative divergence between, on the one hand, the neoliberals who welcome the triumph of individual autonomy and the market principle over state power, and the radicals or neo-Marxists for whom

[1] The approaches set out below present General summaries of different ways of thinking about globalization: they do not represent fu particular positions and many differences among the individual theorists mentioned. The aim of the presentation is to highlight the trends and faultlines in the current debate and literature.

contemporary globalization represents the triumph of an oppressive global capitalism (cf. Ohmae, 1995; Greider, 1997). But despite divergent ideological conviction there exists a shared set of beliefs that globalization is primarily an economic phenomenon; that an increasingly integrated global economy exists today; that the needs of global capital impose a neoliberal economic discipline on all governments such that politics is no longer the 'art of the possible' but rather the practice of 'sound economic management'.

Furthermore, the hyperglobalizers claim that economic globalization is generating a new pattern of winners as well as losers in the global economy. The old North-South division is argued to be an increasing anachronism as a new global division of labour replaces the traditional core-periphery structure with a more complex architecture of economic power. Against this background, governments have to 'manage' the social consequences of globalization, or those who 'having been left behind, want not so much a chance to move forward as to hold others back' (Ohmae, 1995, p. 64). However, they also have to manage increasingly in a context in which the constraints of global financial and competitive disciplines make social democratic models of social protection untenable and spell the demise of associated welfare state policies (J. Gray, 1998).

Globalization may be linked with a growing polarization between winners and losers in the global economy. But this need not be so, for, at least in the neoliberal view, global economic competition does not necessarily produce zero-sum outcomes. While particular groups within a country may be made worse off as a result of global competition, nearly all countries have a comparative advantage in producing certain goods which can be exploited in the long run. Neo-Marxists and radicals regard such an „optimistic view" as unjustified, believing that global capitalism creates and reinforces structural patterns of inequality within and between countries. But they agree at least with their neoliberal counterparts that traditional welfare options for social protection are looking increasingly threadbare and difficult to sustain.

Among the elites and 'knowledge workers' of the new global economy tacit transnational 'class' allegiances have evolved, cemented by an ideological attachment to a neoliberal economic orthodoxy. For those who are currently marginalized, the worldwide diffusion of a consumerist ideology also imposes a new sense of identity, displacing traditional cultures and ways of life. The global spread of liberal democracy further reinforces the sense of an emerging global civilization defined by universal standards of economic and political organization. This 'global civilization' is also replete with its own mechanisms of global governance, whether it be the IMF or the disciplines of the world market, such that states and peoples are increasingly the subjects of new public and private global or regional authorities (Gill, 1995; Ohmae, 1995; Strange, 1996; Cox, 1997). Accordingly, for many neoliberals, globalization is considered as the harbinger of the first truly global civilization, while for many radicals it represents the first global 'market civilization' (Perlmutter, 1991; Gill, 1995; Greider, 1997).

In this hyperglobalist account the rise of the global economy, the emergence of institutions of global governance, and the global diffusion and hybridization of cultures are interpreted as evidence of a radically, new world order, an order which prefigures the demise of the nation-state.(Luard, 1990; Ohmae, 1995; Albrow, 1996). Since the national economy is increasingly a site of transnational and global flows, as opposed to the primary container of national socio-economic activity, the authority and legitimacy of the nation-state are challenged: national governments become increasingly unable either to control what transpires within their own borders or to fulfil by themselves the

demands of their own citizens. Moreover, as institutions of global and regional governance acquire a bigger role, the sovereignty and autonomy of the state are further eroded. On the other hand, the conditions facilitating transnational cooperation between peoples, given global infrastructures of communication and increasing awareness of many common interests, have never been so propitious. In this regard, there is evidence of an emerging 'global civil society'.

Economic power and political power, in this hyperglobalist view, are becoming effectively denationalized and diffused such that nation-states, whatever the claims of national politicians, are increasingly becoming 'a transitional mode of organization for managing economic affairs' (Ohmae, 1995, p. 149). Whether issuing from a liberal or radical/socialist perspective, the hyperglobalist thesis represents globalization as embodying nothing less than the fundamental reconfiguration of the 'framework of human action' (Albrow, 1996, p. 85).

The sceptical thesis

By comparison the sceptics, drawing on statistical evidence of world flows of trade, investment and labour from the nineteenth century, maintain that contemporary levels of economic interdependence are by no means historically unprecedented. Rather than globalization, which to the sceptics necessarily implies a perfectly

integrated worldwide economy in which the 'law of one price' prevails, the historical evidence at best confirms only heightened levels of internationalization, that is, interactions between predominantly national economies (Hirst and Thompson, 1996b). In arguing that globalization is a myth, the sceptics rely on a wholly economistic conception of globalization, equating it primarily with a perfectly integrated global market. By contending that levels of economic integration fall short of this 'ideal type' and that such integration as there is remains much less significant than in the late nineteenth century (the era of the classical Gold Standard), the sceptics are free to conclude that the extent of contemporary 'globalization' is wholly exaggerated (Hirst, 1997). In this respect, the sceptics consider the hyperglobalist thesis as fundamentally flawed and also politically naive since it underestimates the enduring power of national governments to regulate international economic activity. Rather than being out of control, the forces of internationalization themselves depend on the regulatory power of national governments to ensure continuing economic liberalization.

For most sceptics, if the current evidence demonstrates anything it is that economic activity is undergoing a significant 'regionalization' as the world economy evolves in the direction of three major financial and trading blocs, that is, Europe, Asia-Pacific and North America (Ruigrok and Tulder, 1995; Boyer and Drache, 1996; Hirst and Thompson, 1996b). In comparison with the classical Gold Standard era, the world economy is therefore significantly less integrated than it once was (Boyer and Drache, 1996; Hirst and Thompson, 1996a). Among the sceptics, globalization and regionalization are conceived as contradictory tendencies. As both Gordon and Weiss conclude, in comparison with the age of world empires, the international economy has become considerably less global in its geographical embrace (Gordon, 1988; Weiss, 1998).

Sceptics tend also to discount the presumption that internationalization prefigures the emergence of a new, less state-centric world order. Far from considering national

governments as becoming immobilized by international imperatives, they point to their growing centrality in the regulation and active promotion of cross-border economic activity. Governments are not the passive victims of internationalization but, on the contrary, its primary architects. Indeed, Gilpin considers internationalization largely a by-product of the US-initiated multilateral economic order, which, in the aftermath of the Second World War, created the impetus for the liberalization of national econ. omies (Gilpin, 1987). From a very different perspective, Callinicos and others explain the recent intensification of worldwide trade and foreign investment as a new phase of Western imperialism in which national governments, as the agents of monopoly capital, are deeply implicated (Callinicos et al., 1994).

However, despite such differences of emphasis, there is a convergence of opinion within the sceptical camp that, whatever its exact driving forces, internationalization has not been accompanied by an erosion of North-South inequalities but, on the contrary, by the growing economic marginalization of many 'Third World States' as trade and investment flows within the rich North intensify to the exclusion of much of the rest of the globe. (Hirst and Thompson, 1996b). Moreover, Krugman questions the popular belief that a new international division of labour is emerging in which deindustrialization in the North can be traced to the operation of multinational corporations exporting jobs to the South (Krugman, 1996). Similarly Ruigrok and Tulder, and Thompson and Allen seek to demolish the 'myth' of the 'global corporation', highlighting the fact that foreign investment flows are concentrated among the advanced capitalist states and that most multinationals remain primarily creatures of their home states or regions (Ruigrok and Tulder, 1995; Thompson and Allen, 1997).

Accordingly, the sceptical thesis is generally dismissive of the notion that internationalization is bringing about a profound or even significant restructuring of global economic relations. In this respect, the sceptical position is an acknowledgement of the deeply rooted patterns of inequality and hierarchy in the world economy, which in structural terms have changed only marginally over the last century.

Such inequality, in the view of many sceptics, contributes to the advance of both fundamentalism and aggressive nationalism such that rather than the emergence of a global civilization, as the hyperglobalizers predict, the world is fragmenting into civilizational blocs and cultural and ethnic enclaves (Huntington, 1996). The notion of cultural homogenization and a global culture are thus further myths which fall victim to the sceptical argument. In addition, the deepening of global inequalities, the realpolitik of international relations and the 'clash of civilizations' expose the illusory nature of ,global governance' in so far as the management of world order remains, as it has since the last century, overwhelmingly the preserve of Western states. In this respect, the sceptical argument tends to conceive of global governance and economic internationalization as primarily Western projects, the main object of which is to sustain the primacy of the West in world affairs. As E. H. Carr once observed: 'international order and "international solidarity" will always be slogans of those who feel strong enough to impose them on others' (1981, p. 87).

In general the sceptics take issue with all of the primary claims of the hyperglobalizers pointing to the comparatively greater levels of economic interdependence and the more extensive geographical reach of the

world economy at the beginning of the twentieth century. They reject the popular 'myth' that the power of national governments or state sovereignty is being undermined today by economic internationalization or global

governance (Krasner, 1993; 1995). Some argue that 'globalization' more often than not reflects a politically convenient rationale for implementing unpopular orthodox neoliberal economic strategies. (Hirst, 1997). Weiss, Scharpf and Armingeon, among others, argue that the available evidence contradicts the popular belief that there has been a convergence of macroeconomic and welfare policies across the globe (Weiss, 1998; Scharpf, 1991; Armingeon, 1997). While international economic conditions may constrain what governments can do, governments are by no means immobilized. The internationalization of capital may, as Weiss argues, 'not merely restrict policy choices, but expand them as well' (1998, pp. 184ff.). Rather than the world becoming more interdependent, as the hyperglobalizers assume, the sceptics seek to expose the myths which sustain the globalization thesis.

The transformationalist thesis

At the heart of the transformationalists thesis is a conviction that, at the dawn of a new millennium, globalization is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order (Giddens, 1990; Scholte, 1993; Castells, 1996). According to the proponents of this view, contemporary processes of globalization are historically unprecedented such that governments and societies across the globe are having to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction between international and domestic, external and internal affairs (Rosenau, 1990; Cammilleri and Falk, 1992, Ruggie, 1993; Linklater and MacMillan, 1995; Sassen, 1996). For Rosenau, the growth of 'intermestic' affairs define a 'new frontier', the expanding political, economic and social space in which the fate of societies and communities is decided (1997, pp. 4-5). In this respect, globalization is conceived as a powerful transformative force which is responsible for a 'massive shake-out' of societies, economies, institutions of governance and world order (Giddens, 1996).

In the transformationalist account, however, the direction of this 'shake-out' remains uncertain, since globalization is conceived as an essentially contingent historical process- replete with contradictions (Mann, 1997). At issue is a dynamic and open-ended conception of where globalization might be leading and the kind of world order which it might prefigure. In comparison with the sceptical and hyperglobalist accounts, the transformationalists make no claims about the future trajectory of globalization; nor do they seek to evaluate the present in relation to some single, fixed ideal-type 'globalized world', whether a global market or a global civilization. Rather, transformationalist accounts emphasize globalization as a long-term historical process which is inscribed with contradictions and which is significantly shaped by conjunctural factors.

Such caution about the exact future of globalization is matched, nonetheless, by the conviction that contemporary patterns of global economic, military, technological, ecological, migratory, political and cultural flows are historically unprecedented. As Nierop puts it, 'virtually all countries in the world, if not all parts of their territory and all segments of their society, are now functionally part of that larger [global] system in one or more respects' (1994, p. 171). But the existence of a single global system is not taken as evidence of global convergence or of the arrival of single world society. On the contrary, for the transformationalists, globalization is associated with new patterns

of global stratification in which some states, societies and communities are becoming increasingly enmeshed in the global order while others are becoming increasingly marginalized. A new configuration of global power relations is held to be crystallizing as the North-South division rapidly gives way to a new international division of labour such that the 'familiar pyramid of the core-periphery hierarchy is no longer a geographic but a social division of the world economy' (Hoogvelt, 1997, p. xii). To talk of North and South, of First World and Third World, is to overlook the ways in which globalization has recast traditional patterns of inclusion and exclusion between countries by forging new hierarchies which cut across and penetrate all societies and regions of the world. North and South, First World and Third World, are no longer 'out there' but nestled together within all the world's major cities. Rather than the traditional pyramid analogy of the world social structure, with a tiny top echelon and spreading mass base, the global social structure can be envisaged as a three-tier Arrangement of concentric circles, each cutting across national boundaries, representing respectively the elites, the contented and the marginalized (Hoogvelt, 1997.). The recasting of patterns of global stratification is linked with the growing deterritorialization of economic activity as production and finance increasingly acquire a global and transnational dimension. From somewhat different starting points, Castells and Ruggie, among others, argue that national

economies are being reorganized by processes of economic globalization such that national economic space no longer coincides with national territorial borders (Castells, 1996; Ruggie, 1996). In this globalizing economy, systems of transnational production, exchange and finance weave together ever more tightly the fortunes of communities and households on different continents.

At the core of the transformationalist case is a belief that contemporary globalization is reconstituting or 're-engineering' the power, functions and authority of national governments. While not disputing that states still retain the ultimate legal claim to 'effective supremacy over what occurs within their own territories', the transformationalists argue that this is juxtaposed, to varying degrees, with the expanding jurisdiction of institutions of international governance and the constraints of, as well as the obligations derived from, international law. This is especially evident in the EU, where sovereign power is divided between international, national and local authorities, but it is also evident in the operation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Goodman, 1997). However, even where sovereignty still appears intact, states no longer, if they ever did, retain sole command of what transpires within their own territorial boundaries. Complex global systems, from the financial to the ecological, connect the fate of communities in one locale to the fate of communities in distant regions of the world. Furthermore, global infrastructures of communication and Transport support new forms of economic and social organization which transcend national boundaries without any consequent diminution of efficiency or control. Sites of power and the subjects of power may be literally, as well as metaphorically, oceans apart. In these circumstances, the notion of the nation-state as a self-governing, autonomous unit appears to be more a normative claim than a descriptive statement. The modern institution of territorially circumscribed sovereign rule appears somewhat anomalous juxtaposed with the transnational organization of many aspects of contemporary economic and social life (Sandel, 1996). Globalization, in this account, is therefore associated with a transformation or, to use Ruggie's term, an 'unbundling' of the relationship between sovereignty, territoriality and state power (Ruggie, 1993; Sassen, 1996).

Of course, few states have ever exercised complete or absolute sovereignty within their own territorial boundaries, as the practice of diplomatic immunity highlights (Sassen, 1996). Indeed the practice, as opposed to the doctrine, of sovereign statehood has always readily adapted to changing historical realities (Murphy, 1996). In arguing that globalization is transforming or reconstituting the power and authority of national governments, the transformationalists reject both the hyperglobalist rhetoric of the end of the sovereign nation-state and the sceptics' claim that 'nothing much has changed.' Instead, they assert that a new 'sovereignty regime' is displacing traditional conceptions of statehood as an absolute, indivisible, territorially exclusive and zero-sum form of , public power (Held, 1991). Accordingly, sovereignty today is, they suggest, best understood 'less as a territorially defined barrier than a bargaining resource for a politics characterized by complex transnational networks' (Keohane, 1995).

This is not to argue that territorial boundaries retain no political, military or symbolic significance but rather to acknowledge that, conceived as the primary spatial markers of modern life, they have become increasingly problematic in an era of intensified globalization. Sovereignty, state power and territoriality thus stand today in a more complex relationship than in the epoch during which the modern nation-state was being forged. Indeed, the argument of the transformationalists is that globalization is associated not only with a new 'sovereignty regime' but also with the emergence of powerful new non-territorial forms of economic and political organization in the global domain, such as multinational corporations, transnational social movements, international regulatory agencies, etc. In this sense, world order can no longer be conceived as purely state-centric or even primarily state governed, as authority has become increasingly diffused among public and private agencies at the local, national, regional and global levels. Nation-states are no longer the sole centres or the principal forms of governance or authority in the world (Rosenau, 1997).

Given this changing global order, the form and functions of the state are having to adapt as governments seek coherent strategies of engaging with a globalizing world. Distinctive strategies are being followed from the model of the neoliberal minimal state to the models of the developmental state (government as the central promoter of economic expansion) and the catalytic state (government as facilitator of coordinated and collective action). In addition, governments have become increasingly outward looking as they seek to pursue cooperative strategies and to construct international regulatory regimes to manage more effectively the growing array of cross-border issues which regularly surface on national agendas. Rather than globalization bringing about the 'end of the state', it has encouraged a spectrum of adjustment strategies and, in certain respects, a more activist state. Accordingly, the power of national governments is not necessarily diminished by globalization but on the contrary is being reconstituted and restructured in response to the growing complexity of processes of governance in a more interconnected world (Rosenau, 1997).

The three dominant tendencies in the globalization debate are summarized in table I.1. To move beyond the debate between these three approaches requires a framework of enquiry through which the principal claims of

each might be assessed. But to construct such a framework demands, as an initial condition, some understanding of the primary fault-lines around which the debate itself revolves. Identifying the critical issues in the debate cr6ates. an intellectual foundation for thinking about how globalization might

Table 1.1 Conceptualizing globalization: three tendencies

	Hyperglobalists	Sceptics	Transformationalists
What's new?	A global age	Trading blocs, weaker geogovernance than in earlier periods	Historically unprecedented levels of global interconnectedness
Dominant features	Global capitalism, global governance, global civil society	World less interdependent than in 1890s	'Thick' (intensive and extensive) globalization
Power of national governments	Declining or eroding	Reinforced or enhanced	Reconstituted, restructured
Driving forces of globalization	Capitalism and technology	States and markets	Combined forces of modernity
Pattern of stratification	Erosion of old hierarchies	Increased marginalization of South	New architecture of world order
Dominant motif	McDonalds, Madonna, etc.	National interest	Transformation of political community
Conceptualization of globalization	As a reordering of the framework of human action	As internationalization and regionalization	As the reordering of interregional relations and action at a distance
Historical trajectory	Global civilization	Regional blocs/clash of civilizations	Indeterminate: global integration and fragmentation
Summary argument	The end of the nation-state	Internationalization depends on state acquiescence and support	Globalization transforming state power and world politics

best be conceptualized and the particular grounds on which any assessment of competing claims about it might be pursued.

best be conceptualized and the particular grounds on which any assessment of competing claims about it might be pursued.

Sources of Contention in the Globalization Debate

Five principal issues constitute the major sources of contention among existing approaches to globalization. These concern matters of

- conceptualization
- causation
- periodization
- impacts
- and the trajectories of globalization.

In exploring each of these in turn a cumulative picture will develop of the requirements of a rigorous account of globalization, a picture which will help move us beyond the debate between the three approaches outlined above.



Conceptualization

Among both the sceptics and hyperglobalizers there is a tendency to conceptualize globalization as prefiguring a singular condition or end-state, that is, a fully integrated global market with price and interest rate equalization. Accordingly, contemporary patterns of economic globalization are assessed, as previously noted, in relation to how far they match up to this ideal type (Berger and Dore, 1995; Hirst and Thompson, 1996b). But even on its own terms this approach is flawed, since there is no a priori reason to assume global markets need to be 'perfectly competitive' any more than national markets have ever been. National markets may well fall short of perfect competition but this does not prevent economists from characterizing them as markets, albeit markets with various forms of 'imperfections'. Global markets, as with domestic markets, can be problematic.

In addition, this 'ideal type' approach is both unacceptably teleological and empiricist: unacceptably teleological in so far as the present is (and apparently should be) interpreted as the stepping stone in some linear progression towards a given future end-state, although there is no logical or empirical reason to assume that globalization - any more than industrialization or democratization - has one fixed end condition; and unacceptably empiricist in that the statistical evidence of global trends is taken by itself to confirm, qualify or reject the globalization thesis, even though such a methodology can generate considerable difficulties (Ohmae, 1990; R. J. B. Jones, 1995; Hirst and Thompson, 1996b). For instance, the fact that more people in the world speak (dialects of) Chinese than English as a first language does not necessarily confirm the thesis that Chinese is a global language. Likewise, even if it could be shown that trade GDP ratios for Western states in the 1890s were similar to, or even higher than, those for the 1990s, this evidence by itself would reveal little about the social and political impacts of trade in either period. Caution and theoretical care are needed in drawing conclusions from seemingly clear global trends. Any convincing account of globalization must weigh the significance of relevant qualitative evidence and interpretative issues.

In comparison, socio-historical approaches to the study of globalization regard it as a process which has no single fixed or determinate historical 'destination', whether understood in terms of a perfectly integrated global market, a global society or a global civilization (Giddens, 1990; Geyer and Bright, 1995; Rosenau, 1997). There is no a priori reason to assume that globalization must simply evolve in a single direction or that it can only be understood in relation to a single ideal condition (perfect global markets). Accordingly, for these transformationalists, globalization is conceived in terms of a more contingent and open-ended historical process which does not fit with orthodox linear models of social change (cf. Graham, 1997). Moreover, these accounts tend also to be sceptical of the view that quantitative evidence alone can confirm or deny the reality' of globalization since they are interested in those qualitative shifts which it may engender in the nature of societies and the exercise of power; shifts which are rarely completely captured by statistical data.

Linked to the issue of globalization as a historical process is the related matter of whether globalization should be understood in singular or differentiated terms. Much Of the sceptical and hyperglobalist literature tends to conceive globalization as a largely

singular process equated, more often than not, with economic or cultural interconnectedness (Ohmae, 1990; Robertson, 1992; Krasner, 1993; Boyer and Drache, 1996; Cox, 1996; Hirst and Thompson, 1996b; Huntington, 1996; Strange, 1996; Burbach et al., 1997). Yet to conceive it thus ignores the distinctive patterns of globalization in different aspects of social life, from the political to the cultural. In ' this respect, globalization might be better conceived as a highly differentiated process which finds expression in all the key domains of social activity (including the political, the military, the legal, the ecological, the criminal, etc.). It is by no means clear why it should be assumed that it is a purely economic or cultural phenomenon (Giddens, 1991; Axford, 1995; Albrow, 1996). Accordingly, accounts of globalization which acknowledge this differentiation may be more satisfactory in explaining its form and dynamics than those which overlook it.

Causation

One of the central contentions in the globalization debate concerns the issue of causation: what is driving this process? In offering an answer to this question existing accounts tend to cluster around two distinct sets of explanations: those which identify a single or primary imperative, such as capitalism or technological change; and those which explain globalization as the product of a combination of factors, including technological change, market forces, ideology and political decisions. Put simply, the distinction is effectively between monocausal

and multicausal accounts of globalization. Though the tendency in much of the existing literature is to conflate globalization with the expansionary imperatives of markets or capitalism this has drawn substantial criticism on the grounds that such an explanation is far too reductionist. In response, there are a number of significant attempts to develop a more comprehensive explanation of globalization which highlights the complex intersection between a multiplicity of driving forces, embracing economic, technological, cultural and political change (Giddens, 1990; Robertson, 1992; Scholte, 1993; Axford, 1995; Albrow, 1996; Rosenau, 1990, 1997). Any convincing analysis of contemporary globalization has to come to terms with the central question of causation and, in so doing, offer a coherent view.

But the controversy about the underlying causes of globalization is connected to a wider debate about modernity (Giddens, 1991; Robertson, 1992; Albrow, 1996; Connolly, 1996). For some, globalization can be understood simply as the global diffusion of Western modernity, that is, Westernization. World systems theory, for instance, equates globalization with the spread of Western capitalism and Western institutions (Amin, 1996; Benton, 1996). By contrast, others draw a distinction between Westernization and globalization and reject the idea that the latter is synonymous with the former (Giddens, 1990). At stake in this debate is a rather fundamental issue: whether globalization today has to be understood as something more than simply the expanding-reach of Western power and influence. No cogent analysis of globalization can avoid confronting this issue.

Periodization

Simply seeking to describe the 'shape' of contemporary globalization necessarily relies (implicitly or explicitly) on some kind of historical narrative. Such narratives, whether

they issue from grand civilizational studies or world historical studies, have significant implications for what conclusions are reached about the historically unique or distinctive features of contemporary globalization (Mazlish and Buultjens, 1993; Geyer and Bright, 1995). In particular, how world history is periodized is central to the kinds of conclusions which are deduced from any historical analysis, most especially, of course, with respect to the question of what's new about contemporary globalization. Clearly, in answering such a question, it makes a significant difference whether contemporary globalization is defined as the entire postwar era, the post-1970s era, or the twentieth century in general.

Recent historical studies of world systems and of patterns of civilizational interaction bring into question the commonly accepted view that globalization is primarily a phenomenon of the modern age (McNeill, 1995; Roudometof and Robertson, 1995; Bentley, 1996; Frank and Gills, 1996). The existence of world religions and the trade networks of the medieval era encourage a greater sensitivity to the idea that globalization is a process which has a long history. This implies the need to look beyond the modern era in any attempt to offer an explanation of the novel features of contemporary globalization. But to do so requires some kind of analytical framework offering a platform for contrasting and comparing different phases or historical forms of globalization over what the French historian Braudel refers to as the *longue durge* - that is, the passage of centuries rather than decades (Helleiner, 1997).

Impacts

There is an extensive literature implicating economic globalization in the demise of social democracy and the modern welfare state (Garrett and Lange, 1991; Banuri and Schor, 1992; Gill, 1995; Amin, 1996; J. Gray, 1996; Cox, 1997). Global competitive pressures have forced governments, according to this view, to curtail state spending and interventions; for, despite different partisan commitments, all governments have been pressed in the same direction. Underlying this thesis is a rather deterministic conception of globalization as an 'iron cage' which imposes a global financial discipline on governments, severely constraining the scope for progressive policies and underlining the social bargain on which the post-Second World War welfare state rested. Thus there has apparently been a growing convergence of economic and welfare strategies among Western states, irrespective of the ideology of incumbent governments.

This thesis is contested vociferously by a plethora of recent studies which cast serious doubt on the idea that globalization effectively 'immobilizes' national governments in the conduct of economic policy (Scharpf, 1991; R. J. B. Jones, 1995; Ruigrok and Tulder, 1995; Hirst and Thompson, 1996b). As Milner and Keohane observe, 'the impact of the world economy on countries that are open to its influence does not appear to be uniform' (1996, p. 14). Such studies have delivered significant insights into how the social and political impact of globalization is mediated by domestic institutional structures, state strategies and a country's location in the

global pecking order (Hurrell and Woods, 1995; Frieden and Rogowski, 1996; Garrett and Lange, 1996). A number of authors have also contributed to a greater awareness of the ways in which globalization is contested and resisted by states and peoples (Geyer and Bright, 1995; Frieden and Rogowski, 1996; Burbach et al., 1997). In so doing, such studies suggest

the need for a sophisticated typology of how globalization impacts on national economies and national communities which acknowledges its differential consequences and the signal importance of the forms in which it is managed, contested and resisted (Axford, 1995).

Trajectories

Each of the three 'schools' in the globalization debate has a particular conception of the dynamics and direction of global change. This imposes an overall shape on patterns of globalization and, in so doing, presents a distinctive account of globalization as a historical process. In this respect, the hyperglobalizers tend to represent globalization as a secular process of global integration (Ohmae, 1995; R. P. Clark, 1997). The latter is often associated with a linear view of historical change; globalization is elided with the relatively smooth unfolding of human progress. By comparison, the sceptical thesis tends to a view of globalization which emphasizes its distinct phases as well as its recurrent features. This, in part, accounts for the sceptics' preoccupation with evaluating contemporary globalization in relation to prior historical epochs, but most especially in relation to the supposedly 'golden age' of global interdependence (the latter decades of the nineteenth century) (R. J. B. Jones, 1995; Hirst and Thompson, 1996b)., Neither of these models of historical change finds much support within the transformationalist camp. For the transformationalists tend to conceive history as a process punctuated by dramatic upheavals or discontinuities. Such a view stresses the contingency of history and how epochal change arises out of the confluence of particular historical conditions and social forces. And it informs the transformationalist tendency to describe the process of globalization as contingent and contradictory. For, according to this thesis, globalization pulls and pushes societies in opposing directions; it fragments as it integrates, engenders cooperation as well as conflict, and universalizes while it particularizes. Thus the trajectory of global change is largely indeterminate and uncertain (Rosenau, 1997).

Clearly, a convincing attempt to construct an analytical framework which moves the globalization debate beyond its present intellectual limits has to address the five major points of contention described above. For any satisfactory account of globalization has to offer: a coherent conceptualization; a justified account of causal logic; some clear propositions about historical periodization; a robust specification of impacts; and some sound reflections about the trajectory of the process itself. Confronting these tasks is central to devising and constructing fresh ways of thinking about globalization.

The five tasks inform the chapters that follow, and we return to them again in the conclusion. What follows immediately is an attempt to address the first of the concerns the nature and form of globalization.

Rethinking Globalization: an Analytical Framework

What is globalization? Although in its simplest sense globalization refers to the widening, deepening and speeding up of global interconnectedness, such a definition begs

further elaboration. Despite a proliferation of definitions in contemporary discussion - among them 'accelerating interdependence', 'action at a distance' and 'time-space compression' [2] (see, respectively, Ohmae, 1990; Giddens, 1990; Harvey, 1989) - there is scant evidence in the existing literature of any attempt to specify precisely what is 'global' about globalization. For instance, all the above definitions are quite compatible with far more spatially confined processes such as the spread of national or regional interconnections. In seeking to remedy this conceptual difficulty, this study commences from an understanding of globalization which acknowledges its distinctive spatial Attributes and the way these unfold over time.

Globalization can be located on a continuum with the local, national and regional.[3] At the one end of the continuum lie social and economic relations and networks which are organized on a local and/or national basis; at the other end lie social and economic relations and networks which crystallize on the wider scale of regional and global interactions. Globalization can be taken to refer to those spatio-temporal processes of change which underpin a transformation in the organization of human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and continents. Without reference to such expansive spatial connections, there can be no clear or coherent formulation of this term.

Accordingly, the concept of globalization implies, first and foremost, a *stretching of* social, political and economic activities across frontiers such that events, decisions and activities in one region of the world can come to have significance for individuals and communities in distant regions of the globe. In this sense, it embodies transregional interconnectedness, the widening reach of networks of social activity and power, and the possibility of action at a distance. Beyond this, globalization implies that connections across frontiers are not just occasional or random, but rather are regularized such that there is a detectable *intensification*, or growing magnitude, of interconnectedness, patterns of interaction and flows which transcend the constituent societies and states of the world order. Furthermore, @rowing extensity and intensity of global interconnectedness may also imply a *speeding up* of global interactions and processes as the development of worldwide systems of Transport and communication increases the Potential velocity of the global diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people. And the growing *extensity, intensity and velocity* of global interactions may also be associated with a deepening enmeshment of the local and global such that the *impact of* distant events is magnified while even the most local developments may come to have enormous global consequences. In this sense, the boundaries between domestic matters and global affairs may be blurred. A satisfactory definition of globalization must capture each of these elements: extensity (stretching), intensity, velocity and impact. And

2 By 'accelerating interdependence' is understood the growing intensity of international enmeshment among national economies and societies such that developments in one country impact directly on other countries. 'Action at a distance' refers to the way in which, under conditions of contemporary globalization, the actions of social agents (individuals, collectivities, corporations, etc.) in one locale can come to have significant intended or unintended consequences for the behaviour of 'distant others'. Finally, 'time-space compression' refers to the manner in which globalization appears to shrink geographical distance and time; in a world of instantaneous communication, distance and time no longer seem to be a major constraint on patterns of human social organization or interaction.

3 Regions refer here to the geographical or functional clustering of states or societies. Such regional clusters can be identified in terms of their shared characteristics (cultural, religious, ideological, economic, etc.) and high level of patterned interaction relative to the outside world (Buzan, 1998).

a satisfactory account of globalization must examine them thoroughly. We shall refer to these four elements henceforth as the 'spatio-temporal' dimensions of globalization.

By acknowledging these dimensions a more precise definition of globalization can be offered. Accordingly, globalization can be thought of as

> *a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions - assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact - generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.*

In this context, flows refer to the movements of physical artefacts, people, symbols, tokens and information across space and time, while networks refer to regularized or patterned interactions between independent agents, nodes of activity, or sites of power (Modelski, 1972; Mann, 1986; Castells, 1996).

This formulation helps address the failure of existing approaches to differentiate globalization from more spatially delimited processes - what we can call 'localization', 'nationalization', 'regionalization' and 'internationalization'. For as it is defined above, globalization can be distinguished from more restricted social developments. Localization simply refers to the consolidation of flows and networks within a specific locale. Nationalization is the process whereby social relations and transactions are developed within the framework of fixed territorial borders. Regionalization can be denoted by a clustering of transactions, flows, networks and interactions between functional or geographical groupings of states or societies, while internationalization can be taken to refer to patterns of interaction and interconnectedness between two or more nation-states irrespective of their specific geographical location (see Nierop, 1994; Buzan, 1998). Thus contemporary globalization describes, for example, the flows of trade and finance between the major regions in the world economy, while equivalent flows within them can be differentiated in terms of local, national and regional clusters.

In offering a more precise definition of these concepts it is crucial to signal that globalization is not conceived here in opposition to more spatially delimited processes but, on the contrary, as standing in a complex and dynamic relationship with them. On the one hand, processes such as regionalization can create the necessary kinds of economic, social and physical infrastructures which facilitate and complement the deepening of

globalization. In this regard, for example, economic regionalization (for instance, the European Union) has not been a barrier to the globalization of trade and production but a spur. On the other hand, such processes can impose limits to globalization, if not encouraging a process of deglobalization. However, there is no a priori reason to assume that localization or regionalization exist in an oppositional or contradictory relationship to globalization. Precisely how these processes interrelate in economic and other domains is more an empirical matter, and one which is dealt with in subsequent chapters.

Historical forms of globalization

Sceptics of the globalization thesis alert us to the fact that international or global interconnectedness is by no means a novel phenomenon; yet they overlook the possibility

that the particular form taken by globalization may differ between historical eras. To distinguish the novel features of globalization in any epoch requires some kind of analytical framework for organizing such comparative historical enquiry. For without such a framework it would be difficult to identify the most significant features, continuities or differences between epochs. Thus the approach developed here centres on the idea of *historical forms of globalization* as the basis for constructing a systematic comparative analysis of globalization over time. Utilizing this notion helps provide a mechanism for capturing and systematizing relevant differences and similarities. In this context, historical forms of globalization refer to

the spatio-temporal and organizational attributes of global interconnectedness in discrete historical epochs.

To say anything meaningful about either the unique Attributes or the dominant features of contemporary globalization requires clear analytical categories from which such descriptions can be constructed. Building directly on our earlier distinctions, historical forms of globalization can be described and compared initially in respect of the four spatio-temporal dimensions:

- the extensity of global networks
- the intensity of global interconnectedness
- the velocity of global flows
- the impact propensity of global interconnectedness.

Such a framework provides the basis for both a *quantitative* and a *qualitative* assessment of historical patterns of globalization. For it is possible to analyse (1) the extensiveness of networks of relations and connections; (2) the intensity of flows and levels of activity within these networks; (3) the velocity or speed of interchanges; and (4) the impact of these phenomena on particular communities. A systematic assessment of how these phenomena have evolved provides insights into the changing historical forms of globalization; and it offers the possibility of a sharper identification and comparison of the key Attributes of, and the major disjunctures between, distinctive forms of globalization in different epochs. Such a historical approach to globalization avoids the current tendency to presume either that globalization is fundamentally new, or that there is nothing novel about contemporary levels of global economic and social interconnectedness since they appear to resemble those of prior periods.

Of course, the very notion of historical forms of globalization assumes that it is feasible to map, in an empirical sense, the extensity, intensity, velocity and impact propensity of global flows, networks and transactions across time. In subsequent chapters we seek to operationalize each of these dimensions by using various statistical and other indicators to assess, for instance, the geographical scope of trade flows - their magnitude, velocity, impact and so on. But one particular dimension of globalization is especially difficult to operationalize: the impact propensity of global flows, networks and transactions. Yet without some clear understanding of the nature of impact, the notion of globalization would remain imprecise. How should impact propensity be conceived?

For the purpose of this study, we distinguish between four analytically distinct types of impacts: *decisional, institutional, distributive and structural.* Decisional impacts refer to the degree to which the relative costs and benefits of the policy choices confronting governments, corporations, collectivities and households are influenced by global forces and conditions. Thus globalization may make some policy options or courses of action more or less costly and, in so doing, condition the outcome of individual or organizational decision-making. Depending on decision-makers' and collectivities' sensitivity or vulnerability to global conditions, their

policy choices will be constrained or facilitated to a greater or lesser degree.[4] Decisional impacts can be assessed in terms of high impact (where globalization fundamentally alters policy preferences by transforming the costs and benefits of different courses of action) and low impact (where policy preferences are only marginally affected).

But the impact of globalization may not always be best understood in terms of decisions taken or forgone, since it may operate less transparently by reconfiguring the agenda of decision-making itself and, consequently, the available choices which agents may or may not realistically make. In other words, globalization may be associated with what Schattschneider referred to as the 'mobilization of bias' in so far as the agenda and choices which governments, households and corporations confront are set by global conditions (1960, p. 71). Thus, while the notion of decisional impacts focuses attention on how globalization directly influences the preferences and choices of decision-makers, the notion of institutional impact highlights the ways in which organizational and collective agendas reflect the effective choices or range of choices available as a result of globalization. In this respect, it offers insights into why certain choices may never even be considered as options at all.

Beyond such considerations, globalization may have considerable consequences for the distribution of power and wealth within and between countries. Distributional impacts refer to the ways in which globalization shapes the configuration of social forces (groups, classes, collectivities) within societies and across them. Thus, for instance, trade may undermine the prosperity of some workers while enhancing that of others. In this context, some groups and societies may be more vulnerable to globalization than others.

Finally, globalization may have discernible structural impacts in so far as it conditions patterns of domestic social, economic and political organization and behaviour. Accordingly, globalization may be inscribed within the institutions and everyday functioning of societies (Axford, 1995). For instance, the spread of Western conceptions of the modern state and capitalist markets have conditioned the development of the majority of societies and civilizations across the globe. They have forced or stimulated the adaptation of traditional patterns of power and authority, generating new forms of rule and resource allocation. The structural consequences of globalization may be visible over both the short and the long term in the ways in which states and societies accommodate themselves to global forces. But such accommodation is, of course, far

4 'Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework - how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another and how great are the costly effects ... Vulnerability can be defined as an actor's liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered' (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 12).

from automatic. For globalization is mediated, managed, contested and resisted by governments, agencies and peoples. States and societies may display varying degrees of sensitivity or vulnerability to global processes such that patterns of domestic structural adjustment will vary in terms of their degree and duration.

In assessing the impact of globalization on states and communities, it is useful to emphasize that the four types of impact can have a direct bearing on them, altering their form and modus operandi, or an indirect bearing, changing the context and balance of forces with which states have to contend. Decisional and institutional impacts tend to be direct in this regard, although they can have consequences for the economic and social circumstances in which states operate. Distributional and structural impacts tend to be indirect but, of course, none the less significant for that.

There are other important features of historical forms of globalization which should be distinguished. In addition to the spatio-temporal dimensions which sketch the broad shape of globalization, there are four dimensions which map its specific organizational *profile: infrastructures, institutionalization, stratification and modes of interaction.* Mapping the extensity, intensity, velocity and impact propensity of networks of global interconnectedness necessarily involves mapping the *infrastructures* which facilitate or carry global flows, networks and relations. Networks cannot exist without some kind of infrastructure support. Infrastructures may be physical, regulative/legal, or symbolic, for instance, a transportation infrastructure, the law governing war, or mathematics as the common language of science. But in most domains infrastructures are constituted by some combination of all these types of facility. For example, in the financial realm there is a worldwide information system for banking settlements, regulated by a regime of common rules, norms and procedures, and working through its own technical language via which its members communicate.

Infrastructures may facilitate or constrain the extensity and intensity of global connectedness in any single domain. This is because they mediate flows and connectivity: infrastructures influence the overall level of interaction capacity in every sector and thus the Potential magnitude of global interconnectedness. Interaction capacity, understood as the Potential scale of interaction defined by existing technical capabilities, is determined primarily, but not exclusively, by technological capacity and communications technology (see Buzan et al., 1993, p. 86). For instance, the interaction capacity of the medieval world system, constrained as it was by limited means of communication, among other things, was considerably less than that of the contemporary era, in which satellites and the Internet facilitate instant and almost real-time global communication (Deibert, 1997).

Thus changes in infrastructure have important consequences for the development and evolution of global interaction capacity.
Infrastructural conditions also facilitate the *institutionalization* of global networks, flows and relations. Institutionalization comprises the regularization of patterns of interaction and, consequently, their reproduction across space and time. To think in terms of the institutionalization of patterns of global connections (trade, alliances, etc.) is to acknowledge the ways in which global networks and relations become regularized and embedded in the practices and operations of the agencies (states, collectivities, households, individuals) in each social domain, from the cultural to the criminal (see Giddens, 1979, p. 80). Institutionalization, therefore, constitutes a further significant Dimension of historical forms of globalization.

Discussion of infrastructures and institutionalization links directly to the issue of power. By power is meant the capacity of social agents, agencies and institutions to maintain or transform their circumstances, social or physical; and it concerns the resources which underpin this capacity and the forces that shape and influence its exercise. Accordingly, power is a phenomenon found in and between all groups, institutions and societies, cutting across public and private life. While 'power', thus understood, raises a number of complicated issues, it usefully highlights the nature of power as a universal dimension of human life, independent of any specific site or set of institutions (see Held, 1989, 1995).
But the power of an agent or agency or institution, wherever it is located, never exists in isolation. Power is always exercised, and political outcomes are always determined, in the context of the relative capabilities of parties. Power has to be understood as a relational phenomenon (Giddens, 1979, ch. 2; Rosenau, 1980, ch. 3). Hence, power expresses at one and the same time the intentions and purposes of agencies and institutions and the relative balance of resources they can deploy with respect to each other. However, power cannot simply be conceived in terms of what agents or agencies do or do not do. For power is also a structural phenomenon, shaped by and in turn shaping the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups and the practices of organizations (Lukes, 1974, p. 22). Any organization or institution can condition and @t the behaviour of its members. The rules and resources which such organizations and institutions embody rarely constitute a neutral framework for action, for they establish patterns of power and authority and confer the right to take decisions on some and not on others; in effect, they institutionalize a power relationship between 'rulers' and 'ruled', 'subjects' and 'governors' (McGrew, 1988, pp. 18-19).
Globalization transforms the organization, distribution and exercise of power. In this respect, globalization. in different epochs may be associated with distinctive patterns of global *stratification*. In mapping historical forms of globalization, specific attention needs to be paid to patterns of stratification. In this context, stratification has both a social and a spatial dimension: hierarchy and unevenness, respectively (see Falk, 1990, pp. 2-12). Hierarchy refers to asymmetries in the control of, access to and enmeshment in global networks and infrastructures, while unevenness denotes the asymmetrical effects of processes of globalization on the life chances and well-being of peoples, classes, ethnic groupings and the sexes. These categories provide a mechanism for identifying the distinctive relations of global domination and control in different historical periods.
There are important differences too in the dominant *modes of interaction* within each epoch of globalization. It is possible to distinguish crudely between the dominant types of interaction - imperial or coercive, cooperative, competitive, conflictual - and the primary instruments of power, for example, military vs economic instruments. Thus, arguably, in the late nineteenth-century era of Western expansion, imperialism and military power were the dominant modes and instruments of globalization, whereas in the late twentieth century economic instruments, competition and cooperation appear to take precedence over military force (Morse, 1976).
All in all, historical forms of globalization can be analysed in terms of eight dimensions: see box 1.1. Collectively, they determine the shape of globalization in each epoch.

Box I.1 Historical forms of globalization: key dimensions

Spatio-temporal dimensions
1 the extensity of global networks
2 the intensity of global interconnectedness
3 the velocity of global flows
4 the impact propensity of global interconnectedness

Organizational dimensions
5 the infrastructure of globalization
6 the institutionalization of global networks and the exercise of power
7 the pattern of global stratification
8 the dominant modes of global interaction

Determining the Shape of Contemporary Globalization

Building on the framework above, a typology of globalization can be constructed. Global flows, networks and relations can be mapped in relation to their fundamental spatio-temporal dimensions: extensity, intensity, velocity and impact propensity. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 set out the relations between these four dimensions. In these figures high extensity refers to interregional/intercontinental networks and flows, and low extensity denotes localized networks and transactions. Accordingly, as figure 1.3 indicates, there are different possible configurations of these dimensions; the four uppermost quadrants in this figure represent, at one spatial extreme, different types of globalized worlds (that is, different configurations of high extensity, intensity, velocity and impact) while the lower quadrants represent, at the other spatial extreme, different configurations of localized networks. This simple exercise delivers the groundwork for devising a more systematic typology of globalization which moves the debate beyond the economistic ideal type and 'one world' models of the sceptics and hyperglobalizers. For the four upper quadrants of figure 1.3 suggest that there are a multiplicity of logical shapes which globalization might take since high extensity can be combined with different possible values for intensity, velocity and impact.
Four of these potential shapes are of particular interest since they represent the outer limits of this typological exercise, combining high extensity with the most extreme values of intensity,- velocity and impact. In this regard, figure 1.4 identifies four discrete logical types of globalization which reflect very different patterns of interregional flows, networks and interactions. They constitute a simple typology of globalization which shows that it has no necessarily fixed form:

- Type 1 represents a world in which the extensive reach of global networks is matched by their high intensity, high velocity and high impact propensity across all the domains or facets of social life from the economic to the cultural. This might be labelled *thick globalization*. For some sceptics the late nineteenth-century era of

Subsequent chapters utilize the broad elements of this framework for describing and explaining the historical patterns of globalization in each of the key domains of human activity. They do so by comparing four great epochs of globalization: the pre-modern period; the early modern period of western expansion; the modern industrial era; and the contemporary period from 1945 to the present. The leading processes of globalization, it will be seen, unfolded across several centuries in a slow and uneven manner, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify any single starting point. There are interesting continuities across different historical periods as well as breaks, ruptures and reversals. Different processes of globalization have developed at different times, followed different trajectories and tempos. This is reflected in somewhat different periodizations used in each chapter of this book. For example, chapter 1 takes the history of political globalization back to the ancient empires. Chapter 2 on organized violence and the military begins by reflecting on key changes in the early modern period. Chapters 3-5 also start from the early modern period, exploring the globalization of trade, finance and production. Chapter 6 on migration begins with the earliest migratory movements which peopled the planet, but examines, in particular, movements which followed from the expansion of Europe. Chapter 7 starts with the globalization of culture from the spread of the Roman Empire and world religions, while it puts special emphasis on developments from the late nineteenth century. And chapter 8 focuses on environmental degradation in the second half of the twentieth century, although earlier significant periods are mentioned. The conclusion pulls these different historical narratives together, examining disjunctures and confluences of change across earlier periods and domains. It brings the story of the different temporalities together, exploring some of their main connections and articulations. The latter is an important exercise since the Potential synergy between processes of globalization in each domain may produce its own systemic logic. While it is essential to map globalization in each domain it is also crucial not to neglect the ways in which the totality of these flows, networks, interactions and interconnections generates its own imperatives. The conclusion will, therefore, seek to integrate the narratives of globalization in each domain into a more comprehensive comparison of the main historical forms of globalization.

It is important to stress that it is only after the mapping of historical forms of globalization, with respect to the key domains of human activity, that it is possible to identify the extent to which there is a clustering of patterns of global interconnectedness

across all these areas. Only from an analysis of such clustering will it be feasible to deduce the overall shape of contemporary globalization; that is, whether contemporary patterns of global change can most appropriately be described as thick, thin, expansive, diffused, or by some other Potential shape.

In sum

The account of globalization developed in subsequent chapters reflects and builds on a number of points made so far in the introduction:

1. Globalization can best be understood as a process or set of processes rather than a singular condition. It does not reflect a simple linear developmental logic, nor does it prefigure a world society or a world community. Rather, it reflects the emergence of interregional networks and systems of interaction and exchange. In this respect, the enmeshment of national and societal systems in wider global processes has to be distinguished from any notion of global integration.
2. The spatial reach and density of global and transnational interconnectedness weave complex webs and networks of relations between communities, states, international institutions, non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations which make up the global order. These overlapping and interacting networks define an evolving structure which both imposes constraints on and empowers communities, states and social forces. In this respect, globalization is 'akin to a process of structuration' in so far as it is a product of both the individual actions of, and the cumulative interactions between, countless agencies and institutions across the globe (Giddens, 1981; Buzan et al., 1993; Nierop, 1994; Jervis, 1997). Globalization is associated with an evolving dynamic global structure of enablement and constraint. But it is also a highly stratified structure since globalization is profoundly uneven: it both reflects existing patterns of inequality and hierarchy while also generating new patterns of inclusion and exclusion, new winners and losers (Hurrell and Woods, 1995). Globalization, thus, can be understood as embodying processes of structuration and stratification.
3. Few areas of social life escape the reach of processes of globalization. These processes are reflected in all socialdomains from the cultural through the economic, the political, the legal, the military and the environmental. Globalization is best understood as a multifaceted or differentiated social phenomenon. It cannot be conceived as a singular condition but instead refers to patterns of growing global

interconnectedness within all the key domains of social activity. To understand the dynamics and consequences of , globalization, therefore, demands some knowledge of the differential patterns of global interconnectedness in each of these domains. For instance, patterns of global ecological interconnectedness are quite different from the patterns of global cultural or military interaction. Any general account of the processes of globalization must acknowledge that, far from being a singular condition, it is best conceived as a differentiated and multifaceted process.

4. By cutting through and across political frontiers globalization is associated with both the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of socio-economic and political

space. As economic, social and political activities are increasingly 'stretched' across the globe they become in a significant sense no longer primarily or solely organized according to a territorial principle. They may be rooted in particular locales but territorially disembedded. Under conditions of globalization, 'local', 'national' or even 'continental' political, social and economic space is re-formed such that it is no longer necessarily coterminous with established legal and territorial boundaries. On the other hand, as globalization intensifies it generates pressures towards a reterritorialization of socio-economic activity in the form of subnational, regional and supranational economic zones, mechanisms of governance and cultural complexes. It may also reinforce the 'localization' and 'nationalization' of societies. Accordingly, globalization involves a complex deterritorialization and reterritorialization of political and economic power. In this respect, it is best described as being *aterritorial.*

5. Globalization concerns the expanding scale on which power is organized and exercised, that is, the extensive spatial reach of networks and circuits of power. Indeed, power is a fundamental Attribute of globalization. In an increasingly interconnected global system, the exercise of power through the decisions, actions, or inactions, of agencies on one continent can have significant consequences for nations, communities and households on other continents. Power relations are deeply inscribed in the very processes of globalization. In fact, the stretching of power relations means that sites of power and the exercise of power become increasingly distant from the subjects or locales which experience their consequences. In this regard, globalization involves the structuring and restructuring of power relations at a distance. Patterns of global stratification mediate access to sites of power, while the consequences of globalization are unevenly experienced. Political and economic elites in the world's major metropolitan areas are much more tightly integrated into, and have much greater control over, global networks than do the subsistence farmers of Burundi.

The points set out above help clarify the meaning of globalization in very specific ways. In particular, they draw attention to the dangers of eliding globalization with concepts such as interdependence, integration, universalism and convergence. Whereas the concept of interdependence assumes symmetrical power relations between social or political actors, the concept of globalization leaves open the possibility of hierarchy and unevenness; that is, a process of global stratification. Integration too has a very specific meaning since it refers to processes of economic and political unification which prefigure a sense of community, shared fortunes and shared institutions of governance. As previously noted, the notion of globalization as the precursor to a single world society or community is deeply flawed. So too is the association of globalization with 'universalism' for clearly the global is not a synonym for the universal; global interconnectedness is not experienced by all peoples or communities to the same extent or even in the same way. In this respect, it is also to be distinguished from convergence since it does not presume growing homogeneity or harmony. On the contrary, as both Bull and Buzan have argued, growing interconnectedness may be both a source of intense conflict (rather than cooperation) as well as a product of shared fears and deeply held animosities (Bull, 1977; Buzan, 1991).

The Book Ahead

The volume begins by exploring political globalization (see chapter 1). There are several reasons for this starting point. In the first instance, expansionist states and empires have been active in creating regional and global links and they are important elements of the changing historical forms of globalization. Second, different types of states have created distinctive forms of territorial space - from loose frontiers to tightly organized boundaries - which have shaped and mediated patterns of regional and global relations, networks and flows. Third, one particular form of political rule - the modern and contemporary nation-state - profoundly altered the nature, form and prospects of globalization; for it was with the development of the modern nation-state that the

focal point of rule became national governments and their claim to sovereignty, autonomy and distinctive forms of accountability within a bounded territory. It is worth dwelling on this latter point for a moment.

Modern nation-states, as will be seen from chapters 1 and 2, distinguish themselves from previous forms of political rule by claiming a proper symmetry and correspondence between sovereignty, territory, legitimacy and, with the passage of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, democracy. The concept of sovereignty lodges a distinctive claim to the rightful exercise of political power over a circumscribed realm (see Skinner, 1978, vol. 2; Held, 1995, ch. 2). It seeks to specify the political authority within a community which has the right to determine the framework of rules, regulations and policies within a given territory and to govern accordingly. However, in thinking about the impact of globalization on the modern nation-state, one needs to distinguish the claim to sovereignty - the entitlement to rule over a bounded territory - from state autonomy - the actual power the nation-state possesses to articulate and achieve policy goals independently. In effect, state autonomy refers to the capacity of state representatives, managers and agencies to articulate and pursue their policy preferences even though these may on occasion clash with the dictates of domestic and international social forces and conditions (Nordlinger, 1981). Moreover, to the extent that modern nation-states are democratic, sovereignty and autonomy are assumed to be embedded within, and congruent with, the territorially organized framework of liberal democratic government: 'the rulers' - elected representatives - are accountable to 'the ruled' - the citizenry - within a delimited territory. There is, in effect, a 'national community of fate', whereby membership of the political community is defined in terms of the peoples within the territorial borders of the nation-state; this community becomes the proper locus and home of democratic politics.

For many of those involved in the debate about globalization and its consequences, the sheer density and scale of contemporary economic, social and political activity appear to make territorial forms of politics increasingly impotent. Within Western societies this perception is linked to anxieties about the declining effectiveness of government, the growing fragmentation of civic communities and, despite the end of the Cold War, growing personal insecurity. Whether real or imagined, these anxieties reflect a 'fear that, individually and collectively, we are losing control of the forces that govern our lives' (Sandel, 1996, p. 3). Thus it is argued by hyperglobalizers and transformationalists that globalization weaves together, in highly complex and abstract

systems, the fate of households, communities and peoples in distant regions of the globe such that 'communities of fate' cannot be identified in exclusively national or territorial terms. The implication is that, under conditions of globalization, one cannot understand the nature and possibilities of political community by referring merely to national structures.

Of course, it is essential to recognize that sovereignty, particularly in its legal sense, is eroded only when it is displaced by forms of independent and/or 'higher' legal or juridical authority which curtail the rightful basis of decision-making within a national polity. But for the hyperglobalizers and transformationalists, the very idea of the sovereign state as an independent unit which governs itself and directs its own future sits uneasily alongside the globalization of economic production and exchange, the growing significance of international regimes, legal interaction and global institutions, the internationalization of domestic policy and the domestication of international policy. Globalization poses the question as to whether global and regional patterns of enmeshment are displacing 'notions of sovereignty as an illimitable, indivisible and exclusive form of public power' such that 'sovereignty itself has to be conceived today as already divided among a number of agencies - national, regional and international and limited by the very nature of this plurality' (Held, 1991, p. 222).


However, while globalization may constrain what governments can do, governments are, the sceptics retort, by no means necessarily immobilized nor is their sovereignty necessarily eroded. Moreover, globalization has differential impacts; its political consequences vary considerably between different states as well as across different policy sectors. Whether globalization entails a general diminution, an enhancement or a transformation of the sovereignty and autonomy of states remains a controversial matter. Subsequent chapters will, therefore, return repeatedly to this theme.

Mapping the shape and political consequences of globalization is the key objective of the chapters that follow. But the range of states which will be considered will be ,restricted first and foremost to states in advanced capitalist societies (SIACS). There are two justifications for narrowing the enquiry in this way. First, if globalization does impact on sovereign statehood it is the SIACS, as the principal model and locus of modern statehood, which provide the strongest test of its political ramifications. Second, in the globalization debate the hyperglobalizers, the transformationalists and the sceptics make radically different claims about the fate of SIACS. This study seeks to evaluate these competing claims. However, it does so by concentrating the enquiry on six specific SIACS, namely the US, UK, Sweden, France, Germany and Japan. This particular configuration of states has been selected because of the differences and commonalities between them along a range of variables including their positions in the interstate hierarchy, domestic political structures and cultures, foreign and defence policy postures, levels of global enmeshment, industrial and economic structures and performance and strategies for adjusting to globalization (see the Methodological Appendix). Accordingly' the penultimate

and concluding sections of subsequent chapters will seek to relate the analysis of the shape and history of globalization in each domain to the fate of the six SIACS. This will involve a specific exploration of their differential levels of global enmeshment in each domain and an examination of its implications for state sovereignty and autonomy. The primary purpose of this analysis is to deliver a more systematic understanding of the nature and differential political consequences of contemporary globalization. For comparative purposes, other individual

states - particularly those with developing economies - will be referred to and discussed only where relevant.

The threads of the volume will be drawn together in the last chapter, which will seek, as noted previously, to deliver a systematic description and assessment of the shape of contemporary globalization. This chapter will conclude with an assessment of the implications of globalization for the sovereignty and autonomy of SIACS. But it will also take the globalization debate into normative territory in exploring some of the key intellectual, institutional and political challenges it generates. In particular, it will confront directly the political fatalism which surrounds much discussion of contemporary globalization with a normative agenda which elaborates the possibilities for democratizing and civilizing the unfolding 'global transformation'.



Competing Conceptions of Globalization[1]

Leslie Sklair

ABSTRACT

Globalization is a relatively new idea in the social sciences, although people who work in and write about the mass media, transnational corporations and international business have been using it for some time. The purpose of this paper is to critically review the ways in which sociologists and other social scientists use ideas of globalization and to evaluate the fruitfulness of these competing conceptions.

The central feature of the idea of globalization is that many contemporary problems cannot be adequately studied at the level of nation-states, that is, in terms of each country and its inter-national relations. Instead, they need to be conceptualized in terms of global processes. Some have even gone so far as to predict that global forces, by which they usually mean transnational corporations and other global economic institutions, global culture or globalizing belief systems/ideologies of various types, or a combination of all of these, are becoming so powerful that the continuing existence of the nation-state is in serious doubt. This is not a necessary consequence of most theories of globalization.

The argument of this paper is that much of the globalization literature is confused because not all those who use the term distinguish it clearly enough from internationalization, and some writers appear to use the two terms interchangeably. I argue that a clear distinction must be drawn between the inter-national and the global. The hyphen in inter-national is to distinguish (inadequate) conceptions of the 'global' founded on the existing even if changing system of nation-states, from (genuine) conceptions of the global based on the emergence of global processes and a global system of social relations not founded on national characteristics or nation-states. This global system theory is the framework for my own research.

Globalization studies can be categorized on the basis of four research clusters:

1. The world-systems approach;
2. The global culture approach;
3. The global society approach;
4. The global capitalism approach;

The body of the paper is an exposition and critique of these approaches. The paper argues that the global capitalism approach is most productive for theory and research in globalization and concludes with a brief discussion of resistances to globalization.

---

[1] This paper will be published in an extended form in Sklair (forthcoming).

JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH, V. 2, SUMMER 1999, 143-163
http://jwsr.ucr.edu/
ISSN 1076-156x

Competing Conceptions of Globalization[1]

Leslie Sklair

ABSTRACT

Globalization is a relatively new idea in the social sciences, although people who work in and write about the mass media, transnational corporations and international business have been using it for some time. The purpose of this paper is to critically review the ways in which sociologists and other social scientists use ideas of globalization and to evaluate the fruitfulness of these competing conceptions.

The central feature of the idea of globalization is that many contemporary problems cannot be adequately studied at the level of nation-states, that is, in terms of each country and its inter-national relations. Instead, they need to be conceptualized in terms of global processes. Some have even gone so far as to predict that global forces, by which they usually mean transnational corporations and other global economic institutions, global culture or globalizing belief systems/ideologies of various types, or a combination of all of these, are becoming so powerful that the continuing existence of the nation-state is in serious doubt. This is not a necessary consequence of most theories of globalization.

The argument of this paper is that much of the globalization literature is confused because not all those who use the term distinguish it clearly enough from internationalization, and some writers appear to use the two terms interchangeably. I argue that a clear distinction must be drawn between the inter-national and the global. The hyphen in inter-national is to distinguish (inadequate) conceptions of the 'global' founded on the existing even if changing system of nation-states, from (genuine) conceptions of the global based on the emergence of global processes and a global system of social relations not founded on national characteristics or nation-states. This global system theory is the framework for my own research.

Globalization studies can be categorized on the basis of four research clusters:

1. The world-systems approach;
2. The global culture approach;
3. The global society approach;
4. The global capitalism approach;

The body of the paper is an exposition and critique of these approaches. The paper argues that the global capitalism approach is most productive for theory and research in globalization and concludes with a brief discussion of resistances to globalization.

[1] This paper will be published in an extended form in Sklair (forthcoming).

JOURNAL OF WORLD-SYSTEMS RESEARCH, V, 2, SUMMER 1999, 143-163
http://jwsr.ucr.edu/
ISSN 1076-156X

INTRODUCTION

Globalization is a relatively new idea in the social sciences, although people who work in and write about the mass media, transnational corporations and international business have been using it for some time. Jacques Maisonrouge, the French-born former President of IBM World Trade, was an early exponent of the view that the future lies with global corporations who operate as if the world had no real borders rather than organizations tied to a particular country. The influential U.S. magazine, *Business Week* (14 May 1990) summed this view up in the evocative phrase: 'The Stateless Corporation'. The purpose of this paper is to critically review the ways in which sociologists and other social scientists use ideas of globalization and to evaluate the fruitfulness of these competing conceptions.

The central feature of the idea of globalization is that many contemporary problems cannot be adequately studied at the level of nation-states, that is, in terms of each country and its inter-national relations, but instead need to be seen in terms of global processes. Some globalists (for example, Ohmae, 1990) have even gone so far as to predict that global forces, by which they usually mean transnational corporations and other global economic institutions, global culture or globalizing belief systems/ideologies of various types, or a combination of all of these, are becoming so powerful that the continuing existence of the nation-state is in serious doubt. This is not a necessary consequence of most theories of globalization, though many argue that the significance of the nation-state is declining (even if the ideology of nationalism is still strong in some places).

There is no single agreed definition of globalization, indeed, some argue that its significance has been much exaggerated, but as the ever-increasing numbers of books and articles discussing different aspects of it suggest, it appears to be an idea whose time has come in sociology in particular and in the social sciences in general. The author of the first genuine textbook on globalization suggests that it may be '*the* concept of the 1990s' (Waters, 1994, p.1; see also Robertson, 1992, Albrow, 1996).

The argument of this paper is that the central problem in understanding much of the globalization literature is that not all those who use the term distinguish it clearly enough from internationalization, and some writers appear to use the two terms interchangeably. I argue that a clear distinction must be drawn between the inter-national and the global. The hyphen in

inter-national is to signify confusing conceptions of globalization founded on the existing even if changing system of nation-states, while the global signifies the emergence of processes and a system of social relations not founded on the system of nation-states.

This difficulty is compounded by the fact that most theory and research in sociology is based on concepts of society that identify the unit of analysis with a particular country (for example, sociology of Britain, of Japan, of the USA, of Russia, of India, etc.), sub-systems within countries (British education, the Japanese economy, American culture, politics in Russia, religion in India) or comparisons between single countries and groups of them (modern Britain and traditional India, declining America and ascendent Japan, rich and poor countries, the West and the East). This general approach, usually called state-centrism, is still useful in many respects and there are clearly good reasons for it. Not the least of these is that most historical and contemporary sociological data sets have been collected on particular countries.[1] However, most globalization theorists argue that the nation-state is no longer the only important unit of analysis. Some even argue that the nation-state is now less important in some fundamental respects than other global, forces; examples being the mass media and the corporations that own and control them, transnational corporations (some of which are richer than the majority of nation-states in the world today) and even social movements that spread ideas such as universal human rights, global environmental responsibility and the world-wide call for democracy and human dignity. Yearley (1995, chapter 1) identifies two main obstacles to making sociological sense of globalization, namely 'the tight connection between the discipline of sociology and the nation-state' (p.9) and the fact that countries differ significantly in their geographies. Despite these difficulties (really elaborations of the local-global problem which will be discussed below) he makes the telling point that a focus on the environment encourages us to 'work down to the global' from the universal, a necessary corrective to state-centrist conceptions which work up to the global from the nation-state or even, as we shall see from individualistic notions of 'global consciousness'.

[1] For some extremely interesting examples of cross-cultural data presented in forms that are not state-centrist, see United Nations Development Programme (1993).

The study of globalization in sociology revolves primarily around two main classes of phenomena which have become increasingly significant in the last few decades. These are the emergence of a globalized economy based on new systems of production, finance and consumption; and the idea of 'global culture'. While not all globalization researchers entirely accept the existence of a global economy or a global culture, most accept that local, national and regional economies are undergoing important changes as a result of processes of globalization even where there are limits to globalization (see, for example, Scott, ed. 1997).

Researchers on globalization have focused on two phenomena, increasingly significant in the last few decades:

(i) the ways in which transnational corporations (TNC) have facilitated the globalization of capital and production (Dunning 1993, Barnet and Cavanagh 1994, Dicken 1998);

(ii) transformations in the global scope of particular types of TNC, those who own and control the mass media, notably television channels and the transnational advertising agencies. This is often connected with the spread of particular patterns of consumption and a culture and ideology of consumerism at the global level (Featherstone 1991, Dowmunt 1993, Sklair 1995, Barker 1997).

The largest TNCs have assets and annual sales far in excess of the Gross National Products of most of the countries in the world. The World Bank annual publication *World Development Report* reports that in 1995 only about 70 countries out a total of around 200 for which there is data, had GNPs of more than ten billion US dollars. By contrast, the *Fortune* Global 500 list of the biggest TNCs by turnover in 1995 reports that over 440 TNCs had annual sales greater than $10 billion. Thus, in this important sense, such well-known names as General Motors, Shell, Toyota, Unilever, Volkswagen, Nestle, Sony, Pepsico, Coca Cola, Kodak, Xerox and the huge Japanese trading houses (and many other corporations most people have never heard of) have more economic power at their disposal than the majority of the countries in the world. These figures prove little in themselves, they simply indicate the *gigantism* of TNCs relative to most countries.

Not only have TNCs grown enormously in size in recent decades but their 'global reach' has expanded dramatically. Many companies, even from large rich countries, regularly earn a third or more of their revenues from

'foreign' sources (see Sklair 1998a). Not all *Fortune* Global 500 corporations are headquartered in the First World: some come from what was called the Third World or those parts of it known as the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs).[3] Examples of these are the 'national' oil companies of Brazil, India, Mexico, Taiwan and Venezuela (some owned by the state but most run like private corporations), banks in Brazil and China, an automobile company from Turkey, and the Korean manufacturing and trading conglomerates (*chaebol*), a few of which have attained global brand-name status (for example, Hyundai and Samsung).

Writers who are sceptical about economic globalization argue that the facts that most TNCs are legally domiciled in the USA, Japan and Europe and that they trade and invest mainly between themselves means that the world economy is still best analyzed in terms of national corporations and that the global economy is a myth (see, for example, Hirst and Thompson, 1996). But this deduction entirely ignores the well-established fact that an increasing number of corporations operating outside their 'home' countries see themselves as developing global strategies, as is obvious if we read their annual reports and other publications rather than focus exclusively on aggregate data on foreign investment.[4] You cannot simply assume that all 'US', 'Japanese' and other 'national' TNCs somehow express a 'national interest'. They do not. They primarily express the interests of those who own and control them, even if historical patterns of TNC development have differed from place to place, country to country and region to region. Analysing globalization as a relatively recent phenomenon, originating from the 1960s, allows us to see more clearly the tensions between traditional 'national' patterns of TNC development and the new global corporate structures and dynamics. It is also important to realize that, even in state-centrist terms, a relatively small investment for a major TNC can result in a relatively large

[3] On the NICs see Dicken (1998) and Sklair, ed. (1994).

[4] All parts of all economies are clearly not equally globalized. However, there does appear to be increasing evidence that production and marketing processes within TNCs are being 'deterritorialized' from their 'home' countries into something like a new global system. This is a highly controversial issue in the study of TNC (see Sklair 1998a).

measure of economic presence in a small, poor country or a poor region or community in a larger and less poor country.

The second crucial phenomenon for globalization theorists is the global diffusion and increasingly concentrated ownership and control of the electronic mass media, particularly television (Barker, 1997). The number of TV sets per capita has grown so rapidly in Third World countries in recent years (from fewer than 10 per thousand population in 1970 to 60 per 1,000 in 1993, according to UNESCO) that many researchers argue that a 'globalizing effect' due to the mass media is taking place even in the Third World (Sussman and Lent 1991, Sklair 1995).

Ownership and control of television, including satellite and cable systems, and associated media like newspaper, magazine and book publishing, films, video, records, tapes, compact discs, and a wide variety of other marketing media, are concentrated in relatively few very large TNCs. The predominance of US-based corporations is being challenged by others based in Japan, Europe and Australia and even by 'Third World' corporations like the media empires of TV Globo, based in Brazil and Televisa, based in Mexico (Nordenstreng and Schiller, 1993).

MAIN APPROACHES TO GLOBALIZATION

As with other topics in sociology, there are several ways to categorize theory and research on globalization. One common approach is to compare mono-causal with multi-causal explanations of the phenomenon, as does McGrew (1992). This is a useful way of looking at the problem but it has two main drawbacks. First, it ends up by putting thinkers with entirely different types of explanations—for example those who see globalization as a consequence of the development of material-technological forces and those who see it as a consequence of ideological and/or cultural forces—in the same bag. Second, few thinkers present an entirely mono-causal explanation of anything; most of the thinkers McGrew identifies as mono-causal do try to show the relevance of a variety of factors even if they tend to prioritize some factors over others, while those he identifies as multi-causal do not always argue that everything causes everything else. Globalization, by its very nature, is a big and complex subject.

A second approach is to compare the disciplinary focus of globalization studies. This is certainly an interesting and fruitful avenue to explore: several disciplines have made distinctive contributions to the study of globalization (to some extent all the social sciences have contributed to the debate, but anthropology, geography and international political economy in addition to sociology, can be singled out). These contributions are commonly borrowed by sociologists of globalization, and *vice versa*, and this will be reflected in my own categorization. I have chosen to categorize globalization studies on the basis of four research clusters in which groups of scholars are working on similar research problems, either in direct contact with each other or, more commonly, in rather indirect contact. Accordingly, I identify the following four sources of globalization research in contemporary sociology:

1. The world-systems approach;
2. The global culture approach;
3. The global society approach;
4. The global capitalism approach.

1. The World-Systems Approach

This approach is based on the distinction between core, semiperipheral and peripheral countries in terms of their changing roles in the international division of labour dominated by the capitalist world-system. World-systems as a model in social science research, inspired by the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, has been developed in a large and continually expanding body of literature since the 1970s (see Wallerstein 1979, and Shannon, 1989 for a good overview).

The world-systems approach is, unlike the others to be discussed, not only a collection of academic writings but also a highly institutionalized academic enterprise. It is based at the Braudel Center at SUNY Binghamton, supports various international joint academic ventures, and publishes the journal, *Review*. Though the work of world-systems theorists cannot be said to be fully a part of the globalization literature as such (see King, ed., 1990), the institutionalization of the world-systems approach undoubtedly prepared the ground for globalization in the social sciences.

In some senses, Wallerstein and his school could rightly claim to have been 'global' all along—after all, what could be more global than the 'world-system'? However, there is no specific concept of the 'global' in most world-systems literature. Reference to the 'global' comes mainly from critics and, significantly, can be traced to the long-standing problems that the world-

system model has had with 'cultural issues'. Wallerstein's essay on 'Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System', the critique by Boyne, and Wallerstein's attempt to rescue his position under the title of 'Culture is the World-System' (all in Featherstone, ed. 1990), illustrate the problem well.

Chase-Dunn, in his suggestively titled book *Global Formation* (1989), does try to take the argument a stage further by arguing for a dual logic approach to economy and polity. At the economic level, he argues, a global logic of the world-economy prevails whereas at the level of politics a state-centred logic of the world-system prevails. However, as the world-economy is basically still explicable only in terms of national economies (countries of the core, semiperiphery and periphery), Chase-Dunn's formulation largely reproduces the problems of Wallerstein's state-centrist analysis.

There is, therefore, no distinctively 'global' dimension in the world-systems model apart from the inter-national focus that it has always emphasized. Wallerstein himself rarely uses the word 'globalization'. For him, the *economics* of the model rests on the inter-national division of labour that distinguishes core, semiperiphery and periphery countries. The *politics* are mostly bound up with antisystemic movements and 'superpower struggles'. And the *cultural*, insofar as it is dealt with at all, covers debates about the 'national' and the 'universal' and the concept of 'civilization(s)' in the social sciences. Many critics are not convinced that the world-systems model, usually considered to be 'economistic' (that is, too locked into economic factors) can deal with cultural issues adequately. Wolff tellingly comments on the way in which the concept of 'culture' has been inserted into Wallerstein's world-system model: 'An economism which gallantly switches its attentions to the operations of culture is still economism' (in King ed., 1991, p.168). Wallerstein's attempts to theorize 'race', nationality and ethnicity in terms of what he refers to as different types of 'peoplehood' in the world-system (Wallerstein, 1991) might be seen as a move in the right direction, but few would argue that cultural factors are an important part of the analysis.

While it would be fair to say that there are various remarks and ideas that do try to take the world-systems model beyond state-centrism[5], any

[5] For example, research on the idea of commodity chains, networks of labour, production and marketing of goods, has shifted attention away from national economies to global forces, to some extent (see Gereffi in Sklair, ed. 1994, chapter 11).

conceptions of the global that world-system theorists have tend to be embedded in the world-economy based on the system of nation-states. The 'global' and the 'inter-national' are generally used interchangeably by world-systems theorists. This is certainly one possible use of 'global' but it seems quite superfluous, given that the idea of the 'inter-national' is so common in the social science literature. Whatever the fate of the world-systems approach, it is unlikely that ideas of globalization would have spread so quickly and deeply in sociology without the impetus it gave to looking at the whole world.

2. Global Culture Model

A second model of globalization derives specifically from research on the 'globalization of culture'. The global culture approach focuses on the problems that a homogenizing mass media-based culture poses for national identities. As we shall see below, this is complementary to, rather than in contradiction with, the global society approach, which focuses more on ideas of an emerging global consciousness and their implications for global community, governance and security.

This is well illustrated in the collection of articles in book-form from the journal *Theory, Culture and Society (TCS)* edited by Featherstone (1990) under the title *Global Culture*. *TCS* has brought together groups of like-minded theorists through the journal and conferences, which has resulted in an institutional framework and an intellectual critical mass for the development of a culturalist approach to globalization. Of the writers associated with TCS who have made notable contributions to this effort, Robertson-who has been credited with introducing the term globalization into sociology (Waters 1995, p.2)-is probably the most influential.

Although these researchers cannot be identified as a school in the same way as world-system researchers can be, their works do constitute a relatively coherent whole. First, they tend to prioritize the cultural over the political and/or the economic. Second, there is a common interest in the question of how individual and/or national identity can survive in the face of an emerging 'global culture'.

A distinctive feature of this model is that it problematises the existence of 'global culture', as a reality, a possibility or a fantasy. This is based on the very rapid growth that has taken place over the last few decades in the

scale of the mass media of communication and the emergence of what Marshall McLuhan famously called 'the global village'. The basic idea is that the spread of the mass media, especially television, means that everyone in the world can be exposed to the same images, almost instantaneously. This, the argument goes, turns the whole world into a sort of 'global village'.

Of considerable interest to sociologists theorizing and researching globalization is the distinctive contribution of anthropologists to these debates. Friedman, a Swedish anthropologist, argues, for example, that: 'Ethnic and cultural fragmentation and modernist homogenization are not two arguments, two opposing views of what is happening in the world today, but two constitutive trends of global reality. The dualist centralized world of the double East-West hegemony is fragmenting, politically, and culturally, but the homogeneity of capitalism remains as intact and as systematic as ever' (in Featherstone 1990:311). While not all would agree either that capitalism remains intact and systematic or that it is, in fact, the framework of globalization, the fragmentation of 'the double East-West hegemony' is beyond doubt. Ideas such as hybridization and creolization have been proposed in the effort to try to conceptualize what happens when people and items from different (sometimes, but not always, dominant and subordinate) cultures interact.[6]

Some 'globalization of culture' theorists have also contributed to current debates on postmodernity in which transformations in the mass media and media representations of reality and so-called 'hyperreality' play a central role. Indicative of similar interests is a compilation of articles edited by Albrow and King (1990) which raised several central issues relevant to the ideas of global sociology, global society and globalization, as new problem areas in the social sciences. One important emphasis has been the 'globalization' of sociology itself as a discipline. This connects in some important ways with the debate about the integrity of national cultures in a globalizing world. While the classical sociological theorists, notably Marx, Weber and Durkheim, all tried to generalize about how societies changed and tried to

[6] See Stuart Hall's chapter 6 in Hall et al. (1992). Also relevant here are Appadurai's five dimensions of global cultural flows: ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes,

establish some universal features of social organization, none of them saw the need to theorize on the global level. This connects in some important ways with the debate about the integrity of national cultures in a globalizing world, and particularly the influence of 'Western' economic, political, military and cultural forms on non-Western societies.

Globo-localism

A subset of the global culture approach, characterised as 'globo-localism', derives from a group of scholars from various countries and social science traditions whose main concern is to try to make sense of the multifaceted and enormously complex web of local-global relations. There is a good deal of overlap between this and the 'globalization of culture' model, but the globo-local researchers tend to emphasize the 'territorial' dimension.

This view has been actively developed within the International Sociological Association (ISA). The ISA 12th World Congress of Sociology in Madrid in the 1990 was organized around the theme 'Sociology for One World: Unity and Diversity'. Mlinar (ed., 1992) reports that 'the issue of globalization was readily accepted' and his edited volume of papers from the conference illustrates the variety of issues raised in Madrid. The 1994 ISA Congress in Bielefeld, Germany, continued the theme under the title 'Contested Boundaries and Shifting Solidarities' and again discussions of globalization were quite prominently featured on the agenda, and the 1998 Conference in Montreal continues the trend. It is not surprising that globalization and territory attracted attention, for in the background to the 1990 and 1994 conferences the wars in the former Yugoslavia were raging (Mlinar himself is from Slovenia, formerly part of Yugoslavia) and, of course, the first shocks of the end of the communist state system were giving way to new territorial issues created by an explosive mix of local and global forces.

If Mlinar is a European progenitor of the globo-local model, then the American progenitor is Alger (1988) who developed the concept of the 'local-global nexus'. There is no single common theoretical position in the work of Mlinar, Alger and the others involved in this enterprise. What unites them is the urge to theorize and research questions of what happens to *territorial identities* (within and across countries) in a globalizing world. Thus, it is part of the more general global culture model, but with a distinct territorial focus.

The main research question for all these writers is the autonomy of local cultures in the face of an advancing 'global culture'. Competing claims of local cultures against the forces of 'globalization' have forced themselves onto the sociological, cultural and political agendas all over the world. This is largely continuous with the focus of the third globalization model, based on the idea of global society.

3. Global Society Models

Inspiration for this general conception of globalization is often located in the pictures of planet earth sent back by space explorers. A classic statement of this was the report of Apollo XIV astronaut Edgar Mitchell in 1971:

> It was a beautiful, harmonious, peaceful-looking planet, blue with white clouds, and one that gave you a deep sense...of home, of being, of identity. It is what I prefer to call instant global consciousness.[7]

Had astronaut Mitchell penetrated a little through the clouds, he would also have seen horrific wars in Vietnam and other parts of Asia, bloody repression by various dictatorial regimes in Africa and Latin America, dead and maimed bodies as a result of sectarian terrorism in Britain and Ireland, as well as a terrible toll of human misery from hunger, disease, drug abuse and carnage on roads all round the world as automobile cultures intensified their own peculiar structures of globalization. Nevertheless, some leading globalization theorists, for example Giddens (1991) and Robertson (1992), do attribute great significance to ideas like 'global awareness' and 'planetary consciousness'.

Historically, global society theorists argue that the concept of world or global society has become a believable idea only in the modern age and, in particular, science, technology, industry and universal values are increasingly creating a twentieth century world that is different from any past age. The globalization literature is full of discussions of the decreasing power and significance of the nation-state and the increasing significance (if not actually

[7] This is quoted in many different places. My source is, significantly, from the back page of the 25th Anniversary Issue of *Earthmatters*, the magazine of Friends of the Earth, UK. The quote is superimposed on a very cloudy map of a rather polluted planet earth.

power) of supra-national and global institutions and systems of belief. Ideas of space-time distanciation (see Giddens, 1991) and of time-space compression (see Harvey, 1989) illustrate how processes of globalization compress, stretch and deepen space-time for people all over the world thus creating some of the conditions for a global society.

In his attempt to order the field of globalization studies, Spybey (1996) contrasts the view that 'modernity is inherently globalizing' (Giddens, 1991, p.63) with the view that globalization predates modernity (Robertson, 1992). While Spybey comes down in favour of Giddens thesis that globalization is best conceptualized as 'reflexive modernization', he is less clear about why these differences matter and, in the end, as with so many debates in the social sciences, the main protagonists seem to be saying more or less the same things in rather different languages. However, it is important to establish whether globalization is a new name for a relatively old phenomenon (which appears to be the argument of Robertson), or whether it is relatively new, a phenomenon of late modenity (the argument of Giddens) or whether it is very new and primarily a consequence of post-1960s capitalism (the argument of Sklair). Why does this matter? It matters because if we want to understand our own lives and the lives of those around us, in our families, communities, local regions, countries, supra-national regions and, ultimately how we relate to the global, then it is absolutely fundamental that we are clear about the extent to which the many different structures within which we live are the same in the most important respects as they have been or are different. Two critics, in their attempt to demonstrate that globalization is a myth because the global economy does not really exist, argue that there is 'no fundamental difference between the international submarine telegraph cable method of financial transactions [of the early twentieth century] and contemporary electronic systems (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p.197). They are entirely mistaken. The fundamental difference is, precisely, in the way that the electronics revolution (a post-1960s phenomenon) has transformed the quantitative possibilities of transferring cash and money capital into qualitatively new forms of corporate and personal financing, entrepreneurship and, crucially, the system of credit on which the 'global culture and ideology of consumerism largely rests. Some globalization theorists argue forcefully that these phenomena are all new and fundamental for understanding not only what is happening in the rich countries, but in

social groups anywhere who have a part to play in this global system. In this sense the idea of a global society is a very provocative one but, while it is relatively easy to establish empirically the objective dimensions of globalization as they involve the large majority of the world's population, the idea of a global society based on subjective relationships to globalization, planetary consciousness and the like, is highly speculative.[8]

There appears to be, however, a real psychological need for many writers to believe in the possibilities of a global society (which I share).[9] As McGrew (1992) shows, this theme is elaborated by scholars grappling with the apparent contradictions between globalization and local disruption and strife based on ethnic and other particularistic loyalties. It is in this type of approach that a growing appreciation of the ethical problems of globalization is particularly to be found. The reason for this is simple: now that humankind has the capacity to destroy itself through war and toxic accidents of various types, a democratic and just human society on the global level, however utopian, seems to be the best long-term guarantee of the continued survival of humanity (Held 1995).

4. Global Capitalism Model

A fourth model of globalization locates the dominant global forces in the structures of an ever-more globalizing capitalism (for example, Ross and Trachte 1990, Sklair 1995, McMichael 1996; see also Robinson 1996). While all of these writers and others who could be identified with this approach develop their own specific analyses of globalization, they all strive towards a concept of the 'global' that involves more than the relations between nation-states and state-centrist explanations of national economies competing against each other.

Ross and Trachte focus specifically on capitalism as a social system which is best analyzed on three levels, namely the level of the internal logic of the system (inspired by Marx and Adam Smith), the structural level of historical development and the level of the specific social formation, or society. They explain the deindustrialization of some of the heartland regions of capitalism and the transformations of what we still call the Third World in these terms and argue that the globalization of the capitalist system is deeply connected to the capitalist crises of the 1970s and after (oil price shocks, rising unemployment, and increasing insecurity as the rich countries experience problems in paying for their welfare states). This leads them to conclude that: 'We are only at the beginning of the global era' (Ross and Trachte, 1990, p.230).

Sklair proposes a more explicit model of the global system based on the concept of *transnational practices*, practices that originate with non-state actors and cross state borders. They are analytically distinguished in three spheres: economic, political and cultural-ideological. Each of these practices is primarily, but not exclusively, characterized by a major institution. The *transnational corporation* (TNC) is the most important institution for economic transnational practices; the *transnational capitalist class* (TCC) for political transnational practices; and the *culture-ideology of consumerism* for transnational cultural-ideological practices (Sklair 1995). The research agenda of this theory is concerned with how TNCs, transnational capitalist classes and the culture-ideology of consumerism operate to transform the world in terms of the global capitalist project.

[8] I take this argument further in the section on 'Globalization in Everyday Life' in Sklair (forthcoming).

[9] For example, Strauss and Falk argue 'For a Global People's Assembly' in the *International Herald Tribune*, (14 November 1997), a publication that advertises itself as the newspaper for global elites!

Table 1 – The Transnational Capitalist Class

TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICES	LEADING INSTITUTIONS	INTEGRATING AGENTS
economic sphere transnational capital; International capital; State capital	economic forces Global TNCs; World Bank, IMF, BIS; State TNCs	Global Business Elite
political sphere TNC executives, Globalizing bureaucrats, Politicians and professionals; regional blocs; Emerging transnational states	political forces Global business organization, Open-door agencies, WTO, Parties and lobbies; EU, NAFTA, ASEAN; UN, NGOs	Global Political Elite
culture-ideology sphere Consumerism; Transnational neo-liberalism	culture-ideology forces Shops, media; Think tanks, elite social movements	Global Cultural Elite

In global system theory the TCC acts as a 'global ruling class'. While the empirical evidence to support this argument is as yet in a very embryonic phase, Table 1 suggests how the TCC fits into the global system in terms of its economic base, its leading institutions and its integrating agents.

The culture-ideology of consumerism prioritizes the exceptional place of consumption and consumerism in contemporary capitalism, increasing consumption expectations and aspirations without necessarily ensuring the income to buy. The extent to which economic and environmental constraints on the private accumulation of capital challenge the global capitalist project in general and its culture-ideology of consumerism in particular, is a central issue for global system theory (Sklair in Redclift and Benton 1994; see also Durning 1992).

McMichael (1996) focuses on the issue of Third World development and provides both theoretical and empirical support for the thesis that globalization is a qualitatively new phenomenon and not simply a quantitative expansion of older trends. He contrasts two periods. First, the 'Development Project' (late 1940s to early 1970s), when all countries tried to develop their national economies with the help of international development agencies and institutions. The second period he labels the 'Globalization Project' (1980s onwards), when development is pursued through attempts to integrate economies into a globalized world market, and the process is directed by a public-private coalition of 'Global Managers'. He explains:

> As parts of national economies became embedded more deeply in global enterprise through commodity chains, they weakened as national units and strengthened the reach of the global economy. This situation was not unique to the 1980s, but the mechanisms of the debt regime institutionalized the power and authority of global management within states' very organization and procedures. This was the turning point in the story of development. (McMichael 1996, p.135)

This contribution to the debate is notable for its many telling empirical examples of the effects of globalization on Third World communities.

To these writers on globalization and capitalism we can add other Marxist and Marx-inspired scholars who see capitalism as a global system, but do not have any specific concepts of globalization. The most important of these is the geographer, David Harvey, whose Marxist analysis of modernity and postmodernity is significant for the attempt to build a bridge between the

debates around economic and cultural globalization (Harvey, 1989, especially chapter 15).

SUMMING-UP THE APPROACHES.

Each of the four approaches to globalization has its own distinctive strengths and weaknesses. The world-system model tends to be economistic (minimizing the importance of political and cultural factors), but as globalization is often interpreted in terms of economic actors and economic institutions, this does seem to be a realistic approach. The globalization of culture model, on the other hand, tends to be culturalist (minimizing economic factors), but as much of the criticism of globalization comes from those who focus on the negative effects of homogenizing mass media and marketing on local and indigenous cultures, the culturalist approach has many adherents. The world society model tends to be both optimistic and all-inclusive, an excellent combination for the production of world-views, but less satisfactory for social science research programmes. Finally, the global capitalism model, by prioritising the global capitalist system and paying less attention to other global forces, runs the risk of appearing one-sided. However, the question remains: how important is that 'one side' (global capitalism)?[10]

RESISTANCES TO GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is often seen in terms of impersonal forces wreaking havoc on the lives of ordinary and defenceless people and communities. It is not coincidental that interest in globalization over the last two decades has been accompanied by an upsurge in what has come to be known as New Social Movements (NSM) research (Ray 1993, Spybey 1996, chapter 7, Sklair 1998b). NSM theorists, despite their substantial differences, argue that the traditional response of the labour movement to global capitalism, based on class politics, has generally failed; and that a new analysis based on identity politics (of gender, sexuality, ethnicity, age, community, belief systems) is

[10] Today, more or less every specialism in the social sciences has its 'globalization' perspective, for example, globalization of law, social welfare, crime, labour and politics. Among the most important substantive issues, widely discussed by globalization researchers inside and outside the four approaches outlined above, are global environmental change, gender and globalization, global cities and globalization and regionalization, discussed in Sklair (forthcoming).

necessary to mount effective resistance to sexism, racism, environmental damage, warmongering, capitalist exploitation and other forms of injustice.

The globalization of identity politics involves the establishment of global networks of people with similar identities and interests outside the control of international, state and local authorities. There is a substantial volume of research and documentation on such developments in the women's, peace and environmental movements, some of it in direct response to governmental initiatives (for example, alternative and NGO organization shadowing official United Nations and other conferences) but most theorists and activists tend to operate under the slogan: think global, act local (Ekins, 1992).

The main challenges to global capitalism in the economic sphere have also come from those who 'think global and act local'. This normally involves disrupting the capacity of TNCs and global financial institutions to accumulate private profits at the expense of their workforces, their consumers and the communities which are affected by their activities. An important part of economic globalization today is the increasing dispersal of the manufacturing process into many discrete phases carried out in many different places. Being no longer so dependent on the production of one factory and one workforce gives capital a distinct advantage, particularly against the strike weapon which once gave tremendous negative power to the working class. Global production chains can be disrupted by strategically planned stoppages, but these generally act more as inconveniences than as real weapons of labour against capital. The international division of labour and its corollary, the globalization of production, builds flexibility into the system so that not only can capital migrate anywhere in the world to find the cheapest reliable productive sources of labour but also few workforces can any longer decisively 'hold capital to ransom' by withdrawing their labour. At the level of the production process, globalizing capital has all but defeated labour. In this respect, the global organization of the TNCs and allied institutions like globalizing government agencies and the World Bank have, so far, proved too powerful for the local organization of labour and communities.

Nevertheless, the global capitalists, if we are to believe their own propaganda, are continuously beset by opposition, boycott, legal challenge and moral outrage from the consumers of their products and by disruptions from their workers. There are also many ways to be ambivalent or hostile

about global capitalism and cultures and ideologies of consumerism, some of which have been successfully exploited by the 'Green' movement (see Mander and Goldsmith, eds. 1996).

The issue of democracy is central to the advance of the forces of globalization and the practices and the prospects of social movements that oppose them, both local and global. The rule of law, freedom of association and expression, freely contested elections, as minimum conditions and however imperfectly sustained, are as necessary in the long run for mass market based global consumerist capitalism as they are for alternative social systems.[11]

CONCLUSION

This account of the state of globalization studies to date has focused on what distinguishes global from inter-national forces, processes and institutions. It is almost exclusively based on the European and North American literature and it does not preclude the possibility of other and quite different conceptions of globalization being developed elsewhere. Despite the view, particularly evident in the accounts of 'global culture' theorists that globalization is more or less the same as Westernization or Americanization or McDonaldization (Ritzer, 1995), more and more critics are beginning to question this one-way traffic bias in the globalization literature. This critique is well-represented in the empirical cases and analytical points of those who are 'Interrogating Theories of the Global' (in King ed., 1991, chapter 6) and the work of African and Asian scholars represented in Albrow and King (eds. 1990), all of whom provide some necessary correctives to European-North American orthodoxies. These scholars, and others, are doing important research relevant for the study of globalization, and their work does not necessarily fit into the four approaches identified above. It is very likely that an introduction to globalization studies to be written ten years from now will reflect non-Western perspectives much more strongly. Nevertheless, although of quite recent vintage, it is undeniable that globalization

---

11. I say in the long-run. In the short-term, authoritarian regimes can ignore demands for democratization and push forward consumerist market reforms. It is by no means obvious that everyone in the world prefers 'democracy' to 'economic prosperity', if that is the choice they are persuaded to accept.

as a theoretical issue and an object of research, is now firmly on the agenda of the social sciences.

REFERENCES

(place of publication is London unless otherwise indicated)
Albrow, M. (1996) *The Global Age*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Albrow, M. and King, E. eds. (1990) *Globalization, Knowledge and Society*, Sage.
Alger, C. (1988) 'Perceiving, analysing and coping with the local-global nexus', *International Social Science Journal* 117, August: 321-40.
Barker, Chris (1997) *Global Television*, Oxford: Blackwell.
Barnet, R. and Cavanagh, J. (1994) *Global Dreams*, New York: Simon and Schuster.
Chase-Dunn, C. *Global Formation*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.
Dicken, P. (1998) *Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy Paul Chapman, third edition.*
Dowmunt, T. ed. (1993) *Channels of Resistance: Global Television and Local Empowerment*, BFI/Channel Four.
Dunning, J. (1993) *Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy*, Wokingham: Addison-Wesley.
Durning, A. (1992) How Much is Enough, *Earthscan*.
Ekins, P. (1992) *A new world order: grassroots movements for global change*, Routledge.
Featherstone, M. ed. (1990) *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Identity*, Sage.
Giddens, A. (1991) *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hall, S., Held, D. and McGrew, T. eds. (1992) *Modernity and its Futures*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Harvey, D. (1989) *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Held, D. (1995) *Democracy and the Global Order*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (1996) *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
King, A.D. ed. (1991) *Culture, Globalization and the World-System Macmillan.*
Mander, Jerry and Goldsmith, Edward eds. (1996) *The Case against the Global Economy*, San Francisco: Sierra Club.
McGrew, T. (1992) 'A Global Society?', in *Hall et al. eds*, op. cit.
McMichael, P. (1996) *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*, Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.
Mlinar, Z. ed. (1992) *Globalization and Territorial Identities*, Aldershot: Avebury.
Nordenstreng, K. and Schiller, H. eds. *Beyond National Sovereignty: International Communications in the 1990s*, Norwood: Ablex.
Redclift, M. and Benton, T. eds. (1994) *Social Theory and the Global Environment*, Routledge.
Ritzer, G. (1995) *The McDonaldization of Society*, Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge, second edition.
Robertson, R. (1992) *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*, Sage.
Robinson, William (1996) 'Globalisation: nine theses on our epoch', *Race and Class* 38 (2): 13-31.

Ross, R. and Trachte, K. (1990) *Global Capitalism: The New Leviathan*, Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.
Scott, Alan ed. (1997) *The Limits of Globalization*, Routledge.
Shannon, T. (1989) *An Introduction to the World-System Perspective*, Boulder: Westview.
Sklair, L. (forthcoming) 'Globalization: New Approaches to Social Change', in S. Taylor, ed. *Contemporary Sociology*, MacMillan.
Sklair, L. (1998a) 'Globalization and the Corporations: The case of the California Fortune Global 500' *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* (June).
Sklair, L. (1998b) 'Social movements and global capitalism' in F. Jameson and M. Miyoshi, eds. *Cultures of Globalization*, Durham, NC. Duke University Press.
Sklair, L. (1995) *Sociology of the Global System*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, second edition (first ed. 1991).
Sklair, L. ed. (1994b) *Capitalism and Development*, Routledge.
Spybey, T. (1995) *Globalization and World Society*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Sussman, G. and Lent, J. eds. (1991) *Transnational Communications: Wiring the Third World*, Sage.
United Nations Development Programme (1993) *Human Development Report 1993*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wallerstein, I. (1979) *The Capitalist World-Economy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wallerstein, I. (1991) 'The construction of peoplehood: racism, nationalism, ethnicity'. In E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein, eds. *'Race', Nation, Class*, Verso.
Waters, M. (1995) *Globalization*, Routledge, 1995.
Yearley, S. (1996) *Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization: Reinventing the Globe*, Sage.

Transnational Feminist Networks

Collective Action in an Era of Globalization

Valentine M. Moghadam
Illinois State University

abstract: This article seeks to contribute to feminist theorizing, to globalization studies and to theories of social movements by discussing a new organizational form and a new form of women's collective action in an era of globalization: transnational feminist networks (TFNs). The article's empirical section focuses on the origins, objectives and activities of four TFNs, each of which links women across national borders around a common agenda that includes economic, political and foreign policy concerns. It is argued that the women's movement should be understood not only in terms of its local manifestations but as a global phenomenon, characterized by supra-national constituencies, objectives, strategies and organizations. As such it is an integral part of the growing family of global social movements and organizations.

keywords: global feminism ✦ globalization ✦ social movements ✦ transnational feminist networks

Introduction

Current theories of social movements have added much to our understanding of the dynamics of collective action. This includes attention to the role of grievances, political opportunities and constraints, mobilizing structures and framing processes (see, for example, McAdam et al., 1996). However, there are gaps and biases: (1) a Western bias and a tendency to focus research on movements in Western countries; (2) a gender bias and a tendency to ignore women's participation in social movements or theorize the gender dynamics of collective action; and (3) a national bias and a tendency to ignore global or world-systemic developments. Feminist

International Sociology ✦ March 2000 ✦ Vol 15(1): 57–85
SAGE (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
[0268-5809(200003)15:1;57–85;012088]

sociologists have certainly advanced our understanding of the social dynamics of women's movements and women's organizations (e.g. Katzenstein and Mueller, 1987; Ferree and Hess, 1995; Ferree and Martin, 1995), but this body of knowledge is based largely on research concerning single, Western societies. Studies that have had an international focus include Morgan (1985), Moghadam (1994), Stienstra (1994) and Basu (1995), but these have not explicitly addressed social movement theory; nor have they theorized women's movements as transnational or global social movements. (Basu [1995] explicitly rejects this proposition.)

This article builds on earlier research (Moghadam, 1996a), and seeks to contribute to feminist theorizing, to globalization studies and to theories of social movements by discussing a new organizational form and a new form of collective action in an era of globalization: transnational feminist networks (TFNs) and their activism. I focus on the origins, objectives and activities of four TFNs. They are: (1) Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), with branches in the Caribbean, Latin America and South Asia; (2) Network Women in Development Europe (WIDE), based in Brussels; (3) Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), based in Montpelier, France with an active branch in Lahore, Pakistan; and (4) the Association of Women of the Mediterranean Region (AWMR), based in Cyprus and Malta. The following questions are addressed: are women's movements local, or can we speak of a global women's movement? Are women's movements oppositional and anti-systemic? Have feminism and the women's movement developed supra-national constituencies, objectives, strategies and organizations?[1]

Social Theory and Transnational Feminism

Social movements are organized initiatives aimed at effecting political change. Some theorists view social movements as a collective response to deprivation, or the availability of resources, or the contradictions of late capitalism. Some European studies cast social movements – and especially the so-called new social movements – as emancipatory projects, expressions of societal democratization and indicators of, and contributors to, civil society. Students of new social movements have argued that social movements in the late 20th century are liberated from class, ideology and economic concerns; they employ new and creative forms of action; they focus on identity concerns rather than on strategy. It has been suggested that the women's movement, at least in the West, is one such 'identity politics' movement (e.g. Kriesi, 1996: 158).

Parallel to social movement research has been the emergence of scholarship on globalization (e.g. Robertson, 1992) and international non-governmental organizations and their contributions to a global culture

(Boli and Thomas, 1997). An advance in globalization studies is made by Sklair (1995), who proposes an explicit model of the (capitalist) global system based on the concept of 'transnational practices'. These are economic, political or cultural-ideological practices that originate with non-state actors, cross national borders and are characterized by a major institution or organizations. Key to the reproduction of the capitalist global system is the transnational corporation, along with the transnational capitalist class and the culture-ideology of consumerism. Sklair observes that globalization has been accompanied by an upsurge in new social movements operating locally and globally, and that these work to resist the homogenizing forces of globalization.

Social movement theory has not yet incorporated the insights of globalization studies, but theorists are not unaware of the gaps. Tarrow (1996: 61) has raised the following question:

> Whether the increasingly global economy and supranational institutions that have been developing around it over the past few decades have so thoroughly escaped the national state as to create transnational movements is a question students of political opportunity structure will have to face.

Kriesberg (1997) discusses how globalization processes may provide the basis for developing transnational identities, some of which may evolve into activist identities. McCarthy (1997: 243) notes that social movement theory is based on 'empirical evidence about nationally focused social movements operating within Western democracies'. He states that 'chronic social cleavages' such as 'class, religion, region, language, and ethnicity' may be the impetus for social movements; and he notes that 'there is great variation' in how social movement organizations are structured (McCarthy, 1997: 245). He concludes that 'we lack systematic evidence about the scope and shape of transnational protest, and the transnational social sector is in its adolescence' (McCarthy, 1997: 258). Smith (1997: 48) mentions but does not elaborate on the fact that 'TSMOs [transnational social movement organizations] working for women's rights . . . multiplied over the decade.'

Neither the globalization literature nor the social movement literature examines feminism as a transnational social movement with transnational organizations linking women in developing and developed regions and addressing social, economic and foreign policy issues in supra-national terms.

Introducing Women, Gender and a Global Perspective

As important as current theories of social movements are, they lack attention to women as actors in social movements and to the ways that gender

is built into political, organizational and cultural processes. Gender ideologies may shape social movements in profound ways, deeply affecting the discourses, objectives, tactics and outcomes of social movements. Within the same movement, women may be organized and mobilized differently from men. Recruitment methods, leadership roles and management styles may exhibit gender patterning. Gender roles, relations and ideologies may shape political opportunities; opportunities may exist for men but not for women, who may be less mobile or less able to respond to opportunities due to their greater involvement in family roles. Concomitantly, constraints are gendered. Constraints faced by women may be not only political but also cultural and familial. Within the same movement, women and men may have different objectives, priority concerns or modes of protest (West and Blumberg, 1990). Outcomes are also gendered – social movement effects may be different for women than for men (Moghadam, 1997). More to the point, it is important to recognize the extent to which women have organized and mobilized politically, and the ways they have formed their own, alternative movements and organizations – including TFNs. These movements and organizations are based on a sense of collective identity, shared meanings and common goals on the part of members.

Let us define our concepts: feminism, TFNs, global feminism. *Feminism* is a set of ideas, critiques and objectives predicated on the notion that women constitute a special category of people with certain traits and experiences in common, such as child-bearing and child-rearing, whether these be rooted in biology or in culture (Ferree and Hess, 1995: 32). Another essential premise is that women have a disadvantaged position in what is in effect a man's world. This disadvantage is manifested in the family, the economy, the polity and cultural institutions, and it may be differentiated or exacerbated by historical era or economic or political system. Feminism offers a form of analysis and a critique of women's positions and of society as a whole and a goal to effect social change through improvements in the legal status and social positions of women. The goals of equality, autonomy, empowerment or social transformation may be emphasized and prioritized differently by women's organizations, depending on political and economic context.

International feminism has existed for over 100 years, international women's organizations have been in existence for decades and links were established among women's movements in various countries in the early part of this century. Examples are the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the Women's International Democratic Federation and the International Federation of Business and Professional Women (see Rupp, 1998). However, *international* is not the same as *transnational*, which suggests a conscious crossing of national boundaries and a superseding

of nationalist orientations. As with feminism's first wave, second-wave feminism was, like many other social movements at the time, initially nationally based and nationally oriented. In the 1970s, clashes occurred among nationally or regionally framed feminisms, mainly due to disagreements between Western feminists, who tended to emphasize women's need for legal equality and sexual autonomy, and Third World feminists, who tended to emphasize imperialism and underdevelopment as obstacles to women's advancement. These arguments were especially noticeable at the First UN Conference on Women, which took place in Mexico City in 1975, and especially at the second conference, which took place in Copenhagen in 1980.

During the decade of the 1980s, however, a shift took place. In the sociodemographic context of a worldwide growth in the population of educated, employed, mobile and politically aware women, feminist discourses and networking began to spread and to take on not only an international but a transnational form. The new information technologies, along with the changing and increasingly harsh economic environment, broadened the horizons of women's organizations, resulting in considerable international networking and many joint initiatives. Feminists from the North came to appreciate the relevance of economic conditions and foreign policies to women's lives, while feminists from the South came to recognize the pertinence of 'body politics'. The Nairobi conference in 1985 seems to have been the turning point, and several TFNs were established around the time of the conference.

The UN has played a key role in facilitating interaction and cooperation among feminist organizations. Key UN events have been various world conferences, including the world conferences on women, as well as numerous regional preparatory meetings in advance of the conferences. Many TFNs were formed, and numerous women's organizations came into contact with each other between the 1985 Nairobi conference and the Fourth World Conference on Women (in Beijing in 1995). Almost as important as the networking at Nairobi and Beijing were the women's caucuses that formed in connection with other UN conferences of the 1990s. These were the UN Conference on Environment and Development (held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992), the World Conference on Human Rights (held in Vienna in June 1993), the International Conference on Population and Development (held in Cairo in September 1994) and the World Summit on Social Development (held in Copenhagen in March 1995). The result of these meetings and caucuses has been the emergence of 'global feminism' and of TFNs.

Today, feminist groups and women's organizations remain rooted in national or local issues, but their vocabulary, strategies and objectives have much in common with each other and have taken on an increasingly

supra-national form.[2] Moreover, some of these groups and organizations have joined or helped to form TFNs, which have a common agenda across national borders. They engage in information exchange, mutual support and a combination of lobbying, advocacy and direct action toward the realization of their goals of equality and empowerment for women and social justice and societal democratization.

Global feminism may be defined as the discourse and movement of women aimed at advancing the status of women through greater access to resources, legal measures to effect gender equality and the self-empowerment of women within national boundaries but through transnational forms of organizing and mobilizing. It is predicated upon the notion that notwithstanding cultural, class and ideological differences among the women of the world, there is a commonality in the forms of women's disadvantage and the forms of women's organizations worldwide. These organizations are increasingly networking and coordinating their activities, engaging in dialogue and forms of cooperation, solidarity and mutual support, sending representatives to meetings in other countries and regions and utilizing a similar vocabulary to describe women's disadvantage and the desired alternatives. As Sen and Grown (1987: 22) put it in their now-classic publication:

> We know now from our own research that the subordination of women has a long history and is deeply ingrained in economic, political and cultural processes. What we have managed to do in the last few years is to forge grassroots women's movements and world-wide networks such as never existed before, to begin to transform that subordination and in the process to break down other oppressive structures as well.

A vivid demonstration of 'global feminism on the ground' was the myriad preparatory activities around the world for the Fourth World Conference on Women and, of course, the participation of numerous women's NGOs at the conference itself. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action may be regarded as the 'manifesto' of global feminism (Moghadam, 1996a, 1996b). The passages below are taken directly from the Platform for Action, adopted in Beijing on 15 September 1995 (United Nations, 1996):

> The objective of the Platform for Action is the empowerment of women. The full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all women is essential for the empowerment of women. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. . . . (Platform for Action, Ch. II, paragraph 9)

> A world-wide movement towards democratization has opened up the political process in many countries, but the popular participation of women in key decision-making as full and equal partners with men, particularly in politics, has not yet been achieved. . . . (paragraph 17)
>
> Recent international economic developments have had in many cases a disproportionate impact on women and children, the majority of whom live in developing countries. . . . (paragraph 20)
>
> The growing strength of the non-governmental sector, particularly women's organizations and feminist groups, has become a driving force for change. Non-governmental organizations have played an important advocacy role in advancing legislation or mechanisms to ensure the promotion of women. They have also become catalysts for new approaches to development. . . . (paragraph 27)
>
> The human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. . . . (Ch. IV, paragraph 97)

Transnational Feminist Networks since 1985

The proliferation of TFNs may be regarded as both a reflection of the multifaceted process of globalization and a response to and criticism of its vagaries. What began in the early 1980s as the formation of a handful of small feminist networks comprised of individuals in a few neighboring countries has been transformed into large, sometimes professionalized organizations with officers, publications, annual meetings, web sites, ties to national and international non-governmental organizations (such as human rights groups), consultative status with the UN and so on. In many ways, this has changed the global political landscape.

As mentioned above, the 1985 Nairobi conference has been identified as a turning point in national women's organizations and in the emergence of global feminism (see, for example, Bunch and Carrillo, 1990). Regional research centers, feminist book fairs, regional meetings of feminists (notably the Latin American Feminist Meetings) and international academic conferences on women began to proliferate in the period before and after Nairobi. In 1981 the first International Interdisciplinary Congress on Women was held in Haifa, Israel. Subsequent congresses have been held in Groningen, the Netherlands in 1984, Dublin in 1987, New York in 1990, Costa Rica in 1993 and Adelaide, Australia, in 1997. Women have also created their own media outlets; notable among the TFNs formed in the period after the Nairobi conference are those that serve as means of communication. These include the International Women's Information and Communication Service (ISIS), the International Women's

Tribune Center (IWTC) and women's presses, such as Depthnews Asian Women's Feature Service (Stienstra, 1994: 106). These and other feminist networks are able to take advantage of current technological advances in communications, making extensive use of, for example, the fax, email and web sites.[3] In the late 1990s the IWTC has disseminated information via Internet on the deliberations of the UN's Commission on the Status of Women. In 1997 the IWTC helped circulate a women's peace petition. The petition, a non-governmental initiative with over 150 organizational-co-sponsors from around the world, demanded that war, like slavery, colonialism and apartheid, be 'delegitimized as an acceptable form of social behavior'.

One of the best-known of the feminist networks to emerge after Nairobi was Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), currently based in Fiji and comprised largely of feminist groups from developing countries. The manifesto of the DAWN group, now a classic in the field of women-in-development, is *Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives* (Sen and Grown, 1987). The feminist Network Women in Development Europe (WIDE) was also formed after Nairobi.

A number of feminist networks, including DAWN and WIDE, have focused their energies on structural adjustment and its social and gender effects, and on the biases and deficiencies of international development cooperation and assistance. A feminist network in the USA, Alternative Perspectives on Women and Development (Alt-WID), was largely responsible for the publication of a scholarly feminist critique of structural adjustment (Sparr, 1994). This feminist network offers critiques of current economic policies and environmental conditions and argues that increasing women's political power and participation in decision-making would resolve many of these problems (see, for example, its quarterly newsletter, *Alt-WID Resource Center Bulletin).*

The Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), co-founded by the late American lawyer and activist Bella Abzug, defines its goal as 'to make women more visible as equal participants, experts and leaders in policy-making from the community to the international level, and in formulating alternative, healthy, and peaceful solutions to world problems' (from its newsletter, *News and Views*). WEDO co-chairs are based in Brazil, Guyana, Norway, Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, Costa Rica, India and New Zealand. Other feminist networks, such as the International Women's Health Coalition, based in New York, focus on reproductive health and rights issues, mainly through policy-oriented research, publications and advocacy.

Several TFNs focus on women's human rights or legal status, and often work closely together. These include the Sisterhood is Global Institute,

until January 2000 based in Maryland, USA, which has produced a manual for the advocacy of women's human rights in Muslim countries. Women, Law and Development International, a network based in Washington, DC, includes prominent and internationally known lawyers and judges from developing countries, as well as grassroots-oriented regional and local groups that work on such issues as women's health and violence against women.[4] Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLUML) is a network of women who live in Muslim countries or who are from Muslim countries and live elsewhere. The network was formed mainly in response to the rise and spread of fundamentalism and of revisions in Muslim family codes during the 1980s that formalized the second-class citizenship of women (e.g. Iran, Algeria, Egypt). WLUML has a documentation center in France, where its energetic founding member, Marie-Aimée Hélie-Lucas, resides, and branches throughout the Muslim world. It also has an active affiliate in South Asia, Shirkat Gah, based in Lahore, and close ties with leading feminist networks and organizations in North America and Europe. Its most visible forms of action are its Action Alerts (petitions and campaigns reminiscent of Amnesty International), that usually draw attention to the plight of an individual or a group suffering from discrimination or unjust treatment in a Muslim country.

Although TFNs prioritize or emphasize their objectives, they tend to have a broad political agenda. One TFN that is focused on a single issue, however, is the Women's Alliance for Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan. Based in Washington, DC, and led by an Afghan expatriate, WAPHA was formed in 1997 in response to the Taleban takeover. This network of individuals in various countries who are concerned about the status of women in contemporary Afghanistan forged links with two American feminist organizations, the Feminist Majority and the National Organization for Women, in an effective campaign to prevent the Clinton administration from recognizing the Taleban government. Together the women's groups agitate against support for any corporate activity in Afghanistan as long as the Taleban continue to practice 'gender apartheid'.[5]

Can we speak of 'successes' on the part of transnational feminism? In fact, WAPHA's successful lobbying in the sphere of foreign policy is one example. Working with NOW and the Feminist Majority, it has helped to raise American awareness of the repression of women under Taleban rule in Afghanistan. Spurred by WAPHA, protests by the American feminist groups were instrumental in the December 1998 decision by the Unocal corporation to withdraw its bid for a gap pipeline through Afghanistan. Another example of effective transnational feminist action pertains to macroeconomic policy and the World Bank. Concerted action since the

late 1980s of networks including DAWN and WIDE in opposition to structural adjustment policies and the activities of the international financial institutions in developing countries has forced the World Bank to take more seriously gender and social issues and to form an External Gender Consultative Group. The World Bank also has responded officially to a report issued by the 'Women's Eyes on the World Bank', a lobbying group formed at Beijing.[6]

In sum, feminist networks have emerged in the context of the global spread of feminism as a vehicle for political action and as an expression of women's citizenship. Feminist networks provide information and support for members and other women, engage in advocacy and criticism of policies and are moving effectively to take part in the formulation of policies and in the process of decision-making. Interaction and cooperation among feminist networks constitute a significant aspect of the phenomenon. Not only do the large networks have regular contact with each other (as do the four networks examined in this article), but local groups that may belong to one network will also have members that belong to other networks. Feminist networks tap into each other in an almost seamless web, with many points of intersection.

We now consider four transnational feminist networks in some detail.

Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era

DAWN is an expanding network of women researchers and activists from developing countries that promoted alternative approaches to economic development and more equitable gender systems. Its 22-member founding committee included prominent Third World activists and academics. Following an initial meeting in Bangalore, India, in August 1984, on the eve of the Third UN Conference on Women, the network prepared a platform document which was used as the basis of a series of panels and workshops at the NGO Forum in Nairobi in 1985. The network was formally launched the following year in Rio de Janeiro, where a secretariat was established. The secretariat rotated to the Caribbean in 1990, when a new general coordinator was selected, and it moved to Fiji at the end of 1995.

DAWN's specific contribution is to offer an alternative 'model' of socioeconomic development, one which is people centered, holistic, sustainable and which empowers women. In seeking an alternative paradigm for development, DAWN has developed a framework based on an analysis of the issues from the perspective of women in the South. DAWN's analysis attempts to reflect the diversity of regional experiences and to relate the experience of women at the micro-level of the household and community to an understanding of macroeconomics policy and

global trends. Its perspective has served as a catalyst for debates on key development issues.

Following the Nairobi conference, a series of meetings and discussions resulted in the publication of *Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions*. DAWN's vision, now a staple of every publication, was first stated in that book (Sen and Grown, 1987: 80):

> We want a world where inequality based on class, gender and race is absent from every country and from the relationships among countries. We want a world where basic needs become basic rights and where poverty and all forms of violence are eliminated. Each person will have the opportunity to develop her or his full potential and creativity, and values of nurturance and solidarity will characterize human relationships. In such a world women's reproductive role will be redefined: men will be responsible for their sexual behavior, fertility and the well-being of both partners. Child care will be shared by men, women and society as a whole.
>
> We want a world where the massive resources now used in the production of the means of destruction will be diverted to areas where they will help to relieve oppression both inside and outside the home. This technological revolution will eliminate disease and hunger, and give women means for the safe control of their lives, health, sexuality and fertility.
>
> We want a world where all institutions are open to participatory democratic processes, where women share in determining priorities and making decisions. This political environment will provide enabling social conditions that respect women's and men's physical integrity and the security of their persons in every dimension of their lives.

As stated in the book's preamble, the book was written through 'extensive debate and discussion with researchers, activists, and policy makers'. It was felt that by adopting an open and flexible process – one that drew on varied experiences – the group would be better able to come to a common perspective and objective. As the book's preamble states, 'If we ourselves can evolve new working styles, new forms of cooperative organization and practices, this will contribute to the search for genuine alternatives. To build a social order that is just, equitable, and life-affirming for all people, our methods must correspondingly be open and respectful of differences, and must try to break down hierarchies, power, and distrust' (Sen and Grown, 1987: 10).

DAWN's affiliated organizations and individuals are from the Caribbean, Latin America, the Pacific, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Especially active are the Latin American members, who have produced a number of books, including *Alternatives, Volume 1: The Food, Energy, and Debt Crises in Relation to Women* and *Alternatives, Volume 2: Women's Visions and Movements* (DAWN, 1991). Both books were published in Rio de Janeiro in 1991. A book on environmental issues

was prepared for the UN Conference on Environment and Development, and one on alternative economic frameworks was prepared for the World Summit for Social Development and for the Fourth World Conference on Women. A number of studies were prepared for the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) – which took place in Cairo in 1994 – including one entitled *Population and Reproductive Rights: Feminist Perspectives from the South*, written by Sonia Correa and Rebecca Reichmann in association with DAWN. The network was very prominent at the ICPD and at the NGO Forum in Huairo that took place just before the Beijing conference. Its activities took the form of participation in panels and workshops at the NGO Forum and, at the official conference, lobbying of government delegates and attendance at working groups formed to remove the brackets from contested paragraphs of the draft Platform of Action.[7]

Leading figures in DAWN include Gita Sen, an Indian economist and co-author of *Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions*, and Peggy Antrobus, a professor of women and development studies at the University of Barbados, who has become an active resource person in UN circles. Among the Founding Committee members, Noeleen Heyzer of Malaysia is now the director of UNIFEM, while Lourdes Arizpe of Mexico is assistant director-general of UNESCO.

To support its various projects, DAWN receives funding from the major international development aid agencies, certain UN agencies and universities and non-governmental organizations in various developing countries. According to one of its publications, DAWN 'counts on the participation of 4,500 women throughout the Third World'.

Network Women in Development Europe

WIDE was established in 1985, immediately after the Nairobi conference, though it was loosely organized and relatively fundless until 1990. Its focus was on development cooperation with a feminist critique of foreign aid. It saw its mandate as being responsive to women's needs in the South. Gradually, however, its focus shifted, especially as a result of Thatcherism in England and, in Europe, the spread of cutbacks in social spending and the expansion of labor market flexibility. This made the women of WIDE recognize in a more immediate and direct way the links between northern and southern economic and social processes. At the same time, they were very much inspired by DAWN's broad definition of development as spelled out in the book by Sen and Grown and by its vision for an alternative form of development. Like DAWN, WIDE became involved in the international conferences of the 1990s: UNCED in 1992, the International Conference on Human Rights in 1993, the ICPD in 1994, the Social

Summit in March 1995 and the Beijing conference of 1995. WIDE's president, Helen O'Connell, was accredited to the official conference in Beijing and presented a statement during the General Exchange of Views.

WIDE consists of a network of 12 national platforms; each national platform consists of one or more women's groups. The oldest national platform is Ireland and the most recent, Austria. The others are Spain, France, Italy, Belgium (with two platforms, one French and the other Flemish), Germany, England, Switzerland, Holland, Finland and Denmark. Each has its own program of work but shares information with the Brussels office. At its May 1995 General Assembly in Brussels, all 12 national platforms presented reports on their activities and their plans for the Beijing conference. The General Assembly was chaired by the president, had a financial report by the treasurer and a report by the coordinator of the Brussels office.[8]

In the first few years of existence WIDE was based in Dublin but in 1993 moved its office to Brussels, so that it could more effectively carry out its lobbying and advocacy work within the European Union, European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and delegations of member states. WIDE also cooperates and coordinates its activities with other networks in Europe, such as Protestant agencies, Catholic agencies, the European Network on Debt and Development (EURODAD), European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People (EUROSTEP) and others. WIDE is part of the Global Alliance for Alternative Development, which also includes DAWN and Alt-WID. The focus of the Global Alliance is alternative economics – an effort to interrogate economic theory from a feminist and gender perspective.

Much of WIDE's lobbying and educational efforts within the EU are geared toward identifying the contradictions and inconsistencies between the stated objectives of aid and development cooperation and the effects of structural adjustment. Despite its known critiques of currently fashionable neoliberal economic policies, WIDE's funding comes principally from the EU and a few years ago it was invited by the Dutch government to submit an application for a large grant. WIDE was invited to take part in and prepare position papers for the EU Committee on Women's Rights, the UNDP Human Development Report 1995, the OECD/DAC/WID group and the preparatory conferences for the Social Summit and the Beijing conference. According to the WIDE Annual Report for 1994–5, its work for 1996 had five components:

- To influence the debates in the field of gender during the Intergovernmental Conference of the EU in 1996;
- To monitor the implementation of the Platform for Action of Beijing by the EU and its member states;

- To elaborate and publish a gender mapping of the EU trade policies;
- To plan the installation of four regional consultation groups (North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Asia) on EU policy and the impact on women;
- To follow-up on Lomé IV.[9]

In her remarks at the General Assembly in Brussels in May 1995, WIDE's president mentioned two tensions in the organization's structure. One was the tension arising from the need to have a good working relationship with EU officials and to be able to express criticism of EU policies. The other tension was between having a central office and being a network. At the time, this tension was resolved through information exchange among the national platforms and between the national platforms and the WIDE office in Brussels.

On the day before its General Assembly, WIDE held a conference in Brussels to discuss ideas around its draft position paper for the Beijing conference, which began with an examination of the assumptions behind neoclassical economics and their links with misguided neoliberal policies. One book that had inspired this effort is *Male Bias in the Development Process*, edited by British economist Diane Elson (1991). Elson defines male-biased development outcomes as those that result in more asymmetry and inequality between men and women, and she identifies the proximate causes in terms of male bias in everyday attitudes and decisions, in theoretical analysis and in the process of defining and implementing public policy. The key structural factor that shapes these attitudes and policies is the social and economic organization of access to resources and childcare. Following this analysis, WIDE feminists place great emphasis on women's reproductive activities, much of which is unpaid (if it is domestic and based in the home) or underpaid (if it is occupational and within the labor market.) A major criticism by the alternative-economics feminists within the WIDE network is that structural adjustment does not take into account the interdependence between the 'productive economy' and the 'reproductive economy' (also called by some 'the economy of care'). They point out that cuts in programs of expenditure are frequently designed in a way that undermines the ability of women to respond to new price incentives in agriculture, job opportunities in export-oriented manufacturing (in that women have to compensate with their labor time for cuts in social sectors) and that jeopardize human development targets. Their recommendation is that all programs for macroeconomic policy reform should include not only targets for monetary aggregates and policy instruments for achieving them but also targets for human development aggregates and policy instruments for delivering them. The relation between the policy instruments and the targets should be analyzed in

gender-desegregated terms that recognize the inputs of unpaid labor as well as paid labor. In terms of economic analysis and economic policy prescriptions, WIDE feminists are sympathetic to the UNDP's concept of human development.[10]

Many feminist organizations are critical of masculinist organizations and policies that reflect a predominantly male standpoint. As such, WIDE is a feminist network par excellence. For example, a 1994 briefing paper jointly prepared by EURODAD and WIDE was entitled 'Male Chauvinist SAPs: Structural Adjustment and Gender Policies', and highlighted the inherent male bias of structural adjustment policies. A 1995 press release on another report called 'Gender Mapping in the European Union', began as follows:

> European Union policy is 'gender blind', concludes a new report jointly published by WIDE and EUROSTEP. The report, entitled 'Gender Mapping in the EU', pinpoints who pulls the strings in the EU institutions in relation to gender. The report was commissioned to penetrate the institution's lack of procedural transparency and to identify those responsible for policy design and implementation.
>
> 'The EU claims to be gender sensitive in its work,' commented Mieke van der Veken of WIDE, 'but there is no clear gender policy formulated in the aid system and even less in foreign and trade policy departments.' Although there is compulsory gender training in some parts of the Commission, 'in effect there are no equal gender opportunities in recruitment,' says Brita Schioldan Nielsen of EUROSTEP. 'Without a policy of positive discrimination for women the grey-suited masculine culture of the Commission will remain.'

WIDE's 1997 annual meeting, held in Finland, was attended by some 130 participants from 20 countries. The focus was on globalization, the role of international financial institutions and impacts on women. Examples of how economic transformation has affected women focused on Russia, the Nordic welfare states and India. According to the conference report, entitled 'Trade Traps and Gender Gaps: Women Unveiling the Market',

> . . . the globalization of markets has unleashed the forces of deregulation of national financial and labour markets, accelerating the onslaught of inequality, poverty, social disintegration and environmental degradation. These negative effects of the global market will only further be exacerbated by current attempts on the part of transnational corporations and their political supporters to modify and improve rules for the operation of the market on their own terms.

The report highlighted 'the lack of transparency and accountability in economic life in all levels . . . the lack of accountability to citizens of global economic structures', contrasting these with 'the accountability which is

built into the locally based economic and trading initiatives of which examples were presented during the conference' (WIDE, 1998).

Women Living Under Muslim Laws/International Solidarity Network

In July 1984 an Action Committee of Women Living Under Muslim Laws was set up by nine women from Algeria, Sudan, Morocco, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Mauritius and Tanzania. The committee was established in response to situations arising out of 'the application of Muslim laws in India, Algeria, and Abu Dhabi that resulted in the violation of women's human rights' (Kazi, 1997: 141). It evolved in January 1985 into an international network of information, solidarity and support. In April 1986, the first planning meeting of the network, which gathered together ten women from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, set the tasks for the network. These were:

- To create international links between women in Muslim countries and communities;
- To exchange information on their situations (similarities and differences), struggles and strategies, in order to strengthen and reinforce women's initiatives and struggles through various means (publications, exchanges, etc.);
- To support each other's struggles through various means including an Alert for Action system. (Hélie-Lucas, 1993a: 225)

The network receives appeals and responds to as well as initiates campaigns pertaining to violations of human rights, including women's human rights. All requests from groups or individuals that represent varied opinions and currents within the movement for reform or in defense of women's rights and seek support and urgent action are forwarded through the network. As Hélie-Lucas herself explains, these actions range from campaigns concerning the repeal of discriminatory legislation; the end of oppressive practices; the enactment and/or enforcement of legislation favorable to women; cases of systematized or generalized violations of human rights; to individual cases where, for example, inhumane sentences have been given; women have been forcibly married against their will; fathers have abducted their children; and women's lives have been threatened.

Action Alerts are initiated or disseminated by the head office in Montpelier or by the South Asia office, Shirkat Gah Women's Resource Center, based in Lahore, Pakistan. A sample of Action Alert efforts between 1990 and 1995 that were either initiated by WLUML or disseminated by them on behalf of other organizations include the following: an alert on the

campaign to end trafficking of Burmese women and girls into Thai brothels; an alert on the campaign to prosecute three war criminals of the Bangladesh War of Liberation, now citizens and residents of the UK; an alert regarding violation of women's human rights in Kurdistan (in this case 'committed by the relatives of women or even by members of the autonomous government of Kurdistan'); an alert regarding the appeal by a Pakistani fanatical group for the murder of four prominent citizens for alleged blasphemy; an appeal by Amnesty International regarding the torture of a nine-year-old Indonesian boy detained on suspicion of stealing a wallet; an alert regarding the rape of an 11-year-old Bangladeshi girl by police in northeast Delhi; an alert regarding the campaign to save the lives of the 13-year-old Christian Pakistani boy and his uncle who had been sentenced to death under blasphemy charges in Pakistan; an alert regarding the abduction, torture and killing of Marinsah, an Indonesian female factory worker and trade union activist; an appeal from the group Women for Women's Human Rights in Turkey calling for the revision of Turkey's Family Code; many appeals regarding the situation of Algerian women and fundamentalist terror; a condemnation of female genital mutilation; many appeals regarding Bosnia; an appeal by the Union of Palestinian Working Women Committees regarding ill-treatment of Palestinian women fighters in Israeli jails; an alert regarding the Egyptian government's closure of the Arab Women's Solidarity Association; the campaign for the International Day of Protest against the continued presence of US military bases and facilities in the Philippines; an alert regarding the situation of women in Iran; an alert regarding the reinstatement of a law allowing 'honor killings' in Iraq.

In addition to the Action Alerts, the activities of the network entail documenting and disseminating information in the form of Dossiers, which describe the situation of Muslim women and legal codes in various countries and report on the activities of women's organizations. In addition, there is a news sheet published by Shirkat Gah in Lahore. During 1997 and 1998, many articles were devoted to describing the plight of women in Algeria and Afghanistan. The news sheets do not focus exclusively on Muslim women, but address themselves to women's human rights situations throughout the developing world. Shirkat Gah also devotes its resources to translating and publishing books, including two on the gender implications of the changing political economy of Uzbekistan and Central Asia.[11]

Collective projects on topics related to women in the Muslim world occasionally have been organized by WLUML. These include an exchange program in 1988 that allowed 18 women from 15 countries to meet for the purpose of exchanging information on strategies used in different

parts of the Muslim world by women activists. According to Hélie-Lucas (1993a: 227):

> We realized that many local customs and traditions practiced in the name of Islam in one part of the world were in fact unheard of in others. It also became evident that not only are the varied and contradictory interpretations of the Koran monopolized by men but they are also the only ones who have so far defined the status of Muslim women.

This realization led to the initiation of a project on Koranic Interpretation by Women (started in July 1990), which brought together 30 women activists and resource persons from ten countries to read for themselves the verses of the Koran that relate to women. 'The meeting allowed participants to see just how differently the same verses of the Koran have been interpreted (both through translations and explanations, or *tafsir*) by Islamic scholars and various schools of thought' (Hélie-Lucas, 1993a: 227). This effort led to the initiation of yet another project, called the Women and Law Project (1991–4) which involved women in 20 Muslim countries who examined legislation, especially the Muslim family codes, that discriminate against women and indeed contradict clauses regarding equality in countries' constitutions. The stated objective of the Women and Law Project was:

> . . . to empower women living under Muslim laws through knowledge of their rights in their societies and to strengthen their capacity to understand their situations, to act locally, and work together towards meeting their needs. As well, it aims to enhance the participation of Muslim women in the development of their societies.

Finally, WLUML has involved itself in an effort to broaden the scope of development 'conditionality' to benefit women:

> . . . linking aid to the democratization of our countries gives us little hope, since there is no sign that the fate of women will be seen as a valid indicator of democracy by the international community. What we see instead is a narrow interpretation of democracy in the exclusive sense of parliamentary democracy. This never prevented Hitler from being elected!
>
> Rather than leaving women to the 'goodwill' of their (male) political leaders, states should be obliged by donors to direct a percentage of their aid money to women's projects. A women's lobby group is presently working towards having the EC adopt such a policy vis-à-vis the North African countries. (Hélie-Lucas, 1993b: 62)

By 1994 some 25 countries were associated with WLUML through various projects (Kazi, 1997: 145). According to Shaheed (1995: 320),

> . . . over two thousand women in several continents are linked through WLUML. These women have diverse professional and academic backgrounds,

organizational frameworks and political perspectives but share a commitment to expanding women's autonomy. Most are actively involved in the women's movement in their own countries or place of residence. In addition, many are engaged in general advocacy initiatives.

Like WIDE, DAWN and other feminist networks, WLUML stresses information exchange, mutual support and international solidarity toward the realization of its essential goal. Through its projects and documentation and dissemination activities, WLUML has expanded the creative use of scarce resources and helped individuals and groups to form contacts and exchange knowledge, thereby increasing their effectiveness. Such a strategy 'strengthens our local struggles by providing support at the regional and international levels, at the same time as our local struggles strengthen the regional and international women's movement in a mutually supportive process' (Hélie-Lucas, 1993a: 226).

The Association of Women of the Mediterranean Region

The AWMR unites women of Albania, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Gibraltar, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Palestine, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia. It was founded in Malta in 1992 'after seven years of meeting, networking, and joint work' (AWMR brochure). The AWMR has a 19-person board of directors, elected for a period of three years, who are 'dedicated to justice, equality, and peace'. The current president and founding member is Yana Mintoff-Bland. She is the daughter of the veteran socialist leader of Malta, Dom Mintoff, whose early support for the Palestinian cause set him apart from other European leaders. The general secretary, Ninetta Pourou-Kazantzis, is from Limassol, Cyprus. During 1998, board members from Malta, Morocco and Tunisia were elected or appointed to legislative positions in their respective countries.[12] Board members and other AWMR members have been active in various progressive causes, and some have been members of left-wing political parties. This common political background allows for consensus and cooperation of women across different conflict regions. Thus members can agree on such resolutions as: 'We condemn the use of embargoes and military intervention against defenseless populations. These actions deprive children of their basic human right to health.'[13]

AWMR's stated aims are the following:

- Just and peaceful resolution of regional conflicts;
- Regional demilitarization and global disarmament;
- Elimination of discrimination, poverty and violence against women;

- Human rights, real democracy and sustainable development;
- The welfare and rights of children;
- Education for peace through the family, schools and media;
- Common action to end environmental degradation of the Mediterranean region.

Among its actions and achievements have been petitions to end the violence in Bosnia; the sale of Palestinian women's crafts in the USA; joint activity by Jewish and Palestinian women against Israeli aggression; the initiation of dialogue between Greek Cypriot women and Turkish Cypriot women; joint activity among women in Zagreb, Sarajevo and Belgrade; a visit by Italian delegates to Albania in support of women's rights; actions in defense of Algerian women; and a 1997 petition for 'Education for Peace' in the Mediterranean. The association puts out a newsletter, publishes the proceedings of its annual conferences and sends copies of its resolutions to governments and to the UN Secretariat.

The first six annual conferences – held in Malta or Cyprus – were on women's rights, colonialism, militarism, health, refugees and immigrants and education for peace. Each conference ends with a set of resolutions and is followed by a conference report and the publication of a book. In July 1998 the seventh conference was on 'Women and Work in the Mediterranean'. The local organizing committee from the southern Italian region of Lecce was in charge of the arrangements, which included an opening ceremony and social events. The main panel discussions were on: the right to work in the context of women's human rights; exploitation, unemployment and ways to organize; and country analyses of women and work. There was also a workshop on globalization, the presentation of position papers and resolutions and a general assembly. Panel presentations were on immigrant working women in Italy and elsewhere; women, work, and the changing political economy in the Middle East and North Africa; the problems and prospects of women and work in Algeria; women and structural adjustment in Turkey; women and the legal profession in Italy; economic empowerment of women victims of domestic violence and war refugees; and women and work in Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Serbia and Bulgaria. Short papers on the above subjects were available to the participants.[14]

At the 1998 meeting, resolutions were passed on the violence in Algeria; on a parliamentary proposal in Greece to introduce military conscription for women; on the Oslo Agreement and the continuing problems in Israel/Palestine, including their implications for women; on the special problems of persons with mixed marriages in the former Yugoslavia; on women's rights and violence against Kurds in Turkey; on the conflict in Kosovo; and on the continuing division of Cyprus. The final conference

resolution – subsequently sent to government bodies of the region and to the UN – consisted of four paragraphs on the economic and political situation of the region and a list of 12 'minimum conditions necessary to safeguard women's right to work'. The introductory paragraphs highlighted the adverse effects of globalization on national economies, the feminization of poverty in countries of the region, rising unemployment and the growing inequalities within and between countries. The list of minimum conditions emphasized the state's responsibility to provide work opportunities for the unemployed, 'the right to work in dignity and safety and without sexual harassment', good wages, an end to huge income inequalities, conducive social policies for working mothers, and 'the right of all women workers, including home-workers, agricultural workers, and housewives, to pensions and benefits in their own name' (AWMR, 1998).

The Association has no paid positions and is based entirely on volunteer work. It has received funding from a generous private source and some from the governments of Cyprus and Malta, but most of its revenues come from membership fees and the sale of books. In early 1999 it set up a web site and was planning its eighth conference, to be held in Athens with a focus on the environment.

TFNs and the Future of Collective Action

Transnational feminist networks, including the four case studies, offer an alternative to male-dominated political organizations; they are an expression of the political awakening of women; and they exemplify the maturation of feminism and the interaction of women's activists around the world. Feminist networks have actively responded to adverse global processes, including economic restructuring and the expansion of fundamentalism. They are taking advantage of other global processes, including the development and spread of computer technology. In these efforts, they engage in information exchange, mutual support and a combination of lobbying, advocacy and direct action toward the realization of their goals of equality and empowerment for women and social justice and democratization in the society at large. Leading members of transnational feminist networks are often involved with other international non-governmental research or advocacy organizations, and they often use those locations as platforms to publicize or otherwise advance the activities of the feminist networks.

TFNs seem to have devised an organizational structure that consists of active and autonomous local/national women's groups but that transcends localisms or nationalisms. Their discourses and objectives are not particularistic but are universalistic. As such, these TFNs are situated in the tradition of progressive modernist politics, rather than in any new

wave of postmodernist or identity politics.[15] The organizational form is not a federative or international one; rather, it is *transnational* and indeed, *supra-national*.[16] As such, it is the form that the labor movement should have adopted, but never did. Whether the world's labor movements will follow the organizational form and collective action strategies of the worldwide women's movement is a pertinent question.

This article has not focused on the internal structures of the four case study feminist networks, but a few words in this respect are in order. A major difference between feminist networks and other organizations lies in the non-hierarchical structure of the networks. The desire to avoid excesses of power and relations of domination and subordination within the organization leads to innovative ways of sharing responsibility. Feminist networks function to a great extent on the emotional and political commitment of their members and, especially, their staffs – many of whom volunteer a considerable amount of time. What is a strength at one moment, however, could become a weakness, especially if the organization expands and grows and management decisions become necessary. As Moser (1993) explains in her discussion of women's NGOs, unclear authority demarcation and defined responsibilities, and work overload on the part of some members, could lead to conflict and dissent. This is true, of course, not only of feminist organizations but also of many voluntary organizations or political groups that have little funding and depend heavily on the work, time and commitment of a core group of members.[17] It also should be noted that despite their non-hierarchical nature, feminist organizations frequently have strong and sometimes charismatic leaders. Strong leadership can be especially important in getting an organization started. But abuses of charisma have not been unknown in women's organizations.[18]

And what of the internal dynamics of the four case study feminist networks? Although there is a certain degree of professionalization in the networks – especially in WIDE and WLUML, which have a few paid positions – none of them displays any bureaucratization or centralization in decision-making. Within the AWMR the preferred method of decision-making is consensus of the members, but sometimes votes are taken and a resolution is passed by a simple majority. WLUML has been described as having 'a fluid structure and rejection of hierarchies' (Shaheed, 1995: 324). This is not to say that women's organizations, or the TFNs described here, do not experience internal problems (these could include lack of coordination, poor management, competitiveness, leadership abuses and activist burn-out). Rather, it is to suggest that the network form of a feminist organization may be the most suited to transnational organizing, mobilizing, policy-oriented research and advocacy that also includes non-hierarchical and democratic objectives. Moreover, the technological

concomitants of globalization allow women's organizations that prefer a democratic and non-hierarchical setup to interact with each other and to conduct their activities in a more 'efficient' manner.[19]

Like many other feminist networks and women's organizations, the members and activists of DAWN, WIDE, WLUML and AWMR are largely middle-class, highly educated women. In some cases, this class profile can be a disadvantage, inasmuch as the women may be distanced from the concerns of working-class and poor women. But many feminist networks and organizations in fact have extensive connections with women of the popular classes. For example, WLUML includes locally based activist member groups that work at the grassroots. AWMR includes trade unionists and other activists who work at the local, grassroots level. At the same time, given that an important objective of these feminist networks is to challenge the ideas, attitudes, policies and decisions of large sophisticated organizations – including international financial institutions and state agencies – the presence of highly educated women advocates of alternative economics and of women's rights is necessary and effective.

The four feminist networks examined in this article have somewhat different emphases. DAWN and WIDE focus on development and economic issues; WLUML devotes its energies toward legal and political rights of women in Muslim countries; and AWMR has a broad and holistic approach to the problems and prospects of the Mediterranean region. And yet they share a large common ground: research, advocacy and action toward women's equality and empowerment, and toward social transformation. Although there will continue to be a diversity of feminisms, framed by local issues, problems, needs, opportunities and constraints, this need not refute the proposition that there seems to exist a worldwide women's movement with common goals and strategies. The four TFNs that I have described would seem to validate this. These and other feminist networks should be understood as so many webs within the larger net of global feminism.

The study of TFNs has several implications for social theory, including globalization studies and theories of social movements. These may be presented in the form of several propositions for further consideration and research. The first is that TFNs have emerged in a multifaceted context of opportunities and constraints: (1) a growing population of educated, employed, mobile and politically aware women around the world; (2) increasing opportunities afforded by UN conferences; (3) economic crisis and restructuring; (4) continued discrimination, oppression and gender inequality; and (5) economic, political and cultural globalization. The second proposition is that 'new social movements' such as the women's movement are not necessarily non-economic and identity focused. All four of the case study feminist networks organize around

issues pertaining to the economy, the political system and foreign policy, as well as reproductive rights, family laws and violence against women. The third proposition is that the transnational nature of feminist networks calls into question theorizing that begins and ends with single societies. One may continue to argue the need for nationally oriented research and point out the continued salience of nation-states and domestic organizations. But nation-states, national economies and cultural formations – including social movements and organizations – are increasingly affected by global processes, with the result that the appropriate unit of analysis must combine global, regional and local. The fourth proposition is that transnational feminism calls into question sociological research that remains focused on the West. If the concentration of modern capitalism in the West was once a justification for sociology's exclusive focus on Europe and the USA, the existence of global capitalism and the transnational flows of labor, capital and ideas necessitate a broader perspective. A fifth proposition is that transnational feminist networks are the organizational form of the global women's movement and are a central part of the family of global social movements and organizations. Finally, inasmuch as the case study feminist networks appear to be non-hierarchical, flexible and efficient, the research suggests that the *network* form of transnational organizing may be the one most conducive to the era of globalization.

Notes

1. Research for this article was begun in 1995. It is based on a variety of methods: participant observation at two annual meetings (WIDE, Brussels, May 1995 and AWMR, Gallipoli, Italy, July 1998), a close reading of the publications of the TFNs, and relevant secondary sources. In addition, my participation as a UN staff member at two UN conferences (the Social Summit, Copenhagen, March 1995 and the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, September 1995), several pre-Beijing regional preparatory meetings of governments and of non-governmental organizations, and the annual UN Ad-Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Women in Development (which always preceded the annual meeting in March of the Commission on the Status of Women) all gave me insights into the growth of women's organizations worldwide and their global linkages.
2. Fruitful exchanges among nationally based women's groups around a common issue has occurred among Canadian and Mexican women's groups in relation to the North American Free Trade Association. Gabriel and Macdonald (1994) describe how a series of working women's conferences (in which some US women's groups were also involved) were formed to discuss similarities and differences in their approaches to free trade and continental integration: 'NAFTA has thus given rise to innovative forms of collaboration

between Canadian and Mexican women. This cooperation has the potential to provide a model for a feminist internationality' (Gabriel and Macdonald, 1994: 561).

3. An example was the flood of protests against the change of venue for the NGO Forum, the planned parallel meeting of the Fourth World Conference on Women. Protests were sent to the UN by fax and email from women's organizations around the world in May 1995. This very effective method of global feminist communication was coordinated by the IWTC. In another more recent example, the Women's Alliance for Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan (WAPHA) disseminated information and circulating petitions over the Internet.
4. Based on author's observations and interviews during the network's international conference, 'From Basic Needs to Basic Rights', held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in October 1994, and the network's literature.
5. For an analysis of the situation in Afghanistan, see Moghadam (1999).
6. In its October 1997 report, 'Gender Equity and the World Bank Group: A Post-Beijing Assessment', Women's Eyes called on the World Bank's chief economist to embrace equity and sustainability as primary goals of the Bank and to monitor social and gender impacts of policies of projects at the household, community and national levels. In its January 1998 letter of response, the Bank agreed on the need for a new conceptual framework on gender; in March 1998 chief economist Joseph Stiglitz announced that the Bank would publish a policy research report (PRR) on gender; and a workshop to discuss the draft PRR was scheduled for November 1998. (Information from Lydia Williams, *Action Alert!*, 24 August 1998, via Internet.)
7. Based on author's observations and discussions at the NGO Forum and the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, September 1995.
8. Personal observation, annual meeting of WIDE, Brussels, May 1995.
9. The Lomé Convention has been the main form of development cooperation between the EU and 70 African, Caribbean and Pacific states since 1975. The current convention, Lomé IV, expires on 29 February 2000.
10. Since 1990 the UN Development Programme's Human Development Report Office has produced an annual *Human Development Report*. The concept of human development is meant to be an alternative to the conventional emphasis on economic growth as the principal measure of development; the UNDP argues that the enlargement of people's choices through health, education, income and women's equality are more adequate measures.
11. The two books are Marfua Tokhtakhodjaeva (1995), *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam: The Women of Uzbekistan*, and Marfua Tokhtakhodjaeva and Elmira Turgumbekova (1996), *The Daughters of Amazons: Voices from Central Asia*.
12. One AWMR board member, Mme Aicha Belarbi, was appointed to a cabinet post by the new socialist prime minister of Morocco.
13. A resolution of the 1994 conference on 'Militarism in the Mediterranean', held in Malta.
14. Personal observation at the seventh annual conference, held in Gallipoli, Italy, in July 1998. At one point during the conference I was asked to help draft a

resolution on the Kosovo conflict by delegates from Serbia and Albania. I was impressed by the principled and civil nature of the differing views expressed, as well as by the capacity of the women to agree on a statement condemning the violence and calling for negotiations.

15. See, for example, note 14. WLUML explicitly rejects cultural relativist arguments and insists on the applicability of international conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). TFNs acknowledge the diversity of women's experiences and the salience of class, ethnic and other differences, but do not appear to give *difference* the theoretical status or absolute character that postmodernists do.
16. This is not to suggest that local women's groups or local/national issues are obscured by the TFNs. As mentioned earlier, WIDE is comprised of European national women's groups; AWMR meetings spend much time addressing specific local issues raised by members; local women's groups from various countries are linked to WLUML. What is significant is that TFNs are able to unite women's groups and individuals from diverse national backgrounds around a common agenda.
17. This observation is based in part on the author's experience in the Iranian student movement in Canada and the US during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
18. See, for example, Dwyer (1991) on disputes and splits in women's organizations in Egypt and Tunisia.
19. In the past, 'feminist process' was criticized for eschewing organizational structure and efficiency. What my current research suggests is that TFNs conform to neither the bureaucratic form of organization nor the structurelessness of older-style feminist process. Efficiency and participation seem to be valued equally.

References

AWMR (1998) 'Final Resolution', Gallipoli, Italy, 11 July.

Basu, Amrita, ed. (1995) *The Challenge of Local Feminism*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Boli, John, and Thomas, George M. (1997) 'World Culture in the World Polity', *American Sociological Review* 62(2): 171–90.

Bunch, Charlotte and Carrillo, Roxanna (1990) 'Feminist Perspectives on Women in Development', in Irene Tinker (ed.) *Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development*. New York: Oxford University Press.

DAWN (1991) *Alternatives, Volume 1: The Food, Energy, and Debt Crises in Relation to Women* and *Alternatives, Volume 2: Women's Visions and Movements*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Rosa Dos Tempos.

Dwyer, Kevin (1991) *Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate in the Middle East*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Elson, Diane, ed. (1991) *Male Bias in the Development Process*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Ferree, Myra Marx and Hess, Beth B. (1995) *Controversy and Coalition: The New*

Feminist Movement across Three Decades of Change, revised edn. New York: Twayne.

Ferree, Myra Marx and Martin, Patricia Yancey, eds (1995) *Feminist Organizations: Harvest of the New Women's Movement*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Gabriel, Christina and Macdonald, Laura (1994) 'NAFTA, Women and Organising in Canada and Mexico: Forging a "Feminist Internationality"', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 23(3): 535–62.

Hélie-Lucas, Marie-Aimée (1993a) 'Women's Struggles and Strategies in the Rise of Fundamentalism in the Muslim World: From Entryism to Internationalism', in Haleh Afshar (ed.) *Women in the Middle East: Perceptions, Realities, and Struggles for Liberation*. London: Macmillan.

Hélie-Lucas, Marie-Aimée (1993b) 'Women Living Under Muslim Laws', in Joanna Kerr (ed.) *Ours By Right: Women's Rights as Human Rights*. London: Zed Books/North-South Institute.

Katzenstein, Mary Fainsod and Mueller, Carol McClurg, eds (1987) *The Women's Movements of the United States and Western Europe*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Kazi, Seema (1997) 'Muslim Law and Women Living Under Muslim Laws', in Mahnaz Afkhami and Erika Friedl (eds) *Muslim Women and the Politics of Participation: Implementing the Beijing Platform*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Kriesberg, Lawrence (1997) 'Social Movements and Global Transformation', in Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco (eds) *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter (1996) 'The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context', in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, Doug, McCarthy, John D. and Zald, Mayer N., eds (1996) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McCarthy, John D. (1997) 'The Globalization of Social Movement Theory', in Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco (eds) *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Moghadam, Valentine M., ed. (1994) *Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Moghadam, Valentine M. (1996a) 'Feminist Networks North and South: DAWN, WIDE and WLUML', *Journal of International Communication* 3(1): 111–26.

Moghadam, Valentine M. (1996b) 'The Fourth World Conference on Women: Dissension and Consensus', *Indian Journal of Gender Studies* 3(1): 93–102.

Moghadam, Valentine M. (1997) 'Gender and Revolutions', in John Foran (ed.) *Theorizing Revolutions*. New York and London: Routledge.

Moghadam, Valentine M. (1999) 'Revolution, Religion, and Gender Politics: Iran and Afghanistan Compared', *Journal of Women's History* 10(4): 172–95.

Morgan, Robin, ed. (1985) *Sisterhood is Global*. New York: Anchor Books.

Moser, Caroline O.N. (1993) *Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice and Training*. London: Routledge.

Robertson, Roland (1992) *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture.* London: Sage.

Rupp, Leila (1998) *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sen, Gita and Grown, Caren (1987) *Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions.* New York: Monthly Review Press.

Shaheed, Farida (1995) 'Linking Dreams: The Network of Women Living Under Muslim Laws', in Margaret A. Schuler (ed.) *From Basic Needs to Basic Rights: Women's Claim to Human Rights.* Washington, DC: Women, Law and Development International.

Sklair, Leslie (1995) *Sociology of the Global System,* 2nd edn. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Smith, Jackie (1997) 'Characteristics of the Modern Transnational Social Movement Sector', in Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco (eds),*Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics.* Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Smith, Jackie, Chatfield, Charles and Pagnucco, Ron, eds (1997) *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics.* Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Sparr, Pamela, ed. (1994) *Mortgaging Women's Lives: Feminist Critiques of Structural Adjustment.* London: Zed Books.

Stienstra, Deborah (1994) *Women's Movements and International Organizations.* New York: St Martin's Press.

Tarrow, Sidney (1996) 'States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements', in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tokhtakhodjaeva, Marfua (1995) *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam: The Women of Uzbekistan.* Lahore: Shirkat Gah Women's Resource Center.

Tokhtakhodjaeva, Marfua and Turgumbekova, Elmira, eds (1996) *The Daughters of Amazons: Voices from Central Asia.* Lahore: Shirkat Gah Women's Resource Center.

United Nations (1996) *Platform for Action and the Beijing Declaration.* New York: UN.

West, Guida and Blumberg, Rhoda, eds (1990) *Women and Social Protest.* New York: Oxford University Press.

WIDE (1998) 'Trade Traps and Gender Gaps: Women Unveiling the Market: A Full Report of WIDE's Annual Conference Held at Jarvenpaa, Finland, 16–18 May 1997', WIDE, Brussels.

Biographical Note: Valentine Moghadam is Director of Women's Studies and Associate Professor of Sociology at Illinois State University. Born in Iran and previously a senior researcher with the United Nations University, she has published extensively on gender and development issues and on women and social change in the Middle East and North Africa. Recent publications include 'Revolution, Religion and Gender Politics: Iran and Afghanistan Compared'

(*Journal of Women's History*, Vol. 10, No. 4, Winter 1999), and 'Gender and Globalization: Female Labor and Women's Mobilizations' (*Journal of World-Systems Research*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 1999).

Address: Women's Studies Program and Department of Sociology, Illinois State University, Normal, IL 61790-4260, USA. [email: vmmogha@ilstu.edu]


Nordic Journal of International Law **71:** 255–274, 2002.

Women's Burden: Counter-Geographies of Globalization and the Feminization of Survival *

SASKIA SASSEN**
Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago and Centennial Visiting-Professor at the London School of Economics

Abstract. The global migration and trafficking of women is anchored in particular features of the current globalization of economies in both the north and the south. Making this legible requires that we look at globalization in ways that are different from the mainstream view, confined to emphasizing the hypermobility of capital and to the ascendance of information economies. The growing inmiseration of governments and whole economies in the global south has promoted and enabled the proliferation of survival and profit-making activities that involve the migration and trafficking of women. To some extent these are older processes, which used to be national or regional that can today operate at global scales. The same infrastructure that facilitates cross-border flows of capital, information and trade is also making possible a whole range of cross-border flows not intended by the framers and designers of the current globalization of economies. Growing numbers of traffickers and smugglers are making money off the backs of women and many governments are increasingly dependent on their remittances. A key aspect here is that through their work and remittances, women enhance the government revenue of deeply indebted countries and offer new profit making possibilities to 'entrepreneurs' who have seen other opportunities vanish as a consequence of global firms and markets entering their countries or to long time criminals who can now operate their illegal trade globally. These survival circuits are often complex, involving multiple locations and sets of actors constituting increasingly global chains of traders and 'workers'. A central point of the article is that it is through these supposedly rather value-less economic actors – low-wage and poor women – that key components of these new economies have been built. Globalization plays a specific role here in a double sense, contributing to the formation of links between sending and receiving countries, and, secondly, enabling local and regional practices to become global in scale.

> [H]ouseholds and whole communities are increasingly dependent on women for their survival. [G]overnments too are dependent on their earnings as well as enterprises where profit making exists at the margins of the 'licit' economy.

* Published by permission of the *Journal of International Affairs* and the Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York. This article is based on a larger multi-year project by the author on 'Governance and Accountability in the Global Economy' (Department of Sociology, University of Chicago).

** Recent books by the author include *Guests and Aliens*, published by the New Press in 1999, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, published by the New Press in 1998, and *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, published by Columbia University Press in 1996. Her books have been translated into ten languages. Currently she is conducting a

1. Introduction

The last decade has seen a growing presence of women in a variety of cross-border circuits that have become a source for livelihood, profit-making and the accrual of foreign currency. These circuits are enormously diverse but share one feature: they are profit-making or revenue-making circuits developed on the backs of the truly disadvantaged. They include the illegal trafficking in people for the sex industry and for various types of formal and informal labour markets. They also include cross-border migrations, both documented and not, which have provided an important source of convertible currency for governments in home countries. The formation and strengthening of these circuits is largely a consequence of broader structural conditions. Among the key actors emerging in these particular circuits are the women themselves in search of work, but also, and increasingly so, illegal traffickers and contractors as well as the governments of home countries.

I conceptualize these circuits as counter-geographies of globalization. They overlap with some of the major dynamics that compose globalization: the formation of global markets, the intensification of transnational and trans-local networks and the development of communication technologies, which easily escape conventional surveillance practices. The strengthening and, in some cases, formation of new global circuits is made possible by the existence of a global economic system and the associated development of various institutional supports for cross-border money flows and markets.[1] These counter-geographies are dynamic; to some extent they are part of the shadow economy, but they also use some of the institutional infrastructure of the formal economy.[2]

This article maps some of the key features of these counter-geographies, particularly those involving foreign-born women. I focus on the possibility of systemic links between the growth of these alternative circuits for survival, profit-making and hard-currency earnings on the one hand, and major conditions in developing countries that are associated with economic globalization on the other. Among these conditions are growth in unemployment, the closing of a large number of typically small and medium-sized enterprises

research project on 'Governance and Accountability in a Global Economy'. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation.

1 I have argued this for the case of international labour migrations: Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money*, The New Press, New York, 1998, chs. 2, 3 and 4; and *Guests and Aliens*, The New Press, New York, 1999. See also Max Castro (ed.), *Free Markets, Open Societies, Closed Borders?*, University of Miami North-South Center Press, Miami, 1999; and Frank Bonilla et al., *Borderless Borders*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1998.

2 I have analyzed this type of dynamic and multi-locational partial shadow economy in research on the informal economy. See, Sassen, *supra* note 1, ch. 8.

oriented to national rather than export markets, and high, and often increasing government debt. While these economies are frequently grouped under the label 'developing', they are in some cases struggling, stagnant, even shrinking. In the interests of brevity, I will use the term 'developing' as shorthand for all these situations.

2. Mapping a New Conceptual Landscape

The various global circuits that incorporate growing numbers of women have strengthened at the same time as economic globalization has had a significant impact on developing economies. They have had to implement new policies and accommodate new conditions associated with globalization: Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), opening their economies to foreign firms, the elimination of multiple state subsidies, and, it seems almost inevitably, financial crises and the accompanying programs of the IMF. It is now clear that in most of the countries involved, these conditions have created enormous costs for certain sectors of the economy and population and have not fundamentally reduced government debt.

Among these costs are the growth in unemployment, the closure of many firms in often traditional sectors oriented to the local or national market, the promotion of export-oriented cash crops which have increasingly replaced survival agriculture and food production for local or national markets and, finally, the heavy, ongoing burden of government debt in most of these economies.

Are there systemic links between these two sets of developments? That is, are there links between the growing presence of women from developing economies in the variety of global circuits described above and the rise in unemployment and debt in those same economies? One way of articulating this in substantive terms is to posit that (1) the shrinking opportunities for male employment in many of these countries, along with (2) the shrinking opportunities for more traditional forms of profit making in these same countries as they increasingly accept foreign firms in a widening range of economic sectors and are pressured to develop export industries, and (3) the fall in government revenue in many of these countries, partly linked to these conditions and to the burden of debt servicing, have (4) all contributed to raise the importance of finding alternative means for making a living, making a profit and securing government revenue.

The evidence for any of these conditions is incomplete. Yet, there is a growing consensus among experts about the first three points listed above. I will go further and contend that these three conditions are expanding into a new political-economic reality for a growing number of developing

economies and that it is in this context that the fourth point listed above emerges. I also suggest that these conditions have emerged in the lives of a growing number of women from developing economies. Much of the difficulty in understanding the role of women in development, as I discuss in the next section, is attributable to the fact that articulation of these conditions is often not self-evident.

My primary analytic effort is to uncover the systemic connections between low income individuals, who are often represented as a burden rather than a resource, and what are emerging as significant sources for profit and government revenue enhancement, partly in the shadow economy. Prostitution, labour migration and illegal trafficking in women and children for the sex industry are growing in importance as profit-making activities. The remittances sent by emigrants, as well as the organized export of workers are increasingly important sources of revenue for some governments. Women are by far the majority group in prostitution and in trafficking for the sex industry, and they are becoming a majority group in migration for labour. The employment or use of foreign-born women covers an increasingly broad range of economic sectors, some in highly regulated industries, such as nursing, and some illegal and illicit, such as prostitution.

These circuits could be considered as indicators of the (albeit partial) feminization of survival, because it is increasingly on the backs of women that these forms of making a living, earning a profit and securing government revenue are realized. Thus, I use the notion of feminization of survival to refer to the fact that households and whole communities are increasingly dependent on women for their survival. It is important to emphasize that governments too are dependent on their earnings as well as enterprises where profit making exists at the margins of the 'licit' economy. Finally, in using the term circuits, I want to underline the fact that there is a degree of institutionalization in these dynamics and that they are not simply aggregates of individual actions.[3]

What I have described above is indeed a conceptual landscape. The data is inadequate to prove the argument as such. There are, however, partial bodies of data to document some of these developments. Further, it is possible to juxtapose several data sets, each gathered separately, to document some of the interconnections presented above. There is also older literature on women and developing country debt. It focused on the implementation of first-generation SAPs in several developing countries in the wake of the 1980s debt crisis. This literature has documented the disproportionate burden these programs

[3] For a full discussion of the conceptual and empirical elements briefly described here, see project by Saskia Sassen, *Governance and Accountability in the Global Economy*, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1997.

placed on women.[4] There is currently a new literature on a second generation of programs, which is more directly linked to the global economy of the 1990s, some of which is cited later on in this article. These sources of information do not amount to a full empirical specification of the actual dynamics hypothesized here, but they do allow us to document parts of it.

3. Strategic Instantations of Gendering in the Global Economy

There is by now fairly long-standing research and theory addressing the role of women in international economic processes. Much of the earlier research literature aimed to balance the excessive focus on men in international economic development. In mainstream development literature, these processes have often, perhaps unwittingly, been represented as gender neutral.[5]

Globalization has produced yet another set of dynamics in which women are playing a critical role. It is necessary to view these current developments as part of a long process in history that has revealed women's role in crucial economic processes. And, once again, in terms of their articulation in the mainstream global economy, the new economic literature on current globalization proceeds as if this new economic phase is gender neutral, thereby rendering these gender dynamics invisible. This set of dynamics can be found in the alternative cross-border circuits described above in which the role of women, and especially the condition of being a migrant woman, is critical.[6]

[4] The literature is extensive and in many languages. It also includes a vast number of limited circulation items produced by various activist and support organizations. For overviews, see, for example, Kathryn Ward, *Women Workers and Global Restructuring*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1991; Kathryn Ward and Jean Pyle, 'Gender, Industrialization and Development', in Christine E. Bose and Edna Acosta-Belen (eds.), *Women in the Latin American Development Process: From Structural Subordination to Empowerment*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1995, pp. 37–64; Lourdes Beneria, and Shelley Feldman (eds.), *Unequal Burden: Economic Crises, Persistent Poverty, and Women's Work*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992; York Bradshaw et al., 'Borrowing against the Future: Children and Third World Indebtedness', *Social Forces*, 71, no. 3, (1993) pp. 629–656; Irene Tinker (ed.), *Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990; Carolyn Moser, 'The Impact of Recession and Structural Adjustment Policies at the Micro-Level: Low Income Women and Their Households in Guayaquil, Ecuador', *Invisible Adjustment*, 2 (UNICEF, 1989).

[5] For examination of these issues, see, for example, Ward and Pyle, *supra* note 4; Tinker, *supra* note 4; Mirjana Morokvasic, Special Issue on Women Immigrants, *International Migration Review*, 18, no. 4 (1984).

[6] See, for example, *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* (1996) for treatments of this subject which focus on the impacts of economic globalization not on the shadow economy but on lawful features: the partial unbundling of sovereignty and what this means for emergence of cross-border feminist agendas, the place of women and of feminist consciousness in the new

We can identify two older phases in the study of gender in the recent history of economic internationalization. Both relate to processes that continue today. A third phase is focused on more recent transformations, often involving an elaboration of the categories and findings of the previous two phases.

The first phase of development literature generally covered the installation of cash crops and wage labour, typically by foreign firms, and its dependence on the household production and subsistence farming of women as a subsidy for the wage labour of men. Boserup, Deere and others have produced an enormously rich and nuanced literature showing the variants of this dynamic.[7] It has shown that far from being disconnected, the subsistence sector and the modern capitalist enterprise are connected by a gender dynamic. Furthermore, this gender dynamic itself veiled the connection. It was the 'invisible' work of women producing food and other necessities in the subsistence economy that contributed to extremely low wages on commercial plantations and mines, mostly geared to export markets. Women in the so-called subsistence sector thereby contribute, through their largely unmonetized subsistence production, to the financing of the 'modernized' sector. Standard development literature represented the subsistence sector as a drag on the modern sector and as an indicator of backwardness. It was not generally measured in standard economic analyses. Feminist analyses show the actual dynamics of this process of modernization and its dependence on the subsistence sector.[8]

The second phase included scholarship on the internationalization of manufacturing production and the feminization of the proletariat, which accompanied it.[9] The key analytic element in this scholarship was that moving

Asian mode of implementing advanced global capitalism, the global spread of core human rights and its power to alter the position of women. See also, Karen Knop, 'Re/ Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law', *Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems*, 3, (Fall 1993) pp. 293–344; V. Spike Peterson (ed.), *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, Lynne Reinner Publishers, Boulder, 1992; Rekha Mehra, 'Women, Empowerment and Economic Development', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (November 1997) pp. 136–149.

[7] E. Boserup, *Woman's Role in Economic Development*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1970); C.D. Deere, 'Rural Women's Subsistence Production in the Capitalist Periphery', *Review of Radical Political Economy*, 8 (1976) pp. 9–17.

[8] For an analysis of the household in the general context of the development of the world economy, see Joan Smith and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.), *Creating and Transforming Households: The Constraints of the World-Economy*, Cambridge University Press and Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Cambridge and Paris, 1992.

[9] This is a vast literature which focused on different parts of the world, for example, Lim (1980); Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*, University of California Press, California, 1988; June Nash and Maria Patricia Fernandez Kelly (eds.), *Women, Men, and the International Division of Labour*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1983; Helen Safa, *The Myth of the Male Breadwinner: Women and Industrialization in the Caribbean*,

manufacturing jobs offshore under pressure of low-cost imports mobilized a disproportionately female workforce in poorer countries, which had hitherto largely remained outside the industrial economy. In this regard, it is an analysis that also intersected with national questions, such as why women predominate in certain industries (notably the garment and electronics assembly industries) regardless of the level of development in a country.[10] Within the world economy, the formation of a feminized offshore proletariat allows firms to avoid unions in the countries where the capital originated and to secure competitive prices for re-imported goods assembled offshore.

The third phase of scholarship on women and the global economy is emerging around processes that underline transformations in gendering and women's notions of membership. These processes are represented in different literature sources. Among the richest and most pertinent to the subjects discussed in this article is the new feminist scholarship on female immigrants, which examines how international migration alters gender patterns and how the formation of transnational households can empower women.[11] There is also an important new area of scholarship, which focuses on new forms of cross-border solidarity and experiences of membership and identity formation that represents new subjectivities, including feminist subjectivities.[12]

Westview Press, Boulder, 1995; Saskia Sassen, *The Mobility of Labour and Capital*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988; Sylvia Chant (ed.), *Gender and Migration in Developing Countries*, Belhaven Press, New York, 1992; Edna Bonacich et al. (eds.), *Global Production: The Apparel Industry in the Pacific Rim*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1994.

10 See, for example, Milkman (1980); Beneria, Lourdes and Roldan, Marta, *Crossroads of Class and Gender: Homework, Subcontracting, and Household Dynamics in Mexico City*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1987.

11 See, for example, Castro (1986); Sherri Grasmuck and Patricia R. Pessar, *Between Two Islands: Dominican International Migration*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991; Boyd (1989); Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, *Gendered Transitions*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1994.

12 See, for example, Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, Cristina Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*, Gordon and Breach, 1994; Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1994; Lisa H. Malkki, 'Refugees and Exile', from 'Refugee Studies: The National Order of Things', 24 (1995) *Annual Review of Anthropology*, pp. 495–523; Zillah Eisenstein, 'Stop Stomping on the Rest of Us: Retrieving Publicness from the Privatization of the Globe', (1996) 4, *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, Special Symposium on Feminism and Globalization: The Impact of the Global Economy on Women and Feminist Theory; Aihwa Ong, 'Globalization and Women's Rights: The Asian Debate on Citizenship and Communitarianism', (1996) 4, *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, Special Symposium on Feminism and Globalization: The Impact of the Global Economy on Women and Feminist Theory.

From where can international economic processes be studied from a feminist perspective? This is an important question of methodology. In the case of export-oriented agriculture, the strategic site is the nexus between subsistence economies and capitalist enterprise. In the case of the internationalization of manufacturing, it is found between the dismantling of an established, largely male 'labour aristocracy' in major industries (where gains spread to a large share of the workforce in developed economies) and the formation of a low-wage offshore, largely female proletariat in growth sectors. Off-shoring and feminizing this proletariat has kept it from becoming an empowered 'labour aristocracy'. That is, one with actual union power that prevents existing, largely male 'labour aristocracies' from becoming stronger. Introducing a gender understanding of economic processes lays bare these connections.

What are the strategic sites in today's leading processes of globalization? Elsewhere, I have examined this issue from a perspective based on key features of the current global economic system.[13] There, I emphasized the role of global cities as strategic sites for the specialized servicing, financing and management of global economic processes. These cities are also sites for the incorporation of large numbers of women and immigrants in activities that service strategic sectors in both shadow and formal economic activities. This is a type of incorporation that renders invisible the fact that these workers are part of the global information economy. This breaks the nexus between workers in leading industries and the opportunity to become part of the 'labour aristocracy' or its contemporary equivalent, as had historically been the case in industrialized economies. In this sense, women and immigrants emerge as the systemic equivalent of the offshore proletariat. Further, the demands placed on the top-level professional and managerial workforce in global cities are such that the usual modes of handling household tasks and lifestyle are inadequate. As a consequence, we are witnessing the return of the so-called 'serving classes' in globalized cities around the world, composed largely of immigrant and migrant women.[14]

The alternative global circuits that concern me here are yet another example of these dynamics of globalization, but from the perspective of developing economies rather than from the perspective of global cities. Economic globalization needs to be understood in its multiple settings, many of which do not generally get coded as being important to the global economy. In the next sections I give an empirical specification for some of these alternative

13. Sassen, *supra* note 1, ch 5.

14 Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000, ch. 9. For the political implications that arise out of this situation in the cities of the global economy, see Joan Copjec and Michael Sorkin (ed.), *Giving Ground*, Verso, London, 1999.

global circuits, or counter-geographies of globalization. Because the data are inadequate, this is only a partial specification. Yet, it should serve to illustrate some of the key dimensions.

4. Government Debt

Debt and debt servicing problems have become a systemic feature of the developing world since the 1980s. In my estimation, they also induce the formation of new counter-geographies of globalization. They impact on women and on the feminization of survival through the particular features of this debt (rather than the fact of debt *per se*). It is with this logic in mind that this section examines various features of government debt in developing economies.

There is considerable research showing the detrimental effects of debt on government programs for women and children, notably education and health care, which clearly are investments necessary to ensure a better future. Further, the increased unemployment typically associated with the austerity and adjustment programs demanded by international agencies to address government debt have also been found to have adverse effects on women.[15] Unemployment, both of women and of the men in their households, has added to the pressure on women to find ways to ensure household survival. Subsistence food production, informal work, emigration and prostitution have all gained prominence as survival options for women.[16]

Heavy government debt and high unemployment have heightened the need to search for survival alternatives. Shrinking economic opportunities have

[15] See, for example, Michel Chossudovsky, *The Globalisation of Poverty*, Zed/TWN, London, 1997; Guy Standing, 'Global Feminization through Flexible Labour: A Theme Revisited', (1999) 27, *World Development*, 27, no. 3 (1999) pp. 583–602. Aminur Rahman, 'Micro-Credit Initiatives for Equitable and Sustainable Development: Who Pays?', (1999) 27, *World Development*, pp. 67–82; Diane Elson, *Male Bias in Development*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1995. For an excellent overview of the literature on the impact of the debt on women, see Kathryn Ward, 'Women and the Debt', paper presented at the Colloquium on Globalization and the Debt, University of Georgia, 1999.

[16] On these various issues, see, for example, Gonzalez-Alarcon, Diana and Terry McKinley, 'The Adverse Effects of Structural Adjustment on Working Women in Mexico', (1999) 26, *Latin American Perspectives*, pp. 103–117; Claudia Buchmann, 'The Debt Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Women's Education', (1996) 37, *International Journal of Comparative Studies*, pp. 5–30; Safa, *supra* note 9; Erika Jones, 'The Gendered Toll of Global Debt Crisis', (1999) 25, *Sojourner*, pp. 20–38; Nilufer Cagatay and Sule Ozler, 'Feminization of the Labour Force: The Effects of Long-Term Development and Structural Adjustment', (1995) 23, *World Development*, pp. 1883–1894; and several of the references cited in the preceding two footnotes. See also other articles in (2000) 53 *Journal of International Affairs*.

resulted in the increased use of illegal profit-making by enterprises and organizations. In this regard, heavy debt burden plays an important role in the formation of counter-geographies of survival, profit-making and government revenue enhancement. Economic globalization has, to some extent, added to the rapid increase in certain components of this debt, and it has provided an institutional infrastructure for cross-border flows and global markets. We can see economic globalization as facilitating the operation of these counter-geographies on a global scale.[17]

Generally, most countries that became deeply indebted in the 1980s have not been able to solve their debt problem. And in the 1990s we have seen a new set of countries become deeply indebted. Over these two decades, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank through their SAPs and Structural Adjustment Loans launched many innovations. (The latter were tied to economic policy reform rather than the funding of a particular project). The purpose of such programs is to make states more 'competitive', which typically means sharp cuts in various social programs. By 1990 there were almost 200 such loans in place. (During the 1980s also, the Reagan administration put enormous pressure on many countries to implement neoliberal policies, which resembled the SAPs.)

SAPs became a new norm for the World Bank and the IMF on the grounds that they were a promising way to secure long-term growth and sound government policy. Yet all of these countries have remained deeply indebted, with 41 of them now considered as being Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). Furthermore, the actual structure of these debts, their servicing and how they fit into debtor-country economies, suggest that it is not likely that most of these countries will, under current conditions, be able to pay their debt in full.[18] SAPs seem to have made this even more likely by demanding economic reforms that have increased the rates of unemployment and bankruptcy of many smaller, national market-oriented firms.

Even before the economic crisis of the 1990s, the debt of poor countries in the South had grown from USD 507 billion in 1980 to USD 1.4 trillion

[17] This has been an important element in my research on globalization: the notion that once there is an institutional infrastructure for globalization, processes which have basically operated at the national level can scale up to the global level even when this is not necessary for their operation. This would contrast with processes that are by their very features global, such as the network of financial centres underlying the formation of a global capital market (for example, Saskia Sassen, 'Global Financial Centers', 78 *Foreign Affairs* 1 (January/February 1999) pp. 75–87).

[18] In 1998, the debt was held as follows: multilateral institutions (IMF, World Bank and regional development banks): 45 per cent of the debt; bilateral institutions, individual countries and the Paris group: 45 per cent of the debt; and private commercial institutions: 10 per cent. Thomas Ambrogi, 'Jubilee 2000 and the Campaign for Debt Cancellation', *National Catholic Reporter* (July 1999).

by 1992. Debt service payments alone had increased to USD 1.6 trillion, more than the outstanding principal. Further, as is widely recognized now, the South has paid its debt several times over, and yet its debt grew by 250 per cent. According to some estimates, from 1982 to 1998 indebted countries paid four times the original principal, yet at the same time their debt stocks went up by four times.[19]

Yet these countries have been paying a significant share of their total revenue to service their debt. Thirty-three of the 41 Highly Indebted Countries paid three USD in debt service payments to the North for every one USD in development assistance. Many of these countries pay over 50 per cent of their government revenue toward debt service or 20 to 25 per cent of their export earnings.[20]

This debt burden inevitably has large repercussions on state spending. This is well illustrated in the case of Zambia, Ghana and Uganda, three countries that are considered by the World Bank as cooperative and responsible as well as effective in implementing SAPs. In Zambia, for example, the government paid USD 1.3 billion in debt but only USD 37 million for primary education; Ghana's social expenses, at USD 75 million, represented only 20 per cent of its debt service; and Uganda paid nine USD per capita on its debt and only one USD for health care.[21] In 1994 alone, these three countries remitted USD 2.7 billion to bankers in the North. Africa's payments reached USD 5 billion in 1998, which means that for every one USD in aid, African countries paid 1.40 USD in debt service in 1998.[22]

Debt service to GNP ratios in many of the HIPC countries exceed sustainable limits; many are far more extreme than what were considered unmanageable levels during the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s.[23] Debt to GNP ratios are especially high in Africa, where they recently stood at 123 per cent, compared with 42 per cent in Latin America and 28 per cent in Asia.[24]

[19] Eric Toussaint, 'Poor Countries Pay More under a Debt Reduction Scheme?', at www.twnside.org.sg/souths/twn/title/1921-cn.htm (July 1999) p. 1. According to Susan George, the South has paid back the equivalent of six Marshall Plans to the North: A Bandarage, *Women, Population and Crisis*, Zed, London, 1999.

[20] Ambrogi, *supra* note 18.

[21] Asad Ismi, 'Plunder with a Human Face', Z *Magazine* (February 1998).

[22] Dot Keet, 'The International Debt Campaign – An Activist View from 'the South' to Activists in the North' ... and the South', at http://aidc.org.za/archives/dot_keet_debt.html.

[23] OXFAM, 'International Submission to the HIPC Debt Review' (April 1999) at www.caa.org/au/oxfam/advocacy/debt/hipcreview.html.

[24] The IMF asks HIPCs to pay 20 to 25 per cent of their export earnings toward debt service. In contrast, in 1953 the Allies cancelled 80 per cent of Germany's war debt and only insisted on 3 to 5 per cent of export earnings debt service. These more general terms have also been evident in recent history when Central Europe emerged from Communism.

It is these features of the current situation, which suggest that most of these countries will not get out of their indebtedness through such current strategies as SAPs. Indeed it would seem that the latter have in many cases had the effect of raising the debt dependence of countries. Further, together with various other dynamics, SAPs have contributed to an increase in unemployment and in poverty.

Comparatively, the financial crisis in Southeast Asia is illuminating. Indeed, these were and remain highly dynamic economies. Yet, they faced high levels of indebtedness and economic failure among a broad range of enterprises and sectors. The particular features of the financial crisis have brought with them the imposition of structural adjustment policies. One consequence of these policies has been growth in unemployment and poverty attributable to widespread bankruptcies of small and medium sized firms catering to both national and export markets.[25] The USD 120 billion rescue package that introduced SAP provisions (and reduced the autonomy of these governments) served to compensate the losses of foreign institutional investors, rather than to solve the poverty and unemployment suffered by many people. Some view the management of the crisis by the IMF as worsening the situation for the unemployed and poor.

5. Alternative Circuits for Survival

The economic situation described above sets the context for the emergence of alternative circuits of survival. This situation is marked by what I interpret as systemic high unemployment, poverty, and bankruptcies of large numbers of firms and shrinking state resources to meet social needs. Here, I focus on some of the data on the trafficking of women for the sex industry and for work; the growing significance of this trafficking as a profit-making option; and the growing importance of emigrant remittances to the account balances of many of the sending states.

5.1. *Trafficking in Women*

Trafficking involves the forced recruitment and movement of people both within and across state boundaries for work or other services through a variety of forms, all involving coercion. Trafficking is a violation of distinct types of rights: human, civil and political. Trafficking in people appears to be related primarily to the sex market, to labour markets and to illegal migration. Legislation via international treaties and charters, UN resolutions and various

25 See, for example, Kris Olds et al. (eds.), *Globalization and the Asian Pacific: Contested Territories*, Routledge, London, 1999.

bodies and commissions has sought to address the problem of trafficking.[26] Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also playing an increasingly important role.[27]

Trafficking in women for the sex industry is highly profitable for those running the trade. The UN estimates that 4 million people were trafficked in 1998, producing a profit of USD 7 billion for criminal groups.[28] These funds include remittances from prostitutes' earnings and payments to organizers and facilitators. In Japan, profits in the sex industry have been approximately JPY 4.2 trillion per year over the last few years. In Poland, police estimate that for each Polish woman delivered, traffickers receive about USD 700. In Australia, the Federal Police estimate that the cash flow from 200 prostitutes is up to AUS 900,000 a week. Ukrainian and Russian women, highly prized in the sex market, earn the criminal gangs smuggling them about USD 500 to USD 1,000 per woman delivered. These women can be expected to service on average 15 clients a day, and each can be expected to make about USD 215,000 per month for the gang controlling them.[29]

It is estimated that in recent years several million women and girls were trafficked within and out of Asia and the former Soviet Union, two major

26 See, for example, Janie Chuang, 'Redirecting the Debate over Trafficking in Women: Definitions, Paradigms, and Contexts', (1998) 10, *Harvard Human Rights Journal*. Trafficking has become sufficiently recognized as an issue so that it was addressed in the G8 meeting in Birmingham in May 1998. The heads of the 8 major industrialized countries stressed the importance of cooperation against international organized crime and trafficking in persons. The US President issued a set of directives to his administration in order to strengthen and increase efforts against trafficking in women and girls. This in turn generated the legislative initiative by Senator Paul Wellstone: bill S.600 was introduced in the senate in 1999. For a good critical analysis, see Dayan (1999).

27 The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women has centers and representatives in Australia, Bangladesh, Europe, Latin America, North America, Africa and Asia Pacific. The Women's Rights Advocacy Program has established the Initiative Against Trafficking in Persons to combat the global trade in persons. Other organizations are referenced throughout this article.

28 See Foundation against Trafficking in Women (STV) and the Global Alliance against Traffic in Women (GAATW). For regularly updated sources of information on trafficking, see http://www.hrlawgroup.org/site/programs/traffic.html. See also, generally, Sietske Altink, *Stolen Lives: Trading Women into Sex and Slavery*, Harrington Park Press, New York, 1997; Kamala Kempadoo and Jo Doezema, *Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance, and Redefinition*, Routledge, London, 1998; Susan Shannon, 'The Global Sex Trade: Humans as the Ultimate Commodity', *Crime and Justice International* (1995) pp. 5–25; Lap-Chew Lin, and Marian Wijers, *Trafficking in Women, Forced Labour and Slavery-Like Practices in Marriage, Domestic Labour and Prostitution*, Foundation against Trafficking in Women (STV), Utrecht, and Global Alliance against Traffic in Women, Bangkok, 1997; Lin Lim, *The Sex Sector: The Economic and Social Bases of Prostitution in Southeast Asia*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1998.

29 For more detailed information on these various aspects, see the STV-GAATW reports; IOM (1996).

trafficking areas.[30] Increases in trafficking in both of these areas can be linked to women themselves being sold to brokers due to the poverty of their households or parents. High unemployment in the former Soviet republics has been one factor promoting growth of criminal gangs as well as trafficking in women. Upon implementation of market policies, unemployment rates among women in Armenia, Russia, Bulgaria and Croatia reached 70 per cent and in Ukraine 80 per cent. Some research indicates that economic need is fundamental for entry into prostitution.[31]

Trafficking in migrants is also a profitable business. According to a UN report, criminal organizations in the 1990s generated an estimated USD 3.5 billion per year in profits from trafficking migrants generally (not only women).[32] Entry of organized crime into migrant trafficking is a recent development. In the past it was mostly petty criminals who engaged in this type of trafficking. There are reports that organized crime groups are creating global strategic alliances, often with co-ethnic groups across several countries. This facilitates transport, local contact and distribution, and the provision of false documents. The Global Survival Network reported on these practices after a two-year investigation, which used a dummy company to enter the illegal trade.[33] Such networks also facilitate the organized circulation of trafficked women among third countries, not only from sending to receiving countries. Traffickers may move women from Burma, Laos, Vietnam and China to Thailand, while Thai women may be moved to Japan and the United States.[34]

Some of the features of immigration policy and enforcement may contribute to making women who are victims of trafficking even more vulnerable

30 See also article by Donna Hughes in (2000) 53 Journal of International Affairs.

31 There is also a growing trade in children for the sex industry. It has long existed in Thailand but is now also present in several other Asian countries, in Eastern Europe, and Latin America: Cabera, Jaime, 'An International Passion', *Bangkok Post* (Bangkok) 29 August 1999.

32 OIM (1996).

33 See Global Survival Network (1997), *Crime and Servitude: An Expose of the Traffic in Women for Prostitution from the Newly Independent States*, at www.globalsurvival.net/femaletrade.

34 There are various reports on the particular cross-border movements in trafficking. Malay brokers sell Malay women into prostitution in Australia. East European women from Albania and Kosovo have been trafficked by gangs into prostitution in London: Edin Hamzic and Maeve Sheehan, 'Kosovo Sex Slaves Held in Soho Flats', *Sunday Times* (London) 4 July 1999. European teens from Paris and other cities have been sold to Arab and African customers: see S. Shannon, 'The Global Sex Trade: Humans as the Ultimate Commodity', in *Crime and Justice International* (May 1999). In the U.S. the police broke up an international Asian ring that imported women from China, Thailand, Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam. William Booth, 'Thirteen Charged in Gang Importing Prostitutes', *Washington Post* (21 August 1999). The women were charged between USD 30,000 and 40,000 in contracts to be paid through their work in the sex trade or needle trade. The women in the sex trade were shuttled around several states in the US to bring continuing variety to the clients.

and give them little recourse in the law. If the women are undocumented, which is likely, they will not be treated as victims of abuse but as violators of the law insofar as they have violated entry, residence and work laws.[35] The attempt to address undocumented immigration and trafficking through greater border controls over entry raises the likelihood that women will use traffickers to cross the border, and some of these traffickers may turn out to belong to criminal organizations linked to the sex industry.

Further, in many countries prostitution is specifically forbidden for foreign women, which further enhances the role of criminal gangs in prostitution. It also diminishes one of the survival options for foreign women who may have limited access to jobs generally. Conversely, prostitution is tolerated for foreign women in many countries while regular labour market jobs are less so. This is the case for instance in the Netherlands and in Switzerland. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) data, the number of migrant women prostitutes in many EU countries is far higher than that for nationals (for example, 75 per cent in Germany and 80 per cent in the case of Milan, Italy).

While some women know that they are being trafficked for prostitution, for many the conditions of their recruitment and the extent of abuse and bondage only become evident after they arrive in the receiving country. The conditions of confinement are often extreme, and so are the conditions of abuse, including rape and other forms of sexual violence and physical punishments. They are severely underpaid, and wages are often withheld. They are prevented from using protection methods to prevent against HIV, and they typically have no right to medical treatment. If they seek police help they may be taken into detention because they are in violation of immigration laws; if they have been provided with false documents they are subject to criminal charges.[36]

As tourism has grown sharply over the last decade and become a major part of the development strategy for cities, regions and countries, the entertainment sector has experienced parallel growth and recognition as a key development target.[37] In many places, the sex trade is part of the en-

[35] See, generally, Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Second Edition, Guilford Press, New York, 1998; Sarah Mahler, *American Dreaming: Immigrant Life on the Margins*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995; Castro, *supra* note 1.

[36] A fact-sheet by the Coalition to Abolish Slavery and Trafficking reports that one survey of Asian sex workers found that rape often preceded sale into prostitution and that about one-third had been falsely led toward prostitution.

[37] Dennis Judd and Susan Fainstein, *The Tourist City*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1999.

tertainment industry and has grown similarly.[38] At some point it becomes clear that the sex trade itself can become a development strategy in areas with high unemployment and poverty and where governments are desperate for revenue and foreign currency. When local manufacturing and agriculture can no longer function as sources of employment, profits and government revenue, what was once a marginal source of earnings, profits and revenue, now becomes a far more important one. The increased importance of these sectors in development generates greater tie-ins. For instance, if the IMF and the World Bank view tourism as a solution to some of the growth challenges in poor countries and proceed to provide loans for development, they may be contributing to the development of a broader institutional setting for the expansion of the entertainment industry. This may also indirectly support the sex trade. This tie-in with development strategies suggests that trafficking in women may well see expansion.

Women in the sex industry become – in certain kinds of economies – a crucial link supporting the expansion of the entertainment industry and thereby of tourism as a development strategy. This in turn becomes a source of government revenue. These tie-ins are structural, not a function of conspiracies. Their weight in an economy will be raised by the absence or limited nature of other sources for securing a livelihood, profits and revenue for workers, businesspeople and governments.

The entry of organized crime in the sex trades, the formation of cross-border ethnic networks and the rising globalization of many aspects of tourism suggest that we are likely to see further development of a global sex industry. This could lead to further attempts to enter into more 'markets' and a general expansion of the industry. It is a troubling possibility, especially in the context of growing numbers of women with few, if any, employment options. Such numbers are to be expected given high unemployment and poverty, the shrinking of work opportunities that were embedded in the more traditional sectors of these economies and the growing debt burden of governments rendering them incapable of providing social services and support to the poor.

5.2. *Remittances*

Women and migrants generally enter the macro-level of development strategies through yet another channel: the sending of remittances, which in many countries represent a major source of foreign exchange for the government. While the flows of remittances may be minor compared to the massive daily

38 See, for example, Ryan Bishop and Lillian Robinson, *Night Market: Sexual Cultures and the Thai Economic Miracle*, Routledge, New York, 1998.

capital flows in various financial markets, they are often very significant for developing or struggling economies.

In 1998 global remittances by immigrants to their home countries exceeded USD 70 billion.[39] To understand the significance of this figure, it should be related to the GDP and foreign currency reserves of the specific countries involved, rather than to the global flow of capital. For instance, in the Philippines, a key sender of migrants generally and of women for the entertainment industry in several countries, remittances were the third largest source of foreign exchange over the last several years. In Bangladesh, a country with significant numbers of its workers in the Middle East, Japan and several European countries, remittances represent about a third of foreign exchange.

Exporting workers and securing an inflow of remittances are means for governments to cope with unemployment and foreign debt. There are two ways in which governments have secured benefits through these strategies. One of these is highly formalized and the other is simply a by-product of the migration process itself. Among the strongest examples of formal labour export programs are South Korea and the Philippines.[40] In the 1970s, South Korea developed specific programs to promote the export of construction workers, initially to the Middle Eastern OPEC countries and then worldwide. As South Korea entered its own economic boom, exporting workers became less of a necessity or attractive option. In contrast, the Philippine government expanded and diversified the export of its citizens as a means to deal with unemployment and to secure needed foreign exchange from their remittances. It is to this case that I turn now as it illuminates issues at the heart of this article.

The Philippine government, through the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), has played an important role in the emigration of Philippine women to the US, the Middle East and Japan. Established in 1982, it organized and oversaw the export of nurses and maids to high demand areas around the world. High foreign debt and unemployment combined to make this an attractive policy. Filipino overseas workers have sent home on average, almost USD 1 billion a year over the last few years. On the other side, the various importing countries welcomed this policy for their own specific reasons. Oil-producing countries in the Middle East saw the demand for domestic workers rise sharply after the 1973 oil boom. The United States, confronted with a sharp shortage of nurses (a profession that demands years of training yet at the time garnered low wages and little prestige), passed the *Immigration Nursing Relief Act of 1989*, which allowed for the importa-

[39] See, generally, Castles and Miller, *supra* note 35; Castro, *supra* note 1.

[40] Sassen, *supra* note 9.

tion of nurses.[41] And Japan, marked by rising expendable income and strong labour shortages, passed legislation that permitted the entry of 'entertainment workers' into its booming economy in the 1980s.[42]

The Philippine government also passed regulations that permitted mail-order bride agencies to recruit young Filipinas for marriage to foreign men as a matter of contractual agreement. The rapid increase in this trade was primarily due to the organized efforts of the government. Among the major clients were the US and Japan. Japan's agricultural communities were a key destination for these brides. This was attributable to the booming economy where demand for labour in the large metropolitan areas was extremely high, contributing to an enormous shortage of people and especially young women in the Japanese countryside. Consequently, municipal governments made it a policy to accept Filipina brides.

The largest numbers of Filipinas going through these channels work overseas as maids, particularly in other Asian countries.[43] The second largest group, and the fastest growing, are entertainers, mostly in Japan.[44] The rapid increase in the numbers of entertainer-migrants is largely due to the existence of over five hundred 'entertainment brokers' in the Philippines operating outside the state umbrella even though the government may benefit from the remittances of these workers. These brokers work to provide women for the sex industry in Japan, which is basically supported or controlled by organized gangs rather than government-controlled programs for the entry of entertainers. These women are recruited for singing and entertaining, but frequently are forced into prostitution as well.[45]

41 About 80 per cent of the nurses brought in under the new act were from the Philippines.

42 Japan passed a new immigration law (an amendment of an older law), which radically re-drew the conditions for entry of foreign workers. It allowed for the entry of a series of professionals linked to the new service dominated economy – specialists in western-style finance, accounting, law – but made the entry of what it termed 'simple labour' illegal. The latter provision generated a rapid increase in undocumented entries of workers for low-wage jobs. This prohibition underlines the fact that the new law did make special provisions for the entry of 'entertainers': Sassen, *supra* note 1, ch. 6.

43 Brenda Yeoh, Shirlena Huang, and Joaquin Gonzalez III, 'Migrant Female Domestic Workers: Debating the Economic, Social and Political Impacts in Singapore', *International Migration Review*, 33, no. 1 (1999) pp. 114–136; Christine Chin, 'Walls of Silence and Late 20th Century Representations of Foreign Female Domestic Workers: The Case of Filipina and Indonesian House Servants in Malaysia', *International Migration Review*, 31, no. 1 (1997) pp. 353–385; N. Heyzer, *The Trade in Domestic Workers*, Zed, London, 1994.

44 Sassen, *supra* note 14, ch. 9.

45 These women are recruited and brought in through both legal and illegal channels. Regardless, they have little power to resist. Even as they are paid below minimum wage, they produce significant profits for the brokers and employers involved. There has been an enormous increase in so-called entertainment businesses in Japan.

There is growing evidence of significant violence among mail-order brides in several countries, regardless of nationality of origin. In the US, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has recently reported that domestic violence towards mail-order wives has become acute. Again, the law operates against these women seeking recourse, as they are liable to be detained if they do so prior to the first two years of marriage. In Japan, the foreign mail-order wife is not granted full equal legal status to citizens and there is considerable evidence showing that many are subject to abuse not only by the husband but by his extended family as well. The Philippine government approved most mail-order bride organizations until 1989. But under the government of Corazon Aquino, the stories of abuse by foreign husbands led to the banning of the mail-order bride business. It is almost impossible to eliminate these organizations and they continue to operate in violation of the law.

The Philippines, while perhaps the country with the most developed program, is not the only one to have explored these strategies. Thailand started a campaign in 1998, after the financial crisis, to promote migration for work and recruitment of Thai workers by firms overseas. The government sought to export workers to the Middle East, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Australia and Greece. Sri Lanka's government has tried to export 200,000 workers in addition to the one million it already has overseas. Sri Lankan women remitted USD 880 million in 1998, mostly from their earnings as maids in the Middle East and East Asia.[46] Bangladesh had already organized extensive labour export programs to the OPEC countries of the Middle East in the 1970s. This has continued along with individual migrations to these and other countries, notably the US and Great Britain, and it provides a significant source of foreign exchange for Bangladesh. Its workers remitted USD 1.4 billion in each of the last few years.[47]

6. Conclusion

We are seeing the growth of a variety of alternative global circuits for making a living, earning a profit and securing government revenue. These circuits incorporate increasing numbers of women. Among the most important of these global circuits are the illegal trafficking in women for prostitution as well as for regular work, the organized export of women as brides, nurses and domestic servants, and the remittances of an increasingly female

46 Anon, 'Sri Lankan Migrant Workers Remit Rs 60 Billion in 1998', Xinhua News Agency – Ceis Woodside, 12 February 1999.

47 N. David, 'Migrants Made the Scapegoats of the Crisis', *International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Online*, at www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/50/012.

emigrant workforce. Some of these circuits operate partly or wholly in the shadow economy.

This article maps some of the main features of these circuits and argues that their emergence and strengthening are linked to major dynamics of economic globalization, which have had significant impacts on developing economies. Key indicators of such impacts are the heavy and rising burden of government debt, the growth in unemployment, sharp cuts in government social expenditure, the closure of a large number of firms in often fairly traditional sectors oriented to the local or national market and the promotion of export-oriented growth.

I call these circuits counter-geographies of globalization because they are: (1) directly or indirectly associated with some of the key programs and conditions that are at the heart of the global economy, but (2) are circuits not typically represented or seen as connected to globalization, and often actually operate outside and in violation of laws and treaties, yet are not exclusively embedded in criminal operations as is the case with the illegal drug trade. Further, the growth of a global economy has brought with it an institutional infrastructure that facilitates cross-border flows and represents, in that regard, an enabling environment for these alternative circuits.

It is increasingly on the backs of women that these forms of survival, profit making and government revenue enhancement operate. To this we can add the additional government savings attributed to severe cuts in health care and education. These cuts are often part of the effort to make the state more competitive, as demanded by SAPs and other policies linked to the current phase of globalization. These types of cuts generally hit women particularly hard, as they are responsible for the health and education of household members.

These counter-geographies lay bare the systemic connections between, on the one hand, the mostly poor and low-wage women often considered a burden rather than a resource, and, on the other hand, what are emerging as significant sources of illegal profit-making and as important sources of convertible currency for governments. Linking these counter-geographies to programs and conditions at the heart of the global economy also helps us to understand how issues of gender enter into their formation and viability.

Information-Based Global Economy and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Bangalore

SHIRIN MADON

Lecturer in Information Systems
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom

Information technology is at the core of the current process of economic globalization. New areas of the world and new regions within countries are experiencing growth by entering the information age as manufacturers and users of information technology. However, often growth and decline take place simultaneously within the same region due to the tension that results from participation in global operations and the local socioeconomic context of the region. India presents a major case study of this tension, which we describe through a study of the region of Bangalore. The description reveals that the region faces pervasive forms of asymmetry between those who can participate in the global information economy and those who cannot. We argue that these internal disparities will ultimately affect capitalist development and discuss some issues of relevance to planners and policymakers concerned with the twin processes of globalization and local regional development.

Keywords Bangalore, developing countries, globalization, information technology, socioeconomic development

Over the last 20 years, a host of academics, politicians, and industrialists have declared the arrival of the information age. The idea that advanced industrialized countries might be moving to a postindustrialized society first took hold in the United States in the 1960s against a context of increasing prosperity and automation. The main proponents of this approach supported a historical model of development in the leading economies based on shifts in the composition of output and labor from agriculture to manufacturing to services to information activities (Bell, 1973; Porat, 1977; OECD, 1981). Many writers tried to quantify the extent of progress countries were making toward achieving an information economy by counting the number of people employed in information-related occupations, which was defined in various ways. On the whole, there was agreement that the 20th century had witnessed a shift of one-third to one-half of the population within leading economies into occupations that deal with information (Beyers, 1989; Kling, 1990). Change in employment was considered to be one factor in the wide variety of phenomena associated with the information society. Other factors included the diffusion of information technology within society, the expansion of institutions dedicated to the creation and manipulation of information, and the growth in universal public information services (Katz, 1988).

Received 21 February 1997; accepted 26 March 1997.
Address correspondence to Dr. Shirin Madon, Lecturer in Information Systems, Department of Information Systems, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. E-mail: S. Madon@lse.ac.uk

The Information Society, 13:227–243, 1997

0197-2243/97 $12.00 + .00

Certainly by the 1980s, the "information society" concept described a revolution generated by technological advances that would transform the world from its traditional boundaries of nation states into a global society based on competition and on information exchange and manipulation (Angell, 1995). These technological advances have allowed leading economies to produce information processors and control apparatus to increase the productivity and quality of their products and services (Dicken, 1992). These features have given transnational companies (TNCs) distinct advantages in global competition and the potential to dominate smaller markets in developing countries. Leading the pack are the very producers of microelectronic products that not only supply the needs of TNCs, but also supply the products needed by third-world enterprises that intend to compete in the worldwide multi-billion-dollar microelectronics market. The result of these trends has been a restructuring of the international division of labor most visible in the shift of labor-intensive production toward regions and nations that were hitherto peripheral. At the same time, there has been a dramatic increase in the activities of the informal sector both in the core and periphery of the global system (Dunning & Norman, 1987; Enderwick, 1989).

Most accounts of globalization in the information age have tended to examine the phenomenon from the perspective of a few economically advanced countries. For example, studies have been conducted on the nature of new emergent organizational forms, institutional development, and the geographic relocation of industrial activity (Miles & Snow, 1986; Lash & Urry, 1994). In terms of the impact on developing countries, some writers are concerned that economic globalization will increasingly marginalize poorer nations from policymaking regarding the diffusion and exploitation of information and communications technology (Hamelink, 1994; Harris, 1996). They argue that the restructuring of capitalism that occurred in the advanced economies during the 1970s and 1980s did not occur in the majority of developing countries where the information revolution occurred at the same time as industries were striving to achieve technical efficiency. As a result, many information technology initiatives that have been undertaken both in the public and private sectors in developing countries have faced difficulty in improving productivity and effectiveness (Odedra, 1990; Madon, 1994a).

It is claimed that the information revolution that is taking place has far-reaching consequences for the future of cities and regions in the world. For example, Castells and Hall (1996) argue that "technopoles" have increasingly become a major feature of the new industrial landscape in advanced economies as cities and regions emerge as hubs integrating the global information economy. However, their analysis offers little insight into the socioeconomic impact of globalization on these technology hubs. Moreover, they fail to recognize that this type of urban-regional transformation is increasingly diversified around the world. While Western Europe is witnessing the maturity of its metropolitan areas with stagnant or even negative rates of growth, cities in most developing countries are experiencing an urban explosion as they face a new degree of exposure to global socioeconomic forces. The dispersion of these economic activities in developing countries does not follow any uniform pattern but tends to contribute to agglomerations of industries and services in and around focal points in urban sites (Sassen, 1994). Some parts of the developing world are consequently much richer than others as they rush to compete for the status of being the host location for major institutional players (Harris, 1996). Some writers praise the willingness among developing countries to live with massive regional variation in socioeconomic performance (Appleyard, 1995). Others have cautioned that such massive and growing internal disparities mean that developing countries have to cope with a vast territory that is becoming increasingly peripheral from the major processes that fuel economic growth (Avgerou, 1996).

The work of Castells (1986, 1989, 1996) is often cited as an important theoretical contribution to understanding the impact of information-based globalization on urban-regional processes. Castells developed a framework to describe the context of globalization in terms of the restructuring of capitalism and the emergence of a new mode of sociotechnical organization that he calls the informational mode of development. The basic elements of his framework are summarized in Table 1. Fundamental to Castells's thesis is the fragmentation of cities due to globalization. While the dual city is a classic theme of urban sociology, Castells argues that there is a new form of urban dualism on the rise, one specifically linked to the increasing differentiation and segregation of labor in two equally dynamic sectors of the growing economy—the formal economy comprised of knowledge-intensive activities and the labor-based informal economy.

While the focus of Castells's empirical research is the United States, the generalizable hypotheses resulting from his analysis have been used to examine the effects of the twin processes of capitalist restructuring and informationalism in other cities and regions of the world (Cohen, 1987; Salih & Young, 1987). Cohen's (1987) study shows how Mexico's diverse and extensive links to both world and national economies have enabled more balanced socioeconomic development within the country. In contrast, in Salih and Young's study of the city of Penang, Malaysia, the highly skewed process of indigenous development is due to the fact that the city has forged links with the world economy at the expense of links to its own local economy. However, these studies focus on the eco-

Table 1
Basic elements of Castells's framework

Restructuring of capitalism	1. Internationalization of economy with capital movements, labor migration, penetration of markets. 2. Weakening of organized labor in favor of capital. Dramatic increase in informal economy due to lower wages and social benefits. 3. Change in pattern of state intervention away from welfare activities toward capital accumulation (deregulation, privatization). State support for high-tech industries.
Informational mode of development	1. Use of computers to improve productivity in organizations. Trend toward decentralization and integration enables new actors to enter the global marketplace. 2. Segregation between permanent high-level knowledge workers (decision-makers) and flexible manual labor, which is adapted to the convenience of management. 3. Government control and manipulation of information flows but informed by the values and dynamics of society.
Urban-regional transformation	1. High demand for knowledge workers conflicts with institutional capacity to produce such skills. 2. More reliance of organizations and labor on the global economy and less on the social context of location.

nomic impact of globalization on regions in the developing world and tell us little about the growing social malaise and internal disparities that also have impact on these areas.

From a regional perspective, South Asia offers an interesting example of these growing internal disparities. Larger countries in the region like India and Pakistan are in a good position to use their extensive resource base to channel capital into selected high-technology sectors, thereby allowing the development of chosen areas. Hence, the response of many countries in contemporary South Asia has been to expand the production of high-technology goods in selected regions of the country in order to grab a place in the restructured international market and to guarantee adequate foreign exchange. This selected development of certain regions in South Asia brings with it major problems of social inequality. However, the literature tells us little about the extent of such internal disparity and its impact on socioeconomic development within the region.

The scope of this article is to contribute in this direction by describing how the process of globalization is affecting life in the city of Bangalore, which is the capital of Karnataka state in South India. Contrary to popular literature about Bangalore as an informational miracle, the scope of this article is to provide a more balanced view of its success by highlighting the unequal impact of globalization on the region. While acknowledging that cities respond differently to globalization trends according to local circumstances, we confine our analysis to one single location, in the belief that improving understanding of phenomenon in one context is an essential precursor to understanding them across more than one context (Lee, 1989). Hence, the findings from the study of Bangalore can be generalizable to other settings on the basis of being confirmed by additional studies that test them against the empirical circumstances of those settings. The argument we make is that the polarization that is taking place in the region of Karnataka, whereby the majority of the population are excluded from participating in the gains of the information age, is of long-term disadvantage not only in terms of local socioeconomic development but also in terms of global capitalist development. The second section briefly reviews the nature of the information society that exists in India. The third section describes the global processes that have contributed to making Bangalore the silicon valley of South Asia, and at the same time have impacted the local functioning and dynamics of the city and the region. This description is based partly on secondary data sources including central and state government reports and journal articles, and partly on interviews with government personnel, and community workers during July 1995. The final section of the article discusses the main issues that arise from the findings. We organize the discussion in terms of the elements in Castells's framework and discuss issues that are particularly relevant for understanding the impact of information-based globalization on developing countries.

India Enters the Information Age

India has the world's largest urban population, with projections for continuing growth to around 300 million urban dwellers by 2001 (Gilbert & Gugler, 1992). The shift in population to towns and cities has resulted in shifts in economic activity from primary to secondary and tertiary sectors. In India, the primary sector's share of gross domestic product (GDP) dropped from 60% in 1951 to less than 40% in 1981, and the productivity of workers in urban areas rose faster than rural workers (Sita & Chatterjee, 1989). This process of rapid urbanization in India has occurred at a time when India has been taking steps toward becoming part of the information-intensive global economy. As noted in the *Economist* (1996), "there are parts of the Indian economy that are skipping right over the

second industrial age and straight into the information era." As part of this process, in August 1991, India changed the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act to allow 51% foreign investment equity in major industries. This move, reversing a 15-year period of import substitution policies, basically signaled a willingness to subsume internal development goals within the emerging trends toward participating in the global economy. Many foreign information technology companies began to establish themselves in India and to rely increasingly on Indian expertise to design, build, and test complex software applications for the global market, leading to a rapid increase in the number of information-related job in the economy (NASSCOM, 1995).

Regarding institutions dedicated to the creation and manipulation of information, no single entity exists for formulating national policies and strategies for the information technology sector. The government, through the Department of Electronics, the Ministry of Commerce, the National Informatics Centre, and various industry associations, provides broad support for the sector. There are a limited number of institutions devoted to informing, educating, and supporting business users on managing information technology in their organizations. These organizations articulate the interests of users, help diffuse technology in their sectors, and provide channels for information and experience sharing among the business community (Hanna, 1994).

The impact of the information age on the usage of information within Indian society at large remains highly biased in favor of the main cities and professional workers. In general, public libraries are concentrated in the main cities of India as shown in Table 2 (*World of Learning*, 1995). In college and university libraries, book collections vary in quantity and quality depending on the status of the institution. For example, in 1995 the University of Delhi had a book-to-user ratio of 1:10, while Anna University in Tamil Nadu had a ratio of 1:37, and the Aligarh Muslim University in Uttar Pradesh a ratio of 1:54 (*World Guide to Libraries*, 1995). By the late 1980s, automation of academic libraries was only beginning in most institutions, and today only a handful of universities have online access. Specialist libraries and documentation centres for professionals have benefited from relatively greater investment and integration with telematics. In India, there are over 1100 of these centers in which online databases coordinated through international agencies are available in digital or hard-copy form. For the general public, information booths have been set up in all district development agencies providing data on various economic and social activities (NIC, 1991). However, these centers are mainly frequented by students, rather than by local inhabitants.

In terms of the diffusion of telecommunications in the country, India has extremely low availability of services, especially in rural areas (Hanna, 1994). In addition to the high (and unmet) demand for regular telephone services, there is a growing demand for many specialized and intelligent services to enable companies (and government agencies) to transfer data. Table 3 indicates the various public network projects running or on the threshold of being commissioned in India, their objectives, medium, functions and number of users. However, in the main, these services suffer from overloading, poor performance, and high cost. As a result, large corporate users are setting up private networks (Heitzman, 1992). A dual structure therefore exists whereby specialized networks and advanced data services are increasingly forged ahead and developed for business needs, perhaps for technology enclaves, while the goal of basic universal services and other social objectives assume a secondary place.

The most important characteristic of the information infrastructure in India appears to be the inequality of its development. There is a distinct bias toward establishing access to information for urban inhabitants and for the business community at the expense of the

Table 2
Public libraries in India

Name of public library and location	Volumes	Periodicals
Sheth Maheklai Jethabhai Pustakalaya, Ahmedabad	144,000	—
Municipal public library, Ajmer	42,000	85
Public library, Allahabad	60,000	—
Public library, Amreli	32,000	—
Pandit Motilal Nehru municipal library, Amritsar	42,000	109
British Council library, Bangalore	40,000	120
State Central library, Bangalore	207,000	410
Central library, Baroda	234,000	—
Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay	75,000	27
Baghbazar reading library, Calcutta	38,000	—
Delhi public library, New Delhi	700,000	—
Government public library, Delhi	68,000	—
Hardinge municipal public library, Delhi	68,000	—
P. Tandon library, New Delhi	56,000	106
State Central library, Hyderabad	248,000	—
Sumer public library, Jodhpur	38,000	—
Amir-ud-Daula government public library, Lucknow	105,000	38
Archarya Narendra Dev, Lucknow	77,000	146
Connemara public library, Madras	372,000	—
Nilgiri library, Ootacamund, Madras	40,000	—
Central state library, Patiala	68,000	130
Khuda Bakhsh oriental public library, Patna	80,000	830
City general library, Pune	30,000	—
State central library, Shillong	160,000	—
Dwarka Dass library, Simla	30,000	—
District library, Tezpur district, Assam	30,000	—
Trivandrum public library, Trivandrum	185,000	—
Jaikrishna public library, Uttarpara district	30,000	—
Saraswati Niketanam Subroi Mahal, Vetapalem district, Andhra Prahesh	32,000	—
Ram Mohan Free library, Vijawada district, Andhra Pradesh	31,000	—

Note. Compiled from the *World Guide to Libraries* (1995).

rest of the country. Within this national scenario, the next section describes the twin processes of rapid integration of Bangalore within the global information society, and urban-regional transformation within Karnataka state.

Bangalore—Internal Disparities of a City Caught up in the Information Age

A distinctive feature of most cities in the developing world is the fragmented character of their spatial organization. During the colonial period, this fragmentation was a direct consequence of the need to separate the European population from the indigenous (Balbo,

Table 3
Telecommunication network projects in India

Network	Provider	Objective	Services	Number of users
RABMN	DoT	Satcom for remote users	Messaging	300
INDONET	CMC	IT for all	E-mail, file	600
I-NET	DoT	Reliable datacom	E-mail, file	1200
GPSS	VSNL	Overseas datacom	E-mail, file	630
NICNET	NIC	MIS for govt	E-mail, file	450
ERNET	DoE	Datacom for R&D	E-mail, file	85
BANKNET	RBI	Interbank datacom	File transfer	254
SAILNET	SAIL	Datacom for SAIL	File transfer	Major SAIL sites
OILCOMNET	OCC	Datacom for oil sector	Messaging	Major oil centres
SOFTNET	DoE	Promotion of software exports	All types	n/a
ICNET	ICNET	Value added services	E-mail, databases	25

Note. From NASSCOM (1995).

1993). The few decades that have elapsed since the end of colonialism have not been sufficient to transform the fragmented city into an integrated one. In fact, it appears that the nature of fragmentation has shifted to one based on participation in the information-intensive global economy by a core elite, and nonparticipation by the masses.

Bangalore presents a case study of this type of fragmentation. It is the fastest growing city in India (ranked fifth in the country) with a population rising from 1.66 million in 1971 to 2.92 million in 1981 (a 76% growth rate), and a projected population of 3.8 million by 2000 (Heitzman, 1992). At the turn of the century, Bangalore was a provincial town in Southern Karnataka that had evolved from a medieval temple/fort center and a colonial military encampment. Industrialization until the 1940s centered around textile manufacturing. The city's emergence as a center for information technology stems from decisions in New Delhi shortly after independence to locate strategically sensitive industries well away from borders and coastlands. Bangalore was therefore an obvious place to base the Indian air-force base and other public-sector institutions, which promoted the establishment of a number of universities, institutions, and colleges providing engineering and scientific training (Holstrom, 1994).

Between 1951 and 1971, there was a marked correlation between industrial development and accelerating population growth, with figures doubling during the 20-year period. By the 1970s, the occupational profile of the city showed the distinctive patterns of an emerging information society with 10.5% of the population in professional positions, 16.5% in clerical jobs, and 45% in production of which around half were in electrical fields (Singhal & Rogers, 1989). By the late 1980s, Bangalore included 375 large- and medium-scale industries and had 3000 companies employing 100,000 people in the electronics industry alone. The city contained up to 10,000 small industries and 8 large industrial parks (Premi, 1991).

Bangalore now plays a prominent role in international electronics, telecommunications, and information technology, contributing almost 40% of India's production in high-technology industrial sectors (hardware, software, telecommunications) (*The Ob-*

server, 1995). The availability of highly skilled technicians, relative political and social stability within the state, the absence of labor conflicts, and an efficient banking network have meant that almost every big player in the information technology scene has its place there. Among indigenous high-technology companies that have established themselves in Bangalore are Wipro Systems (one of the largest Indian hardware and software vendors), Infosys Technologies, and Sonata Software. These, in turn, have been followed by a galaxy of multinational information technology companies attracted by the temperate climate of the city. These companies have adopted varying strategies to gain competitive advantage through offshore software outsourcing using local programmers and satellite links to design and produce customized packages. Some of these transnational companies (TNCs) like Digital Equipment, IBM, and British Aerospace have formed joint ventures with existing Indian players (NASSCOM, 1995).

Many of the high-tech companies in Bangalore are growing by more than 50% per year and are employing increasing numbers of graduates. For example, Siemens Communications, set up 18 months ago to build software for the group's digital switching systems, already employs 250 people and plans to grow its workforce of software engineers to 1000 by the end of the decade (*Observer*, 1995). The increasing demand for highly skilled "knowledge" workers threatens to outstrip the potential of local institutes in Bangalore to produce such skills, and many of the high-tech companies are having to recruit their workforce from other cities. In recent years, an increasing number of specialized small-scale workshops have been established to supply the high-technology industries. These workshops, most of which are characterized as being in the informal sector, recruit an increasing number of semiskilled migrant workers and help to bridge the gap between the demand and supply of labor.

To capitalize on its emergence as a popular location for software research, Bangalore has established a software technology park at Electronics City, just three-quarters of a mile out of the city. Hundreds of acres of research laboratories are occupied in the park by the likes of IBM, 3M, Motorola, Sanyo, and Texas Instruments. Companies that locate within the park are insulated from the world outside by power generators, by the leasing of special telephone lines, and by an international-style work environment. Bangalore is also in the throes of constructing a new upmarket international information technology park in the suburb of the city. The $250 million project, due to open in 1996, is a joint venture between the government of Karnataka, a Singapore consortium, and the Tata Group. The project aims to integrate advanced work facilities with recreational and residential activities in a single location. The 56-acre complex has already attracted international attention, and thousands of enquiries regarding investment opportunities in the park have flooded in from the United Kingdom, North America, Europe, and Hong Kong. In parallel with the launching of this new park, a new international airport is also being funded by the Indian Tata Group and Singapore International Airlines, which is intended to provide a boost to industrial activity in Bangalore, in particular to the electronics and software industries (*India Today*, 1995).

Increasingly, the presence of a sizeable modern industrial sector has brought prosperity to the city and has given its central parts a cosmopolitan outlook. Measured in terms of expensive restaurants and pubs, boutiques, shopping plazas, and other signs of available purchasing power in the context of Western behavior patterns, a middle class is strikingly present in the central parts of the city and in other expensive areas beyond the center. A similar indicator of prosperity is the boom in the construction industry catering for the upper segments of the housing market and for commercial use. Cheap real estate

has been one of the reasons why entrepreneurs prefer this city to the choked or very expensive cities like Bombay (*Observer*, 1995).

For all the preceding reasons, today Bangalore is conceived internationally as a prosperous and modern Indian city. But this label is misleading. At least three more characteristics have to be added to portray the reality of the situation. First, there exists gross inequality between groups of different socioeconomic status within the city of Bangalore and the region of Karnataka. Second, extreme poverty prevails among many inhabitants in the city. Third, there is an acute problem of civic deficiency both in Bangalore city and in the state of Karnataka, together with poor access to information outside the capital. These three characteristics are described in the remainder of this section.

First, contrary to the international reputation earned by Bangalore, the advent of the information age has yet to make a dent in the overall economic picture of the state, which remains primarily an agricultural state. Out of a total population of almost 50 million people, around 76% live in rural areas, and there is a high incidence of rural poverty in these areas (GOI, 1990). For example, 95% of the rural poor population in Karnataka have an annual family income of less than $102 (Nicoll, 1995). A sizeable share of the increase in the population of Bangalore city is related to migration. Many households of predominantly landless agricultural laborers and marginal farmers have been pushed out of their native rural villages by lack of means to survive and have been forced to move to Bangalore to find employment in the informal sectors as unskilled laborers. Tension has escalated within the city of Bangalore with the vast influx of migrant laborers from other Indian states, mainly from neighboring Tamil Nadu. These Tamil migrants seek menial jobs in construction and pose a real threat to local poor inhabitants, as witnessed in the violent anti-Tamil riots of 1991.

Foreign high-technology companies are largely responsible for the rampant wage inflation in Bangalore, particularly among experienced technical staff. For example, these companies typically offer remuneration of about $395 a month, growing to triple the salary over 3–4 years. These discrepancies have led to social tension between the state government in Karnataka, which is committed to supporting the influx of multinational companies into the state, and the lobby of farmers and agricultural workers who are against the establishment of high-technology multinational fast-food chains within the state. The latest of these attacks was recently launched against the KFC (Kentucky Fried Chicken) chain by a lobby of Karnataka farmers (Nicoll, 1995).

Second, although poverty could be claimed to be of nationwide concern, in Bangalore the problem is more acute. In terms of absolute numbers, the poor easily predominate over the middle classes and professionals. While the share of urban inhabitants living in huts without access to infrastructure facilities is relatively small in Bangalore (10%) in contrast to other Indian metropoles (25–30%), there has been an exponential growth in this share over the last decade. The condition is continuously deteriorating both in terms of an increase in new slum areas and in terms of an increase in the population density of existing slums (de Wit, 1992). The discrepancy in habitat conditions between the rich and the poor inhabitants is also more extreme and more dramatically visible in Bangalore than in other cities. Due to societal modernization, the state is pressured to cut down trees to accommodate use of central urban land for nonresidential purposes and for expensive housing. Local middle-class residents and the urban poor are driven out of the city because of the rise in price of real estate and rent in the city center. They are therefore forced to squat on the urban fringe and to incur transport costs of commuting to the city each day in search for work (*India Today*, 1995).

While it is an open question as to whether the proliferation of shanty towns and environmental degradation is as a result of rural distress and increased population growth, or due to urbanization and globalization, what is certainly noticeable is the increasingly negative attitude of policymakers and planners in Bangalore toward slums. In discussions with the Bangalore state authorities, most policymakers did not officially acknowledge slum dwellers as citizens of the city, even though they clearly constitute the majority of the population. This attitude is reflected in the periodic demotion of any visible manifestations of poverty such as the frequent "clean-up" programs in which squatter settlements are demolished in order to preserve the quality of life of the so-called "modern" sector. Contrary to policy in other Indian cities, an increasing number of slums in Bangalore are located on private land that does not belong to the government and therefore precludes the eventual transfer of ownership to hut-dwellers. In many cases, private developers build high-rise blocks so that less space is consumed for housing and the remaining space is allocated to commercial units for which private developers can reap hefty revenues.

A growing number of small, recently established nongovernment organizations such as CIVIC and the Bangalore Poverty Alleviation Programme (BUPP) have taken issue with the claim that slum dwellers have no right to live in the city. According to these groups, the recent internationalization of industrial activity in Bangalore has had a negative impact on the poor since less money is allocated to improving public services and providing urban development programs. These organizations are striving to give poor urbanites some say in the functioning of the city and are currently fighting against the state government's decision to force slum dwellers to share their already scanty land with private entrepreneurs. The BUPP is also developing an information system on slum activities using data compiled by slum dwellers themselves on the status of the land they occupy, the number of people living in each hut, access to amenities, slum dwellers' prioritization of their own problems, and on the nature of information and communication channels between economic agents in the informal sector. The information from the system will be circulated to city authorities for planning purposes and to slum dwellers themselves to make them more aware of their role in the life of the city.

Third, civic deficiencies caused partially by Bangalore's industrial success need to be faced. Although software companies are not big power users, they need to install voltage regulators, uninterrupted power supplies, and generators to run their computers, because of shortages of power. Similarly, there is a looming water shortage, with municipal pumped water only available 2 days a week and boreholes drying up. The Bangalore Development Authority is trying to encourage more private-sector involvement in the development of infrastructure, especially transport. In terms of industrial development, the city has almost reached saturation point. Today, the state of Karnataka is home to some 114 companies—all of which are located in Bangalore, due to the poor infrastructure facilities outside the city. The development of secondary cities within the state of Karnataka has been envisaged for some time by the Bangalore metropolitan regional development authority, with an ambitious project to develop a mega ring road and a light railway connecting all towns in the state. However, little has been done to date. As a result, thousands of young computer professionals continue to struggle along terrible roads to get to their jobs in software factories.

Information infrastructure in the region remains confined to the business community in the city with poor access to information outside the capital. While the 1965 Public Library Act specified the setting up of 10 district libraries, and 120 subdistrict libraries, by the mid-1980s, resources in the district and subdistrict libraries were suffering from de-

cline in funding resulting in inadequate building maintenance and staffing levels, discontinuation of periodicals, and outdated book collections. In terms of information and communication systems for the public sector and for universal usage, each district in the country has an information center set up by the National Informatics Centre for the purposes of planning and monitoring of development programs and for disseminating information to the public. However, to date, these systems have been largely underutilized, with a few districts performing ad hoc data processing rather than improving productivity of development programs (Madon, 1994b). More recently, the Department of Science and Technology (DST) has launched its Natural Resources Data Management System (NRDMS), with Karnataka volunteering to be the first state in the country to diffuse the system to all district offices by the end of 1996. This system attempts a more sophisticated and integrated areal planning approach through the use of geographic information systems, as opposed to schemewise monitoring of earlier initiatives. It is envisaged that each district in Karnataka will have its own computer system integrating a wide variety of physical and socioeconomic data relevant to the area concerned. However, one of the big problems with the initiative threatens to be sustaining the computerization effort once the pilot phase is over.

To sum up, in recent years Bangalore has grown into a modern, industrial city. Its economy has become more competitive, global, and increasingly dominated by information and communication technology. However, at the same time, the city and region of Karnataka have experienced growing poverty, social inequality, and gross deficiencies in public services.

Discussion

According to social theories of globalization and modernization, the nature of modern economic activity integrates distant localities in such a way that local events are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa (Giddens, 1991). This dialectic process of globalization is in evidence today. For example, the consequences of software being developed in Bangalore impact employment prospects of programmers in advanced industrialized countries. At the same time, the influx of foreign high-technology industries in Bangalore has aggravated the local equilibrium, creating gross internal disparities in living standards, poverty, and civic deficiencies as discussed in this article. As a result, local groups in developing countries are beginning to confront decisions taken at a global level by multinational companies that have negatively affected their livelihood. This dialectic process between the growing internal disparities in Bangalore and the wider global context can be analyzed using the elements of Castells's framework.

Restructuring of Capitalism

The first issue in the framework related to the restructuring of capitalism is the internationalization of the economy. Through the emergence of new information and communication technologies, extremely powerful forces have been unleashed toward global integration. Together with other countries in the world, India has succeeded in participating in this globalization process due to its huge market and large human resource. It is assumed among policymakers in India that future prosperity for the country lies in its closer integration with the global economy and that any attempt to put an artificial ban on efforts toward economic liberalization would clearly jeopardize the great strides that have been made. According to Castells, internationalization of the economy in advanced

economies consists of capital movements, labor migration, internationalization of the production process, and the interpenetration of markets. In the case of India and many other developing countries, the "opening up" process has simply provided a base for foreign TNCs to tap the large domestic market and the local skill base.

Second, the framework points to a conscious weakening of organized labor in favor of capital and a rise in the activities of the urban informal sector in the wake of economic restructuring programs as this sector produces a significant number of consumer goods for national and international use. For example, the previous section revealed that a large proportion of the population of Bangalore is made up of low-level clerical and service workers in the informal economy supporting the high-technology firms. Apart from the increasingly important role of the informal sector in supporting global economic activity, the existence of this sector has another key function in developing countries. It is argued that the informal sector offers the rural poor an opportunity to improve the quality of their lives significantly and to participate in urban life (Balbo, 1993). If a large informal sector is one way of achieving greater equity, one needs to be very careful in fostering solutions aiming to make the city more integrated, homogeneous, and legal as advocated by some structural adjustment programs. Such a view may well be consistent with the industrial and postindustrial society in a Western context, but not so in cities in developing countries that need to accommodate for better or for worse an absolutely astonishing number of people.

The third issue relates to the changing pattern of state intervention. The recent pressures to deregulate, privatize, and be connected to the global market have forced many governments in developing countries to relegate the problem of poverty and gross internal disparities to the background. Studies carried out of the impact of high-technology development on cities in advanced economies reveal that income inequality between sections of the population tends to be an accepted phenomenon (Castells, 1989). However, in developing country contexts, we need to recognize the fact that those adversely affected by inequality constitute the majority of the population. For example, the previous section reveals how the majority of the population in Karnataka face increasing deprivation and poor access to civic amenities and information, while a minority take advantage of the prosperity brought about by closer integration of the city with the global economy. On moral grounds, one could argue that poverty is degrading because it deprives people of their dignity and destroys their creative capacity. But morality aside, leaving out large sections of the population from the fruits of economic growth has also been identified as being detrimental to the cause of capitalist development. As a result, according to new development ideology of the 1990s, the stance advocated by international agencies is that the governments of developing countries should strive above all to integrate all sectors of their economies into the global capitalist economy (North, 1995).

Informational Mode of Development

The first issue relating to the informational mode of development refers to organizational restructuring leading to increased productivity through the use of information technology in advanced economies. However, in low-income countries, a large information sector is not necessarily an indicator of overall prosperity, since it often exists because of organizational inefficiency or simply to absorb the surplus supply of labor (Katz, 1986). For example, in India, the lack of institutions responsible for the creation and manipulation of information results in the implementation of information systems with little understanding of their potential. For example, experience reveals that although communication net-

works have been introduced in India to decentralize decision making within the administration and information access for the public, these systems have been developed on an ad hoc basis and have delivered few real benefits in terms of enhanced productivity among user groups.

The second issue in the framework suggests that both advanced economies and developing countries exhibit segregation between high-level permanent knowledge workers, who are the core decision makers in organizations, and the flexible manual labor force. In the case of Bangalore and many cities in the developing world, this segregation is accompanied by social tension resulting from the extreme wage differential between these two groups of workers and the fact that many of these manual workers are migrants from rural areas and cannot easily adjust into city life.

Third, according to the framework, the informational mode of development in advanced economies results in the control and manipulation of information flows by the government, while being informed by the values and dynamics of society at a local level. However, in the case of many developing countries, this type of democratic organizational form in government is almost nonexistent, and "alternative" institutions are needed to reflect the interests of the silent majority. As the case of Bangalore reveals, the planning and control of the city and region lie firmly in the hands of organized government bodies, with very little opportunity for local entities to voice their concerns.

There is growing evidence that many nongovernment institutions and community organizations in developing countries have attained considerable success in involving the poor in both urban and rural areas in infrastructure-building projects (Harris, 1996). For example, experience has revealed that such initiatives have succeeded in organizing communities so that they are in better control over their work and residence. Grameen Bank's experience, now spanning a decade and a half, is a clear pointer that the poor are capable of taking significant initiatives when motivated by a catalytic agent (Shams, 1995). In the case of Bangalore, empirical evidence in the previous section showed that community organizations such as BUPP and CIVIC have attempted to record and thereby legitimize the economic activities of slum dwellers and semiskilled workers in the informal sector. Another crucial function served by BUPP relates to its attempt to capture information on informal channels of communication among slum dwellers and those engaged in economic activity outside the formal economy. According to BUPP community workers, the two worlds of the formal and informal sector are characterized by different exposure to information flow and communication patterns. The formal sector is usually connected to global communication networks, while for the informal sector communication could be hidden in social networks and experience. To date, we know very little about the functioning and dynamics of these networks in the informal sector.

Urban-Regional Transformation

The first issue in the framework relating to urban-regional transformation refers to the high demand for knowledge workers, which tends to outstrip the institutional capacity within the locality to produce such skills. This point is reinforced in Karnataka, with the stark contrast between select areas of the city and the rest of the region in terms of infrastructure and basic amenities, which has resulted in a handful of premier institutions in the city center being responsible for providing relevant skills for the industry. Essentially, only science and technology institutes within Bangalore city have the necessary infrastructure to produce the skills needed for the industry, creating excessive burden on city resources and resulting in an increasing shortfall of labor for the high-technology compa-

nies. As a result, domestic information technology companies are starting to relocate their activities to other cities in India, while foreign companies are seeking alternative countries within which to locate their subsidiaries.

Second, it is suggested that as the world economy is increasingly dominated by networks and flows of information, organizations are becoming more reliant on the global economy. As a result, knowledge workers appear to connect more with each other across boundaries with much less reliance on the local economy, creating two very distinct worlds within the same city in terms of housing, work, and consumption activities. While the increasing global connectivity of knowledge workers is apparent, no matter how integrated organizations and workers may become with the global economy, their ability to participate in global activities remains influenced by the local environment of their daily existence. In order to redress this imbalance, cities and regions are increasingly becoming critical agents of local socioeconomic development (Castells & Hall, 1996). In the context of developing countries, although municipal and regional authorities have less power than national governments to act upon the processes that shape their economies, they may be in a better position to negotiate with TNCs, to create conditions within the locality to attract new sources of domestic and foreign capital, to support the progressive upgrade of human resources and physical infrastructure, and at the same time to respond to indigenous needs such as equity in development indices.

The difficult challenge for governance in cities like Bangalore is how to provide services for a rapidly growing population, a large proportion of whom are illiterate, and at the same time seek to lock the city into the benefits of the global economy (Townroe, 1996). In order to achieve this goal, the new institutionalists argue that old systems of city management with an overdependence on organized government need to be replaced with alternative "appropriate" institutions (Toye, 1995; North, 1995). The argument put forward by this group of writers is that free-market conditions and liberalization of economic activity need not be in conflict with the development of the informal sector and with the poverty alleviation goals of governments. Much depends on the new opportunities that are created for the poor to freely market their products and services. While abandoning the institution-free theory of neo-classical economics, this approach builds on or modifies certain assumptions of the neo-classicists such as scarcity, efficiency, and hence competition by engaging the services of nongovernment institutions and community organizations.

With the backing of local government, grass-roots mobilizations can play a more decisive role as representatives of civil societies and thereby restore some level of local control in the process of globalization. For example, the pricing policy, the monetary policy, the credit policy, and the industrial policy of the local government would all have to be synchronized to support microlevel initiatives of community organizations. While governments have failed to deliver resources directly to the urban and rural poor under conventional programs, microlevel nongovernment initiatives will not succeed on their own. They require firm and direct political support from local government.

A final issue to address related to urban-regional transformation is that as the events that occur in distant localities across the globe are increasingly influencing one another, the problems of urban and rural development within one region are becoming less distinct. While the visible manifestation of poverty in developing countries typically exists in the city, its cause is often found in the rural areas (Wratten, 1995). For example, urban growth in Bangalore is linked integrally to the poor impact of rural development programs in Karnataka state. While urban areas benefit from a larger share of national resources, development theorists argue that investment should be targeted toward creating

greater synthesis between urban and rural development programs by easing growing industries out of core urban areas into its less developed hinterland (Lipton, 1977).

Conclusion

There is an evident tension between the notions of entering the global information society and local development. Those indicating globalization are almost never located at the local level, and often their choices carry unintended mainly negative consequences, which depress rather than stimulate long-run development of the locality. Cities and regions are indispensable elements in the information economy in which the main source of productivity is the capacity to generate and process new information using labor. This labor is, in turn, dependent on the social milieu of life and culture in the city. Individual citizens should develop an awareness of the precise role of their activities in the information economy. On the basis of such awareness, they will be better placed to bargain for control as it relates to their interests.

Bangalore is one city among many undergoing urban-regional transformation due to trends in globalization. While the city is most discussed in the literature for its recent integration into the global economy, the contribution of this article has been to focus on the accompanying social decline in the region. We have found the elements of Castells's framework to be relevant for the present study, and within each of the elements we have tried to raise issues of particular relevance to developing countries. We acknowledge that the current study is only a stepping stone and needs to be built on through a greater understanding of how global processes locate in local territories. This requires new concepts and research strategies that combine analysis of economic indicators and ethnography to investigate how the rapid growth of informatization affects the social fabric of developing countries.

References

Angell, I. 1995. Economic crime: Beyond good and evil. A speech delivered at the LSE Centre for Computer Security.

Appleyard, B. 1995. Economic prophet of the information age. *The Independent*, 11 December, p. 13.

Avgerou, C. 1996. How can IT enable developing countries to integrate into the global economy? In *Global information technology and systems management: Key issues and trends*, eds. P. Palvia, S. Palvia, and E. Roche, pp. 147–168. Nashua, New Hampshire: Ivy League Publishing.

Balbo, M. 1993. Urban planning and the fragmented city of developing countries. *Third World Planning Review* 1(7):23–35.

Bell, D. 1973. *The coming of post-industrial society: A venture in social forecasting*. New York: Basic Books.

Beyers, W. B. 1989. Speed, information exchange and spatial structure. In *Information society and spatial structure*, eds. H. Ernst and C. Jaeger, pp. 3–18. New York: Belhaven Press.

Castells, M. 1986. High technology, world development, and structural transformation: The trends and the debate. *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Human Governance* 11(3):297–343.

Castells, M. 1989. *The informational city*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Castells, M. 1996. *The rise of the network society*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Castells, M., and Hall, P. 1996. *Technopoles of the world: The making of 21st century industrial complexes*. London: Routledge.

Cohen, M. P. 1987. Exploring the spatial effects of the internationalisation of the Mexican economy. In *Global restructuring and territorial development*, eds. J. Henderson and M. Castells, pp. 136–167. London: Sage.

de Wit, M.J. 1992. The slums of Bangalore—Mapping a crisis in overpopulation. *Geographic Information Systems* 2(1).

Dicken, P. 1992. *Global shift—The internationalisation of economic activity.* London: Paul Chapman.

Dunning, J. H., and Norman, G. 1987. The locational choice of offices of international companies. *Environment and Planning A* 19:613–631.

Economist. 1996. Bangalore bytes. 23 March.

Enderwick, P. 1989. Multinational corporate restructuring and international competitiveness. *California Management Review* 32:44–58.

GOI. 1990. Concurrent evaluation of IRDP—The main findings of the survey for January 1989–December 1989. Government of India, New Delhi, India.

Giddens, A. 1991. *Modernity and self-identity.* Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Press.

Gilbert, A., and Gugler, A. 1992. *Cities, poverty and development.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hamelink, C. J. 1994. *The politics of world communications.* London: Sage.

Hanna, N. 1994. Exploiting Information Technology for Development—A Case Study of India. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 264. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Harris, N. 1996. Macroeconomic reforms and cities. In *Cities and structural adjustment,* eds. N. Harris and I. Fabricius, pp. 1–12. London: UCL Press.

Heitzman, J. 1992. Information systems and urbanisation in South Asia. *Contemporary South Asia* 1(3):363–380.

Holstrom, M. 1994. Bangalore as an Industrial District-Flexible Specialisation in a Labor-Surplus economy? Pondy Papers in Social Sciences, no.14. Pndicherry: French Institute.

India Today. 1995. Real estate survey. 31 July.

Katz, R. L. 1986. Explaining information sector growth in developing countries. *Telecommunications Policy,* September.

Katz, R. L. 1988. *The information society: An international perspective.* New York: Praeger.

Kling, R. 1990. More information, better jobs? Occupational stratification and labor-market segmentation in the United States information labor force. *The Information Society* 7(2):77–107.

Lash, S. and Urry, J. 1994. *Economies of signs and spaces.* London: Sage.

Lee, A.S. 1989. A scientific methodology for MIS case studies. *MIS Quarterly* 13:33–50.

Lipton, M. 1977. *Why poor people stay poor: Urban bias in world development.* London: Temple Smith.

Madon, S. 1994a. *Desiging information systems for development planning.* London: Alfred Waller.

Madon, S. 1994b. District Level Computerisation in Karnataka—Some Preliminary Findings. Report submitted to the Karnataka state government.

Miles, R. E., and Snow, C. C. 1986. Organizations: New concepts for new forms. *California Management Review* 28:62–73.

NASSCOM. 1995. The Software Industry in India: Strategic Review 1995. New Delhi, India: National Association of Software and Service Companies.

NIC. 1991. GISTNIC—General Information Services Terminal of the National Informatics Centre. New Delhi, India: Planning Commission.

Nicoll, A. 1995. A finger-lickin' uproar. *Financial Times* 5 October.

North, D. C. 1995. The new institutional economics and third world development. In *The new institutional economics and third world development,* eds. J. Harriss, J. Hunter, and C. M. Lewis, pp. 17–27. London: Routledge.

Observer. 1995. Karnataka—A world leader in technology. 29 October.

Odedra, M. 1990. The transfer of information technology to developing countries. PhD thesis, London School of Economics.

OECD. 1981. *Information activities, electronics and telecommunications technologies,* Vol. 2, *Background reports.* Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Porat, M. 1977. The Information Economy: Definition and Measurement. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Telecommunications.

Premi, M. K. 1991. *India's population: Heading toward a billion—An analysis of the 1991 census.* New Delhi: B.R. Publishing.

Salih, K., and Young, M. L. 1987. Social forces, the state and the international division of labor: The case of Malaysia. In *Global restructuring and territorial development,* eds. J. Henderson and M. Castells. London: Sage.

Sassen, S. 1994. *Cities in a world economy.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.

Shams, M. K. 1995. Governments must side with the poor. *Public Administration and Development* 15:303–310.

Singhal, A. K., and Rogers, E. M. 1989. *India's information revolution.* New Delhi: Sage.

Sita, K., and Chatterjee, M. 1989. The economic structuring of India. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 13(2):245–255.

Townroe, P. M. 1996. New economic roles: The changing structure of the city economy. In *Cities and structural adjustment,* eds. N. Harris and I. Fabricius, pp. 13–29. London: UCL Press.

Toye, J. 1995. The new institutional economics and its implications for development theory. In *The new institutional economics and third world development,* eds. J. Harriss, J. Hunter, and C. M. Lewis, pp. 49–71. London: Routledge.

World Guide to Libraries. 1995. 10th ed. K.G. Saur.

World of Learning. 1995. 45th ed. London: Europa.

Wratten, E. 1995. Conceptualising urban poverty. *Environment and Urbanisation* 7(1).

Literature Review
GLAD 633
Class Handouts

I. The Purpose of a Literature review

II. Criteria for assessing a literature Review

III. Steps in doing a literature Review:

1. Identifying the literature

2. Selecting the literature to be reviewed
-selection criteria

3. Skimming
- how to skim

4. Classifying

5. Summarizing

6. Synthesizing
- How to synthesize

IV. More on how to write a review

V. How to organize references for a bibliography

VI. Three types of reviews based on three types of topics

I. The Purpose of a Literature review

1. To situate your research within a wider structure of knowledge on the topic
(Do you show the necessary knowledge of the field so we can take your research seriously?)

2. To develop your own research problem and strategy through the literature:
a. what are the main approaches towards this issue?
b. what are the different perspectives that exist towards it?
c. what analytical concepts have been used in the study of this topic?
d. what hypotheses have been developed?
e. what is the "state of knowledge" and how does your research problem fit into it?

This will feed into every stage of your research process

Research Design



Analysis

II. Criteria for Assessing a literature Review:

1. Is there a clear statement of the research problematic?
a. what is the study trying to address in terms of *any or some* of the following:
- a specific phenomena in society
- an area of enquiry within a field
- a problem, a puzzle
- a theoretical issue
- a methodological issue

2. Does the writer set out the terrain of the literature they are going to cover near the beginning?: (1 or more of the following)
1. Do they make a statement that summarizes the main categories of literature that will be addressed?
2. Do they make a statement that covers the main issues that will be addressed?
3. Do they make a statement that sets out what concepts will be addressed?
4. Do they make a statement about the areas of literature that will be addressed?

3. Do they group the different studies they are looking at in the review – and using what criteria?
1. Do they group them by theoretical schools?
2. Do they group them by shared concepts?
3. Do they group them by focus?
4. other criteria...?
5. Do they just do studies one by one?

4. Summarizing: Do they give us only the most important information about each study they are treating?
1. Do they provide only important factual contributions?
2. Do they provide only important conceptual contributions?

5. Is the order in which they treat the different categories of articles logically organized?
1. Is the sequence of literature that is covered organized historically?
2. Is the sequence of literature organized from simple to complex?
3. Is the sequence of literature organized by breaking something down into its component parts?

6. Are there transitions between different areas treated or are the different categories of literature just organized in a list?

7. Does the review lead us somewhere? Is it goal oriented?

8. Do we have a closing statement about what will be taken from the literature to be used in the current study?

Step 1. Identifying sources:

1. **reference material**
WHERE: social science encyclopedias, specialized encyclopedias on gender

2. **review of the literature article/** state of the art article
WHERE: First chapter in an edited book, Annual Review of Sociology journal, Annual Review of Anthropology journal, Annual Review of Political Science (available on JSTOR)

3. **bibliographies**
WHERE: google. Do a search with **key words** and **bibliography** or **syllabus** or **"course outline"**

2. Selection criteria:

(Some criteria to keep in mind)

1. How important is the article or book considered by others to be to the development of this field of interest?
(Does everyone mention it? And how do they mention it?)
2. How relevant is it to your research problematic?
3. Does it provide a useful comparison or contrast for what you're doing?
4. Even though the data or material is distant from what you are doing – does the work provide a useful concept or approach for what you are trying to study?
4. Is it not relevant to your problematic but needs mentioning because it shows how others have treated this issue – and therefore what is wrong or missing from the treatment of this issue?

If you decide the article is important and should be included in your review an initial way to categorize it would be the following:

1. Is it primarily a theory article?
2. Is it primarily an issues article?
3. Is it primarily a case study article?

3. Skimming

The first time you read the article you are reading it in order to classify it in your overall scheme so **you will not be reading it in depth.**

Methods: If there is an abstract read it first, read introduction and conclusions, and look at sub-headings.

Some criteria for skim reading:
1. What is a summary statement of what the author is doing?
2. How would you classify the article:
A case study?
A theoretical article?
An issues article?
3. What are main concepts used?
4. What was the articles main conceptual finding?
5. When was it written?

More suggestions for skimming criteria:

Take notes as you read the literature. You are reading to find out how each piece of writing approaches the subject of your research, what it has to say about it, and (especially for research students) how it relates to your own thesis:

- Is it a general textbook or does it deal with a specific issue(s)?
- Is it an empirical report, a theoretical study, a sociological or political account, a historical overview, etc? All or some of these?
- Does it follow a particular school of thought?
- What is its theoretical basis?
- What definitions does it use?
- What is its general methodological approach? What methods are used?
- What kinds of data does it use to back up its argument?
- What conclusions does it come to?

How to Skim; How to Read Academic Texts

A first principle you might consider is:

Academic material is not meant to be read.
It is meant to be ransacked and pillaged for essential content.

This means that you should never just sit down to read academic works as if they were novels or Reader's Digest articles. Academic study is not suited to such an approach, and the chances are you could spend hours reading and then not have a clue what you have been reading about (does that sound familiar?). Instead, think about the following:

- **Don't feel that you must read everything on the reading list.**
  Use the reading list as a *guideline*—material on the list will often cover much the same ground, a list may sometimes have alternative items to cover different interests or library limitations, and some of the items on the list will be 'optional' to the extent that you can pass the subject without reading them.

- **Be selective.**
  Check through the items on your reading list.
  Which are basic texts, and which are more detailed? (Will you need basic information or more specific information for your assignment?)
  Which are the most accessible to you? (Texts which are crystal clear to one person may be incomprehensible to another, and vice versa—this is not a matter of 'intelligence', but of a preference for a particular presentation and style)
  Which are reasonably available? (It is no good pinning your hopes on a book if there is one copy in the library and 300 students wanting it.)

- **Set a realistic time frame for any reading task.**
  Do not read any longer than you can concentrate. It doesn't matter if your attention span is short—just set your tasks accordingly.

- **Never read without specific questions you want the text to answer.**
  If you want your reading to stay in your memory, you must approach your text with a list of questions about the particular information you are after, and search the text for the answers to those questions. Don't just read with the hope that an answer will appear.

- **Never start reading at page 1 of the text.**
  If there is a summary, a conclusion, a set of sub-headings, or an abstract, *read that first*, because it will give you a map of what the text contains. You can then deal with the text structurally, looking for particular points, not just reading 'blind' and so easily getting lost.

- **Read only as much as you need to get the information you are after.**
  For example, if a piece of information you need is in the abstract of an article, why read the whole article unless you have time to spare?
  If a point is clear from reading a summary, is there any benefit in reading through the complete text of a chapter?
  If you are interested in the overall findings of a study, do you really need to read the methodology and results sections?
  Always keep in mind what you need, what is relevant to the question you are asking the text.

- **There are many 'tricks of the trade' you will either learn or discover for yourself.**
  For example, rather than reading all of a series of articles on a topic, consider whether the literature review in the last article of the series will give you enough to go on with. You can be infinitely creative with your time- and labour-saving strategies. Look for new ways, and talk with other students about how they manage.

Source: http://www.canberra.edu.au/studyskills/learning/reading.html

4. Classifying: What fits Where?

On the basis of the criteria you developed while skimming: Start making groups of articles that share similar criteria

EXAMPLE: I have 6 articles for a review of the literature for a study on gender bias in *Shari'a* law courts

- 1 overview of theories of Shari'a family law
- 1 on human rights issues of Muslim women and family law
- 1 on theories of gender and family law worldwide
- 2 case studies of family law in practice in Arab countries
- 1 case study of women's experience of getting a divorce Iran

What is a logical order to read these articles?

What is the logical order to write-up these articles?

5.Summarizing:

What is the most important information I need to include from each article in my summary for purposes of my project?

- What is the article about?
- What is the author trying to show or prove or disprove?
- What is it's main approach?
- What theory (if any does the author use)
- What concepts does the author use in exploring the issue?
- How does the author go about studying the issue (what is the context and what are the methods he/ she uses)
- What are the author's findings and conclusions?
- What has the author contributed to our knowledge:

a. a new theoretical finding?
b. a new concept?
c. a new set of relationships?
d. new data and information?

6.Synthesizing: (Creating a Strategy for write-up)

Your theoretical literature should be **GOAL ORIENTED**. When you synthesize the literature that you have read you aim to achieve the following:

1. Give a **logical overview** to the issue as it has developed in a field of enquiry.

2. show the development of **different topics, interests or approaches to this field of enquiry** EITHER:

a. as a historical development **OR** b. as **different and competing approaches and points of view**

3. **Identify the concepts and methods or** issues in the literature that **you will be using** in your research project

4. Showing **how you will be** using them in your study and why.

Synthesis: HOW TO

Go back over step 4 (Classifying) and see whether your first round of classification is still logical and useful.

Think of the articles in a sequence that lead somewhere

Broad introduction (The issue, field of interest)

Theoretical trends

More specific concepts

More specific methods

Specific findings

Implications for your study

IV. More on writing the review

Having gathered the relevant details about the literature, you now need to write the review. The kind of review you write, and the amount of detail, will depend on the level of your studies.

Important note: *do not confuse a literature review with an annotated bibliography*.

An *annotated bibliography* deals with each text in turn, describing and evaluating the text, using one paragraph for each text.

In contrast, a *literature review* synthesises many texts in one paragraph. Each paragraph (or section if it is a long thesis) of the literature review should classify and evaluate the themes of the texts that are relevant to your thesis; each paragraph or section of your review should deal with a different aspect of the literature.

Like all academic writing, a literature review must have an introduction, body, and conclusion.

The **introduction** should include:

- the nature of the topic under discussion (the topic of your thesis)
- the parameters of the topic (what does it include and exclude)?
- the basis for your selection of the literature

The **conclusion** should include:

- A summary of major agreements and disagreements in the literature
- A summary of general conclusions that are being drawn.
- A summary of where your thesis sits in the literature (Remember! Your thesis could become one of the future texts on the subject—how will later research students describe your thesis in their literature reviews?)

The body paragraphs could include relevant paragraphs on:

- historical background, including classic texts;
- current mainstream versus alternative theoretical or ideological viewpoints, including differing theoretical assumptions, differing political outlooks, and other conflicts;
- possible approaches to the subject (empirical, philosophical, historical, postmodernist, etc);
- definitions in use;
- current research studies;
- current discoveries about the topic;
- principal questions that are being asked;
- general conclusions that are being drawn;
- methodologies and methods in use;

HOW CAN I WRITE A GOOD LITERATURE REVIEW?

- **Remember the purpose**: it should answer the questions we looked at above. Look at how published writers review the literature. You'll see that you should use the literature to explain your research - after all, you are not writing a literature review just to tell your reader what other researchers have done. You aim should be to show why your research needs to be carried out, how you came to choose certain methodologies or theories to work with, how your work adds to the research already carried out, etc.
- **Read with a purpose:** you need to *summarize* the work you read but you must also decide which ideas or information are important to your research (so you can emphasize them), and which are less important and can be covered briefly or left out of your review. You should also look for the major concepts, conclusions, theories, arguments etc. that *underlie* the work, and look for *similarities* and *differences* with closely related work. This is difficult when you first start reading, but should become easier the more you read in your area.
- **Write with a purpose**: your aim should be to evaluate and show relationships between the work already done (Is Researcher Y's theory more convincing than Researcher X's? Did Researcher X build on the work of Researcher Y?) and between this work and *your own*. In order to do this effectively you should carefully plan how you are going to organize your work.

A lot of people like to organize their work chronologically (using time as their organizing system). Unless developments over time are crucial to explain the context of your research problem, using a chronological system will not be an effective way to organize your work. Some people choose to organize their work alphabetically by author name: this system will not allow you to show the relationships between the work of different researchers, and your work, and should be avoided!

For more information about writing see the following sites:

http://www.shambles.net/pages/learning/infolit/litreview/
http://www.clet.ait.ac.th/
http://csumb.edu/academic/graduate/education/thesis/LitReview.html

V. How to Reference in a Bibliography

Book with one author	Abercrombie, M. L. J. 1960. *The Anatomy of Judgment.* London: Hutchinson.
Article in a journal (Give page numbers)	Anderson, Lynn R. 1967. Belief defence produced by derogation of message source. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 3:4, 349–360:
Book with two authors	Andrews, P. John & Allen, Richard 1994. *Ontological Chaos.* Cambridge: U.P.
Second edition of a book	Anscombe, G. E. M. 1972. *Intention.* 2nd edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Newspaper article with no by-line	*Canberra Times* 1993. Alcohol part of teen lives. CT 1/10/93, 18.
Newspaper article with by-line	Clack, Peter 1993. Drink-drive figures are ACT record, *The Canberra Times* 20/12/93, 3.
Thesis	Elliott, Barry J. 1991. *A Re-Examination of the Social Marketing Concept.* MComm (Hons) Thesis, UNSW.
Conference paper **Give page numbers**	Forsyth, I. & Ogden, E. J. D. 1993. Marketing traffic safety as a consumer product in VIC, Australia. *Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety, Cologne, 28 Sept to 2 Oct 1992.* Cologne: Verlag T-V Rheinland, 1437–1442.
Encyclopaedia entry	Hirst, R. J. 1967. Perception. *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy,* Vol 6, 79–87. New York: Macmillan.
Edited book	Jolling, T. & Bridgestone Tom (eds) 1998. *Antidotes to Catastrophe.* Sydney: Cape.
Report	Kennaird, Allan 1995. *Accident Trends in New Zealand.* Research Report 47. Wellington: Transit New Zealand.
Article in book **Give page numbers**	Lang, Kurt & Lang, Gladys Engel 1959. The mass media and voting. In Burdick E. & Brodbeck A. (eds). *American Voting Behaviour*, 217–235. Glencoe: Free Press.
Online material (give the date that you accessed it) Put URL in small brackets <>	Penn State University online [accessed November 1997]. *Frequently Asked Lecture Questions (FAQ): Human Information Processing.* <http://indy.ie.psu.edu/classes/ie408/lectures/hipfaq.html#questions>
No author	*Public and the Media, The* 1974. Sydney: Department of the Media.
Personal correspondence	Robertson, Henry 1994. *Personal correspondence 13/5/94.*

VI. Three Types of literature reviews based on three types of research problematics

In the gender studies literature we find that some areas of concern have been treated in very theoretical ways and have competing approaches to how they are dealt with. However, much of the literature is primarily issues based rather than having a tradition of theoretical debates. Finally, we have a lot of literature that mainly provides information about a phenomena. This will have an important impact on your literature review—both in terms of content and form.

CASE 1: Theoretical
Example: Gender and Citizenship
Gender and Sex Roles
Gender and Nationalism
(Concept and theory based)

CASE 2: Single Topical
Example: Gender and Domestic Violence
Gender and the Informal Sector
The Gender Division of Labor in Agriculture
(Issue and information based)

Case 3: Overlapping
Example: Gender Bias in Family Courts
(Partly theory-based, partly issues based)
(Theories of family law, Shari'a law, case studies of women in court systems)

V. How to Reference in a Bibliography

Book with one author	Abercrombie, M. L. J. 1960. *The Anatomy of Judgment.* London: Hutchinson.
Article in a journal (Give page numbers)	Anderson, Lynn R. 1967. Belief defence produced by derogation of message source. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 3:4, 349–360.
Book with two authors	Andrews, P. John & Allen, Richard 1994. *Ontological Chaos.* Cambridge: U.P.
Second edition of a book	Anscombe, G. E. M. 1972. *Intention.* 2nd edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Newspaper article with no by-line	*Canberra Times* 1993. Alcohol part of teen lives. CT 1/10/93, 18.
Newspaper article with by-line	Clack, Peter 1993. Drink-drive figures are ACT record. *The Canberra Times* 20/12/93, 3.
Thesis	Elliott, Barry J. 1991. *A Re-Examination of the Social Marketing Concept.* MComm (Hons) Thesis, UNSW.
Conference paper **Give page numbers**	Forsyth, I. & Ogden, E. J. D. 1993. Marketing traffic safety as a consumer product in VIC, Australia. *Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety, Cologne, 28 Sept to 2 Oct 1992.* Cologne: Verlag T-V Rheinland, 1437–1442.
Encyclopaedia entry	Hirst, R. J. 1967. Perception. *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy,* Vol 6, 79–87. New York: Macmillan.
Edited book	Jolling, T. & Bridgestone Tom (eds) 1998. *Antidotes to Catastrophe.* Sydney: Cape.
Report	Kennaird, Allan 1995. *Accident Trends in New Zealand.* Research Report 47. Wellington: Transit New Zealand.
Article in book **Give page numbers**	Lang, Kurt & Lang, Gladys Engel 1959. The mass media and voting. In Burdick E. & Brodbeck A. (eds). *American Voting Behaviour,* 217–235. Glencoe: Free Press.
Online material (give the date that you accessed it) Put URL in small brackets <>	Penn State University online [accessed November 1997]. *Frequently Asked Lecture Questions (FAQ): Human Information Processing.* <http://indy.ie.psu.edu/classes/ie408/lectures/hipfaq.html#questions>
No author	*Public and the Media, The* 1974. Sydney: Department of the Media.
Personal correspondence	Robertson, Henry 1994. *Personal correspondence 13/5/94.*

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1996. 22:153–85

GENDER INEQUALITY AND HIGHER EDUCATION

Jerry A. Jacobs

Department of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

KEY WORDS: women's education, educational history, women's colleges, college majors, fields of study

ABSTRACT

This paper reviews a diverse literature on gender and higher education. Gender inequality is more pronounced in some aspects of the educational systems than in others. The analysis distinguishes 1) access to higher education; 2) college experiences; and 3) postcollegiate outcomes. Women fare relatively well in the area of access, less well in terms of the college experience, and are particularly disadvantaged with respect to the outcomes of schooling. Explanations of gender inequality in higher education should distinguish between these different aspects of education and should explain those contexts in which women have attained parity as well as those in which they continue to lag behind men.

INTRODUCTION

In this essay I draw on a disparate literature to discuss several key questions regarding the relationship between gender inequality and higher education. What aspects of education exhibit the most pronounced gender disparities? How does the education of women interface with gender inequality in the workplace and in the family? Has the expansion of education for women stimulated changes in other arenas, or has the educational system merely reflected developments in the rest of society?

I found research pertinent to these questions in diverse fields outside of sociology, including economics, history, social psychology, career counseling, and educational policy. One recent review of the literature on the effects of college on students included a bibliography running 150 pages (Pascarella &

0360-0572/96/0815-0153$08.00

Terenzini 1991). Rather than review every study that considers the question of sex differences, I focus on those issues that are central to the question of gender inequality. I examine areas that have been vigorously debated—such as the effects of single-sex colleges on women's achievements. I also highlight topics that call for more careful scrutiny—such as why women's achievements in higher education in the United States surpass those in many other industrial countries.

Educational theory and research remain focused on social class disparities. Classic studies of inequality in education typically have focused on disparities by social class among men (Blau & Duncan 1967, Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, Collins 1979, Karabel & Halsey 1977). When gender inequality is discussed, it receives relatively limited attention. For example, Aronowitz & Giroux (1993) devote less than 2 of 256 pages to gender issues. Gender often is mentioned as a variation on the central theme of social class inequalities (Davies 1995). Scholars who do focus on gender issues often treat all aspects of education as working to the disadvantage of women (Sadker & Sadker 1993, Sandler 1986, Byrne 1978). In contrast, I suggest that education is often a relatively advantaged sphere of social life for women, and that gender inequality is more pronounced in some aspects of the educational system than others. My analysis focuses on three processes: 1. access to higher education; 2. college experiences; and 3. postcollegiate outcomes. Women fare relatively well in the area of access, less so in terms of the college experience, and are particularly disadvantaged with respect to the outcomes of schooling. Explanations of gender inequality in higher education should distinguish between these different aspects of education and should explain those contexts in which women have attained parity as well as those in which they continue to trail men.

Many important issues are not covered in this essay: women's athletics, gender equity in standardized testing, part-time and adult study, and the community college experience. The focus on gender differentials also means that relatively little attention has been devoted to variation among women—by class, race, and ethnicity. It is my hope that the focus on gender issues provides insights that help to situate future research on particular groups of women.

ACCESS

Women's Access to College in the United States

In this section I review findings on the enrollment and degree completion of women compared to men, drawing on contemporary and historical data on the United States, as well as international comparisons. I then turn to explanations offered for these patterns, with theories organized under four broad rubrics:

critical or reproductionist, status attainment, comparative historical, and economic.

One of the striking features of education in the United States is the prominence of women among college students. In 1992, women represented 53.1% of enrolled college students. Of women who graduated from high school in 1992, 65.4% enrolled in college the following fall, compared with 59.7% of men. Women's share of degrees climbed steadily during the 1970s and 1980s (Karen 1991), during a period when the fraction of college-age young adults enrolled in school increased slowly but steadily (US Department of Education 1995). By 1982, women surpassed men in the number of bachelor's degrees earned. Women have garnered more bachelor's degrees than their male counterparts ever since. By 1992, 54.2% of bachelor's degree recipients were women. Women earned 58.9% of two-year degrees, 51.5% of master's and professional degrees, and 37.3% of PhD degrees (National Center for Educational Statistics 1994).

In recent years, women's advantage in college enrollment has been similar to that observed for earned degrees, which suggests that women and men complete their degrees at similar rates. Progression to graduate and professional degrees is now at parity by gender. This represents a marked change from earlier periods in this century, when women's completion rates trailed men's (Goldin 1995). Only among PhD recipients does women's representation continue to lag.

Are women equally represented at top-tier institutions? Hearn (1990) and Persell et al (1992) report, based on an analysis of data on 1980 high school seniors, that women were disadvantaged in access to elite schools. While women have made progress since 1980 (Karen 1991), they remain slightly overrepresented in schools with higher acceptance rates, lower faculty/student ratios, lower standardized test scores, and lower fees (Jacobs 1996). The small remaining sex gap at top-tier schools is due to two factors: 1. the relative scarcity of women in schools with large engineering programs and 2. the tendency of women to enroll in school part-time (lower-status institutions are more likely to accept part-time students). Selected reports on admissions as well as enrollment from leading institutions indicate that women are well represented among recent entering classes, except in schools that prominently feature engineering programs (Monthly Forum on Women in Higher Education 1995).

Adult or continuing education represents a substantial fraction of tertiary schooling in the United States (Kasworm 1990). Over one third (35.8%) of college students enrolled in the fall of 1991 were over age 24, including 17.1% of full-time students and 63.9% of part-time students. Women represent 61.8% of these older students, including 57.0% of those enrolled full-time and 63.7% of those enrolled part-time.

The parity women have achieved in college completion is a recent phe-

nomenon, but the 1950s and 1960s represented a historically depressed level. Women represented 41.3% of college graduates in 1940, slipping to 23.9% in 1950, and remaining at a historically low 35.0% in 1960 (US Bureau of the Census 1975). Goldin (1995) estimates, based on retrospective reports from the 1940 Census, that women's college enrollment rates exceeded 90% of men's from the late 1890s until the mid 1920s, although the inclusion of "normal schools," which were often less academically rigorous than other institutions, arguably inflates Goldin's figures (see also Graham 1978).

For the entire twentieth century in the United States, women have comprised a large proportion of students in primary and secondary schools. Women's rate of enrollment among 5–19 year olds has exceeded 90% of men's rate since as early as 1850, and 98% since 1890. Women have represented the majority of high school graduates since at least 1870—in 1920 over 60% of high school graduates were women (US Bureau of the Census 1975: pp. 369–70, 379). Analysis of individual-level data from the 1910 Census indicates that women's enrollments in elementary and high schools were comparable to their male counterparts for most immigrant groups (Jacobs & Greene 1994), although attendance data strongly favor males for certain ethnic groups, such as the Italians (US Immigration Commission 1911, Olneck & Lazerson 1974). The median years of schooling completed by women exceeded those by men for most of this century (Folger & Nam 1967), until the GI Bill after World War II enabled men to surpass women.

International Comparisons

Women in the United States surpassed their counterparts in other countries in access to schooling at both the secondary and tertiary levels for more than a century (Klemm 1901, US Commissioner of Education 1900). Today, the United States enrolls more college students per capita than virtually any other country, and women's share of college enrollments in the United States exceeds that in most other countries (see Stromquist 1989, Kelly 1989, Kelly & Slaughter 1991, King & Hill 1993, and Finn et al 1979 for informative reviews of women and education in developing countries). Data for selected countries are presented in Table 1. In most of the advanced industrial countries of Europe, women's share of enrollments is quite high. But even here, substantial variation persists, with women's share ranging from 40% of college students in Switzerland and 41% in Germany to 55% in France and 61% in Portugal (see also Byrne 1978). Women also fared well in terms of schooling in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe (Kelly 1991, Finn et al 1979), and socialist regimes in developing countries, in their initial years in power, typically emphasized schooling for girls (Carnoy & Samoff 1990). The postsocialist experience warrants close scrutiny, as women's status is eroding in many spheres in these countries (Biaecki &

Heyns 1993, Heyns & Biaecki 1992, Einhorn 1993).

Women's share of enrollment in Latin American colleges and universities is often quite high—Brazil, 53%; Argentina, 47%; Chile, 42%. Asian countries follow: In both China and India one third of college students are women. African countries include many with the lowest share of female enrollments in the world. Within each of these regions, there is substantial variation in women's share of enrollment.

Gender disparities are highest at the tertiary level, as young men typically pursue college before the women in their cohort do. Gender disparities in expenditures are greater than those in enrollments, because college education is more expensive than elementary or secondary schooling.

In terms of adult education, the United States ranked third among eight countries studied—behind Norway and Finland, but just ahead of Sweden and Switzerland—in the proportion of college-level adult students (OECD 1995). However, these figures include those in on-the-job training, in which the United States trails other countries (Lynch 1994). The standing of the United States on continuing education alone might well have been higher.

In some countries, including the United States, education has been relatively favorable to women, compared to other spheres of social life. Why do women get so much education? And why is there more access in the United States than elsewhere?

Explaining Access: Critical Approaches

Theorists who have focused most directly on the issue of gender inequality have approached the subject from a critical, feminist, or neomarxist perspective (Holland & Eisenhart 1990, Stromquist 1989, Connell et al 1982). Critical scholars seek to explain how the educational system reproduces gender inequality in society despite its provoking resistance to such inequality on the part of women students. Holland & Eisenhart argue that a culture of romance leads young women away from a focus on their studies and careers. Based on in-depth interviews and observations with students spanning several years at two southern colleges, they conclude that the college experience is tangential to intellectual and career development among young women. Their ethnographic research is the latest in a series of detailed investigations of undergraduate culture dating back to the 1930s (Hulbert & Schuster 1993, Angrist & Almquist 1975, Komarovsky 1971 (1953), 1985, Waller 1937).

Some basic flaws in the reproductionist approach make it unlikely that this perspective will be useful for elucidating gender issues. In my view, the central theoretical problem with the reproductionist model is that schools do not simply mirror the demands of the economy. Educational systems are surely influenced by vocational exigencies, but schools can easily expand in advance of employ-

Table 1 Comparative data on enrollment, and student and faculty sex composition[1]

Country	Tertiary Enrollment (Per 100,000 Population)	University Faculty Percent Female	University Students Percent Female
North & Central America			
Canada	7197	21(%)	55(%)
Cuba	1836	47	58
El Salvador	1512	26	31
Haiti	107	26	29
Jamaica	950	29	63
Mexico	1478	–	45
Nicaragua	814	31	50
Panama	2377	–	58
United States	5687	31	53
South America			
Argentina	3293	35	47
Brazil	1075	38	53
Chile	2144	–	42
Columbia	1554	25	50
Ecuador	1958	–	39
Paraguay	769	–	46
Peru	3465	16	34
Uruguay	2180	30	53
Venezuela	2847	–	47
Europe			
Austria	2847	24	45
Belgium	2772	21	45
Czech Republic	1128	34	56
Denmark	2917	–	51
France	3414	28	55
Germany	3051	20	41
Greece	1928	29	53
Italy	2795	–	50
Netherlands	3280	21	43
Norway	3883	21	50
Poland	1521	38	52
Portugal	1935	31	61
Russian Federation	1900	–	50
Spain	3335	31	52
Switzerland	2147	12	40

(continued)

Table 1 *(continued)*

Country	Tertiary Enrollment (Per 100,000 Population)	University Faculty Percent Female	University Students Percent Female
Middle East			
Algeria[a]	1163	20	31
Egypt	1697	29	38
Iran	1061	18	31
Iraq[a]	1240	25	38
Israel	2790	32	51
Jordan	2497	12	42
Kuwait	1135	22	68
Saudi Arabia	1064	25	42
Syria	1695	20	38
Turkey	1569	33	37
Asia & Pacific			
Afghanistan	147	22	42
Bangladesh	382	12	20
China[a]	191	12	20
Hong Kong	1534	23	40
India	556	19	32
Indonesia[a]	1032	8	14
Japan	2338	12	29
Korea (South)	4208	22	30
Malaysia	679	24	46
Pakistan	266	17	24
Philippines[a]	2596	53	54
Thailand	2060	51	53
Vietnam	153	22	24
Australia	3178	31	53
New Zealand	4332	26	52
Sub-Sarahan Africa[1]			
Ivory Coast	204	–	19
Kenya	187	–	28
Liberia	–	20	24
Morocco	158	19	37
Nigeria	320	10	27
Senegal	266	15	22
S. Africa	1231	29	48
Tanzania	21	6	15
Zimbabwe	582	16	26

[1]Source: UNESCO, 1995. Figures pertain to most recent year, typically early 1990s. No data are earlier than 1980.

[a]Figures pertain to all tertiary education, not just universities and equivalent institutions.

ment needs or lag behind the economy. Many European countries developed extensive educational systems well in advance of industrialization (Graff 1979, 1987); some produced far more college graduates than their economies could absorb (Barbagli 1982). Moreover, the mechanisms that explain the correspondence that does occur must be specified.

There are also fundamental problems with extending the logic of class reproduction to the case of gender inequality. The analogy between class and gender fails because these two forms of inequality bear a fundamentally different relationship to the educational system. Differential access to higher education is a principal support for racial and social class inequality. In other words, the disadvantaged social position of *(a)* those holding less prestigious positions in society, (*b*) racial and ethnic minorities, and (*c*) the unemployed stems in large part from the fact that they do not have the educational credentials—especially college degrees—of the more socioeconomically successful groups. However, as we have seen, in the United States women have attained access to higher education more or less on par with their male counterparts (although among middle-aged and older women the gender disparity in education attained during the 1950s remains). Gender inequality in earnings persists despite rough equality in access to education, whereas class inequality is based on sharp differences in access to education.

My objection to the resistance approach is that it sometimes infers resistance among students where none exists, while it ignores organized feminist activism in higher education. In the search for student resistance, Holland & Eisenhart, along with others (Lees 1986, Griffin 1985, McRobbie 1982), drew on Willis's (1977) influential study of working class boys in a British secondary school. Holland & Eisenhart found only relatively subtle and individualistic resistance to the culture of romance, compared with somewhat more strident and collective disobedience on the part of Willis's subjects. Yet Holland & Eisenhart look for resistance in the wrong place. Feminist activism is responsible for much of the expansion in opportunities for women, from the founding of elite women's schools (Woody 1929, Solomon 1985, Rosenberg 1982) to the ongoing organizing activity of the American Association of University Women (AAUW) (Levine 1995), to Betty Friedan's (1963) influential critique of the narrow options available to college-educated women, to the passage of equal educational opportunity legislation for women (Stromquist 1993). Women's access to higher education did not emerge because of the dictates of the captains of industry, but because women successfully demanded a place. This does not mean that interviews with a small group of women students during a conservative period in history will reflect clear-cut resistance to patriarchy.

Explaining Access: Status Attainment

Status attainment is an alternative framework for explaining gender inequality. For attainment researchers, gender is an ascriptive characteristic like race. Early attainment studies included gender as a predictor of years of schooling completed (Alexander & Eckland 1974, Marini & Greenberger 1978). More recent studies have not devoted a great deal of attention to gender, although there are some some notable exceptions (Alexander et al 1987a, 1987b, Hearn 1992), because gender tends not to be a significant predictor of educational attainment. Anderson & Hearn (1992) review the literature on educational status attainment (see also Karen 1991).

Some research that explores family composition effects has investigated the possibility that particular combinations of brothers and sisters might reduce parental investments in daughters' schooling (Powell & Steelman 1989, 1990, Butcher & Case 1994). However, given the relatively high levels of educational attainment of women in recent years, there is little reason to expect that parents continue to favor sons over daughters in terms of the decision to pursue college (Hauser & Kuo 1995; see also Behrman et al 1986). The number and spacing of siblings undoubtedly influence the enrollment of children, but at present in the United States these constraints probably do not inhibit parental investments in daughters more than in sons.

The lack of sex differences is viewed as evidence for the triumph of achievement over ascription, but the problem is accounting for universalism that exists in some contexts but not others. In attainment terminology, how does relatively universalistic access in the United States coexist with sharp ascriptive differences in educational process and outcomes? Status attainment researchers are well positioned to determine whether gender per se or other factors are responsible for whatever sex gaps may be observed, but as yet they have not offered a theory of when gender can be expected to matter and when its effects are attenuated. Moreover, international variation has not been explored. To the best of my knowledge, no attainment studies have attempted to explain why young women trail young men in college graduation in some countries more than others.

In principle, proponents of the attainment framework should be able to address gender inequality just as easily as they have addressed race and socioeconomic inequality. At its broadest, the attainment framework is designed to explain later outcomes from earlier inputs. Its individualistic bias can easily be modified by the incorporation of context-level variables. Development of the framework has been stymied by the absence of gender inequality in educational attainment and in the preferred measure of career outcomes, socioeconomic status (England 1979, Jacobs & Powell 1987). This combination

has led attainment researchers to focus little attention on gender inequality in the college experience and has led researchers interested in gender to explore different indicators of gender inequality.

Mickelson (1989) has attempted to explain women's high levels of educational attainment. The puzzle, as she poses it, is why women persist in schooling despite the limited financial returns they face. She considers four possible explanations for this paradox: female reference groups, unrealistic expectations, improved access to high-status husbands, and sex-role socialization. While there may be some truth to each of these suggestions, none explains why the attainment of women relative to men is so much higher in the United States than in many other industrial countries, and moreso in developed countries than in less developed ones. Neither can these suggestions account for the rise over time in the level of women's education relative to men's.

Explaining Access: Comparative Historical Approaches

Another sociological approach explores comparative and historical variation in education experiences (Meyer & Hannan 1979, Meyer et al 1979, Rubinson 1986). Again, this approach should be ideally suited for elucidating gender inequality. Yet practitioners of this approach remain focused on class and race issues and have yet to devote sustained attention to the connection between schooling and gender inequality. Only a few studies explore gender patterns of schooling, and not all of these have focused on explaining the extent of gender disparities. For example, Walters (1986) finds that expanding employment opportunities contributed to the growth of higher education for women between 1952 and 1980. But the remaining puzzle is why the gender gap in education has narrowed more than that observed in labor force participation.

Ramirez & Boli (1987) explore international trends in enrollment through 1975 (see also Ramirez 1980, Ramirez & Weiss 1979). They suggest that there has been diffusion across countries of a model of the relationship between states and individuals that is predicated on the compulsory education of all citizens, and which inevitably results in the incorporation of females into the educational system. They suggest that the demands of citizenship predict an increasing female share of higher education, although applying the notion of citizenship to explain enrollments in higher education seems like a bit of a stretch. More such studies with a longer time frame and more countries would be informative. [See Behrman & Rosenzweig (1994) for cautions regarding the comparability of educational data across countries.]

Clark (1992) reports that the more multinational investment in a developing country, the less higher education is provided for girls. He argues that this is due to the influence of multinational corporations on local political systems as well as on gender role ideology and job opportunities for women. Clark's research

is part of a growing interest in the effect of the world system on women's status and employment opportunities (Ward 1990).

Comparative studies of international enrollment trends conducted by economists focus on the influence of national income levels, urbanization, and fertility. Schultz (1987) shows that the enrollment of girls climbed faster than that of boys in the poorest countries during the period 1961–1980. Specifically, he finds that the elasticity of enrollment with respect to national income is higher for girls than for boys. His findings are consistent with those of Tan & Mingat's research in Asia (1992), who show that gender disparities in elementary and secondary enrollments taper off as countries approach universal enrollment. However, it does not necessarily follow that the same pattern will characterize higher education, since universal enrollment remains unlikely at the college and university level.

A number of informative studies of US women's educational history have been conducted, although most of the focus is on elite schools for women (Solomon 1985, Horowitz 1993, Schwager 1987, Cott 1993, Woody 1929; see also Delamont 1989). Yet a comprehensive comparative historical account of women's access to higher education that highlights the relatively favorable position of US women remains to be done. Some factors that might well contribute to the distinctive position of women in higher education in the United States are 1. the decentralized structure of higher education (Jencks & Reisman 1968), with over 3000 public and private institutions, which allowed for the creation of specialized colleges for women; 2. the existence of the social space for the independent political mobilization of women, which enabled them to create some of the first schools for women; and 3. the ideology of individual opportunity, which women successfully exploited to justify their pursuit of higher education.

Culture and politics feature prominently in comparative historical research, while they are frequently relegated to a minor role in other treatments of education. To what extent do cultural factors impede schooling for girls? The case of women's education in Muslim societies may be instructive in this regard. In some traditional Muslim societies, the requirement that boys and girls attend separate schools may reduce access for girls. The education of girls can suffer when there are not enough schools for girls or when the distance to these schools creates parental concerns about safety, propriety, and the loss of daughter's time for household chores. But this effect is most pronounced in poor countries: oil-related wealth has produced marked improvements in the education of girls. In Kuwait, for example, elementary and secondary education is universal for both sexes, and women attend college in larger numbers than do men (El-Sanabary 1993).

The Muslim preference for same-sex teachers reduces the job opportunities available to women, who otherwise generally garner the lion's share of elementary teaching positions. On the other hand, the expectation of same-sex doctors creates an opportunity for women physicians in some Muslim countries that exceeds women's share of medical positions in many western countries.

The rapid rise of women's education in the oil-producing countries may be interpreted by some as evidence that traditional constraints on women can be overcome by modernization. Put in economic terms, culture acts as a drag on rational allocation of resources, but this lag is overcome more or less easily as incomes rise. Traditional cultures are assumed to be static, acting only as a lag on the forces of modernization and universalism (Ogburn 1922).

But cultures can be dynamic as well as static. Cultural change often occurs with the formation of a nation state. Ramirez & Weiss (1979) stress the importance of political centralization in educational diffusion for women at the elementary and secondary levels in developing countries. Their approach follows Meyer et al's (1979) emphasis on educational expansion as a key step in nation building.

Education serves many gods: It can be used to pursue salvation, vocation, civilization, participation, and recreation (Kelly 1983, cited in Coats 1994). The relative importance of these goals is a matter of history, politics, and culture. The connection between culture and education for women, both positive and negative, needs more thorough exploration.

Wars tend to create employment openings for women, but also educational opportunities as well. The case of women's higher education in Germany during the Third Reich is a case in point. Pauwels (1984) shows that women's enrollment in universities declined markedly from 1933–1939 both in absolute numbers and relative to men, as the Nazis stressed women's familial roles, sought to boost women's fertility, and questioned the intellectual capabilities of women. Ironically, the growing enlistment of young men in the military created a vacuum in college for women to fill, and the war years saw a sharp increase in women's enrollments, both in absolute and relative terms. Barbagli (1982) presents similar evidence for Italy during both the First and Second World Wars (see also De Grazia 1992). In both Germany and Italy these gains were rather quickly eroded in the postwar period (UNESCO 1967). In the United States, women's share of college degrees soared during the Second World War, but women's college enrollment actually declined in absolute terms relative to prewar levels (US Bureau of the Census 1975: 385-386). Women's enrollment in particular fields, such as medicine, did sharply increase during the war, only to tumble abruptly to prewar levels at the conclusion of hostilities (Walsh 1977).

Explaining Access: Economic Models

While the comparative literature on education remains sparse, there is an extensive literature on the returns to schooling and individual-level determinants of education in particular countries (King & Hill 1993, Stromquist 1989, Moore 1987). Parental economic resources are central determinants of attainment, but this effect is often greater for girls than for boys (Stromquist 1989). The same holds for parental education. Distance from school is often more important for girls than boys, especially in countries with single sex schools and a cultural emphasis on propriety. Boys often have more opportunity to make money that draws them into the labor market and out of school, but girls often have more obligations to help with housekeeping and childcare activities. Some studies in moderate income countries find that many girls who are not attending school are engaged in neither income-generating activities nor household chores (Stromquist 1989; see Durbin & Kent (1989) for similar evidence on the United States). My discussion of the economic approach to education centers on whether this perspective captures how children and their families decide to pursue or terminate schooling. In particular, does this literature help us to understand the share of schooling conferred on young women?

Several prominent economists have offered distinctive approaches to understanding women's educational investments. Becker (1975) writes that parents would be rational to invest less in their daughters' schooling than in their sons, even if the percentage change in earnings with an additional year of schooling were identical for both sexes, because their daughters could be expected to work full time for fewer years than do sons. The expected lifetime payoff of a son's education would thus exceed that of a daughter's. This is the private (sometimes referred to as internal) return in terms of earnings to education. This prediction was consistent with the lower investments in young women's college education when Becker formulated this approach during the 1960s, and it is consistent with the lower level of college enrollment for women in many countries today. But this approach does not account for the parity in college enrollments women have achieved in recent years in the United States and in a number of other developed countries.

Becker and others also seem to ignore the fact that men have a larger base level of earnings than do women, so the same percentage return is worth more for sons than daughters. I suspect parents would rather get a 10% return on a $20,000 earnings base (for a son) as opposed to a 10% return on a $15,000 base (for a daughter).

Schultz (1993a,b) maintains that Becker's approach is flawed because it ignores the increased social productivity of women who do not work. He posits

that the increased productivity of women in nonmarket work is identical to that in market work. He also emphasizes that the social returns to schooling—those reaped by society at large rather than the family itself—for women are high, and consequently he urges more investment in their education (see discussion of outcomes of schooling below). This recommendation is consistent with Benavot's (1989) findings that educating girls gives a larger boost to economic development than does educating boys. But Schultz is left with the problem of explaining why parents underinvest in their daughters' schooling.

A third approach to calculating the payoff from women's schooling is offered by Goldin (1992, 1995), who holds that husbands' earnings should be included in the calculation of the costs and benefits of a college education (see also Becker 1975, Behrman et al 1986, Boulier & Rosenzweig 1984). Educational homogamy in marriages is extensively documented (Mare 1991, Lichter 1990). It is evident in second marriages as well as in first marriages (Jacobs & Furstenberg 1986) and characterizes interethnic and interracial marriages as well as endogamous ones (Jacobs & Labov 1995).

Goldin (1995) suggests that during the 1950s women were drawn into college by the financial value of the "Mrs." degree. College attendance increased the chances of marrying a college-educated husband with high earnings potential: 64% of women aged 30–39 in 1960 with 16 or more years of schooling married college-educated husbands, compared with only 11% for women with a high school degree. Indeed, Goldin estimates that 57% of women graduates married before or during their year of college graduation. Goldin concludes that the private rate of return to college approximately doubles if husband's earnings are added to what a college-educated woman could bring home herself.

However, Goldin applies this logic only to the cohort attending college during the 1950s. Ironically, this was the cohort of daughters with the lowest share of college attendance compared to their brothers. If this logic motivated college attendance, the gap between young women and men should have narrowed, rather than widened. The gender gap in enrollment did not narrow until the 1960s, when the career dimension rather than marital dimension of women's college decisions began to rise.

Moreover, if husbands' incomes were included in the financial calculus for the first generation of women college graduates, the total returns to college would be negative, since nearly one third of this group never married (Goldin 1995, Solomon 1985, Rosenberg 1982) and thus lost the prospect of a husband's earnings. The positive effect of college on women's marriage prospects was not taken for granted by the first generation of women attending college. Indeed, there was widespread concern over the low marriage rates of college-educated women (Solomon 1985, Cookingham 1984). If one applies Goldin's family

income calculus consistently, one would have to conclude that the decision to enroll in college was a poor investment for the first generation of women college graduates.

By the 1920s, however, the marriages rates of college-educated women markedly improved, and the marriage-market dimension of college became evident (Horowitz 1993, Frankfort 1977). Smock & Youssef (1977) describe a similar transformation in attitudes regarding educated wives in Egypt, while Hooper (1984) reports that male Chinese college students voice reluctance to seek a college-educated bride (cited in Tilak 1993). This transformation of women's education from marriage-inhibiting to marriage-promoting deserves further attention. In a number of countries, however, men remain ambivalent about, if not actively hostile to, educated wives.

Finally, there is a problem in including husband's earnings for international comparisons. If educational homogamy is the rule, this logic would predict that college is typically a good deal for women, since it helps them secure an affluent husband. The task of explaining the high historical level of women's college enrollments in the United States must do so in a way that differentiates the United States from other countries with much lower shares of college attendance by women.

Manski (1993) points out that economists assume adolescents and their families are able to make exceedingly complicated calculations regarding the costs and benefits of college. The approaches of Becker, Schultz & Goldin make it clear that estimating the economic payoff to college for women is probably even more complicated than the standard economic formulation. Nor do these approaches exhaust the range of economic considerations: Education after all may be viewed as consumption and not strictly as an investment (Schultz 1987).

In summary, parents and children surely take the financial consequences of schooling into account when making educational decisions. However, there are many relevant considerations, and many ways to be rational. Consequently, in my view, economic calculations contribute to but are not sufficient to explain variation across countries and over time in the share of schooling obtained by women.

PROCESS

If college provided an undifferentiated education conferred equally on young men and women, then the issue of access would settle the question of gender inequality. But in fact women and men experience college differently and face markedly different outcomes. Of the many respects in which the college experience differs by gender, I consider five: fields of study, women's studies, faculty, harassment, and women's colleges.

Fields of Study

Women and men pursue different fields of study in college. In the United States, 30% of women would have to change fields of study in order for women to be distributed in the same manner as men (Jacobs, 1995a). The sex typing of fields of study is a worldwide phenomenon (Moore 1987), yet it varies between countries. For example, 51.6% of engineering students are women in Kuwait, compared with 3.3% in Switzerland and Japan (UNESCO 1995). One of the most striking contrasts is within the divided Germany: in the former East Germany, 32.4% of engineering graduates were women, compared with only 7.5% in West Germany. In Poland, 62.7% of mathematics and computer science degrees went to women, compared with 35.9% in the United States and 21.0% in Egypt. Kelly (1989) suggests that segregation of fields of study increases as women's representation in higher education increases, but she does not marshall specific evidence in support of this hypothesis.

In the United States during the early 1960s, women were concentrated in an extremely limited range of fields. Education drew almost half of women undergraduates, and over 70% of women graduates were concentrated in just six fields: education, English, fine arts, nursing, history, and home economics. Now business is the leading field of study for women. In 1990, women garnered 51% of life science bachelor's degrees, 47% of mathematics degrees, 47% of business degrees, but only 14% of engineering degrees. Segregation across majors declined substantially from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s but has reached a plateau during the last 10 years (Jacobs 1995a).

Women have not always been segregated into separate fields from men. Founders of the most prominent women's colleges tried hard to maintain curricula that matched or exceeded men's in scope (Solomon 1985, Horowitz 1993). During the early years of land-grant schools, no separate curriculum for women existed (Thorne 1985). A peculiarly feminine curriculum began to emerge with the development of home economics. This development reflected an enduring emphasis on female domesticity but also was promoted in part by women academics, who were excluded from other fields and sought to create a field of expertise and set of job opportunities for which they would be uniquely suited (Solomon 1985, Rosenberg 1982, Clifford 1989). At the same time, this development contributed to the emergence of a distinctively feminine college experience for young women that served to limit the career prospects of most graduates.

Studies of choice of majors have addressed many issues. Social psychologists have searched for personality congruence between students and their majors (Betz & Fitgerald 1988, Betz et al 1990, Wolfle & Betz 1981). Vocational counseling research has explored the vocational maturity of students and their career realism (Holland 1985, Walsh & Osipow 1994).

The sex typing of fields can be attributed to precollege socialization (Wilson & Boldizar 1990), since students enter college roughly as segregated as they leave. However, about half of students change subjects during college. Therefore, college plays an essential role in maintaining level of segregation (Jacobs 1995, 1989). Many studies have attempted to document the effect of college on students. For example, Hearn & Olzak (1981) suggest that high status majors are competitive, and both men and women leave such fields. Their results also show that women fared poorly in high status fields with close occupational linkages. Yet most research on college effects is typically ahistorical. The net change in the sex segregation of students during college has varied over the last three decades. During the late 1960s and 1970s, the college experience resulted in students being less segregated as seniors than they were as freshmen; during the 1980s there was little or no net change during the college years (Jacobs 1995a, 1989). This finding suggests that change during the college years may reflect social changes in society at large in addition to the experiences unique to the college environment.

Economists have sought to explain the sex typing of fields as due to the desire for women to maximize their lifetime earnings. Polachek (1978) has suggested that female-dominated fields lead to jobs with high rewards early in life and a low earnings trajectory. By entering these majors, women position themselves to earn the most during the period when they are most likely to be working. This hypothesis has not been supported by the evidence. Women's fields pay less initially and exhibit slower earnings growth than do male fields, so that earnings maximization cannot be the explanation of such choices (England 1984, England et al 1988).

Decisions regarding majors in part reflect options in the labor market, but it should be noted that there has been more change in college than in the labor market. Sex segregation in college majors declined by 40% between 1960 and 1990, while sex segregation in the labor market declined by approximately 20% (Jacobs 1995a, Reskin 1993).

Much attention has been devoted to why women are underrepresented in science and engineering (Brush 1991, Yarrison-Rice 1995). The research has focused on sex differences in preparation (Ethington & Wolfle 1988), career orientation (Ware & Lee 1988), parental influences (Maple & Stage 1991) and attrition (Strenta et al 1994, Seymour 1992, Frehill 1996). This line of research has identified many of the steps needed to plug the leaky pipeline that results in relatively few women pursuing careers in mathematics and science. Most of these studies focus on such individual issues as psychological obstacles or lack of social support, or examine specific programs designed to improve women's achievement. However, some studies connect the issues of math and science to broader patterns in education and society. Green (1989) notes that the scarcity

of women in scientific fields needs to be understood in the context of low overall enrollments in science. As we have seen, the sex gap in science and mathematics enrollment varies substantially across countries.

Women's Studies

Another important change in the curriculum has been the creation of women's studies (Musil 1992, Chamberlain 1988, Guy-Sheftall 1995, Stimpson 1986). Since the first women's studies program was founded in the 1969–1970 academic year, over 600 schools have established programs. The number of women's studies programs listed by *Women Studies Quarterly* continues to rise, from 449 in 1984, to 502 in 1989, to 606 in 1994. Wood (1981) showed that larger, more selective schools offering graduate degrees were the first to institute this organizational innovation. Women's studies now exists in many countries, although the extent of its institutionalization varies widely (Kelly 1989).

The National Center for Educational Statistics reports that only 189 bachelor's degree recipients majored in women's studies in 1990 (187 women and 2 men), although undoubtedly there were many more students who included women's studies as a second major or a minor area of concentration within a traditional field of study, such as history or literature. Colleges and universities now offer upwards of 20,000 women's studies courses. (Guy-Sheftall 1995).

Women's studies has had an important impact on the intellectual development of the humanities and the social sciences, most notably in the fields of literature, history, sociology, and anthropology (Farnham 1987, Langland & Gove 1983). Evaluations of the disciplinary impact of women's studies will necessarily be ongoing, as women's studies and the relevant fields evolve. A number of innovative programs have attempted to promote the mainstreaming of gender issues in courses outside women's studies programs (National Council for Research on Women 1991, Fiol-Matta & Chamberlain 1994). It would be valuable to know the extent to which gender issues have been incorporated in courses outside women's studies.

More research assessing the impact of women's studies on students is in order. Luebke & Reilly (1995) show that women's studies majors report that their major significantly enhanced their feminist consciousness and personal self confidence, but unfortunately the study samples students chosen on the recommendation of women's studies program directors. This study is not likely to be any more representative than that of Patai & Koertge (1994), which is largely based on interviews with faculty disillusioned with women's studies. Some studies have examined the impact of women's studies courses, although these assessments tend to be short term (Pascarella & Terenzini 1991:316, Stake & Rose 1994). It would be interesting and valuable to know what fraction of

undergraduates take one or more women's studies courses and what if any lasting impact these courses have on students. Such information would provide sound basis for a discussion of curriculum reform and might displace the shrill charges and countercharges often made regarding feminism, multiculturalism, and the decline of the established canon.

Faculty

Men represent the great majority of college and university faculty worldwide (see Table 1). The figures cited in Table 1 include women at marginal institutions and in marginal positions, and thus they surely overstate women's attainments. In the United States, 31.8% of faculty were women in 1991. Women's representation declines with the prestige of the institution: 37.9% in public two-year schools, 28.9% in the public comprehensive schools, and 19.5% in private research universities. The number of women also declines with faculty rank. Women represent 47.9% of lecturers and instructors, 39.7% of assistant professors, and 17.2% of professors (National Center for Educational Statistics 1994). The US record actually looks quite favorable by comparison with the professoriat in Britain and France, which were 2.3% and 8.7% female, respectively, during the early 1980s (Clark 1987). Graham (1978) notes that women's representation on the faculty of US colleges and universities actually declined between 1930 and 1970, before beginning a sustained advance during the 1970s and 1980s.

There are many reasons that women's entrance into faculty positions is so low. Until recently women were a small proportion of PhD recipients; women are concentrated in a limited number of fields; women entered academia in large numbers during a period of retrenchment, and pursued fields that were facing sharp declines in enrollments (Slaughter 1993). Nonetheless, women's progress remains far slower than would be expected. Viewed optimistically, if a sizable fraction of women who are currently assistant professors are granted tenure, then the sex composition of the faculty will change dramatically during the next decade or two. Parity is unlikely for quite a long time because of the number of fields in which women PhDs remain severely underrepresented (Ransom 1990).

Much research has examined the position of women faculty members (Chamberlain 1988). Studies have examined gender inequality with respect to hiring patterns (Tolbert & Oberfield 1991, Konrad & Pfeffer 1991, Bowen & Schuster 1986, Bach & Perrucci 1984), promotion rates (Hurlbert & Rosenfeld 1992, Long et al 1993, Long & Fox 1995), publication rates (Ward & Grant 1995), mobility between institutions (Rosenfeld 1987), job satisfaction (Tack & Patitu 1992), turnover (Tolbert et al 1995), salaries (Bellas 1994, Tolbert 1986, Fox 1981, Bowen & Schuster 1986, Astin & Snyder 1982, Langton & Pfeffer

1994), and the sense of personal and professional marginalization (Aisenberg & Harrington 1988).

The notion of cumulative disadvantage seems to be a reasonable summary of the underrepresentation of women in faculty positions. In other words, women have been disadvantaged to some extent in every stage of the academic career process. This would account for women's underrepresentation in the higher echelons of university administration (Touchon et al 1993, Chamberlain 1988, Sandler 1986, Sagaria 1988, Sturnick et al 1991), in higher ranks and in higher status institutions. Graham (1978) suggests that the extreme exclusion of women from Ivy League institutions undermined the position of all women faculty, because, with the emergence of the research university as the pinnacle of the higher education system, these schools came to set the pattern for higher education as a whole.

A number of researchers see the position of women faculty as evidence of a chilly climate for women throughout higher education (Sandler 1986). But the effects of faculty composition on students continue to be debated. Tidball (1986, 1980) finds that the proportion of female faculty is strongly associated with the number of women high achievers, even in coeducational schools. This finding is probably less vulnerable to the lack of institutional controls than are Tidball's other findings (see below) and is a result that bears further scrutiny with longitudinal data. Rothstein (1995) finds that women students with female advisors are more likely to continue their education after college. Evidence on student satisfaction with same sex advisors (Erkut & Mokros 1984) and faculty (Ehrenberg et al 1995) is mixed. These issues require more detailed investigation of particular environments on particular groups of women, such as math and science majors. Sadker & Sadker (1993) make the case for gender bias in the classroom, but this evidence is principally based on research in high schools.

There are ironies in the history of women faculty as role models. The first generation of women faculty was expected to forego marriage. As Horowitz (1993) notes, by the 1920s women college students, most of whom planned marriage and not career, did not entirely identify with their female faculty mentors, who had sacrificed so much for the sake of women's education. The faculty were often perplexed and disappointed at the students who followed them (Clifford 1989). Same-sex role models can of course be beneficial, but it is important to understand the context of the student-faculty relationships in order to develop firm generalizations in this area.

Harassment

Sexual harassment as a legal concept is quite new, dating back to MacKinnon's (1979) treatise on the subject. Since that time, a substantial body of research

has been conducted on the issue (Borgida & Fiske 1995, Tinsley & Stockdale 1993, Gruber 1992, 1989, Paludi 1990). The incidence of harassment varies with the status of the perpetrator, the type of behavior, and the length of exposure (Rubin & Borgers 1990). Peer harassment exceeds faculty-student harassment, and verbal harassment is much more common than demands of sexual favors or physical assault, but estimates of the latter are disturbingly high.

Roiphe (1993) sheds much heat but little light on this subject. Criticisms of the estimates of sexual assault launched by Gilbert (1993) were rebutted in detail by Koss & Cook (1993). One of Gilbert's main points is that sexual assault figures from college surveys surpass those found in federal crime reports. However, it is possible that the figures included in crime reports are too low. Indeed, federal statistics on sexual assault are being revised upwards, reflecting an adjustment in survey procedures to more closely follow those used by Koss and others (Sniffen 1995).

Faculty harassment can be especially consequential for graduate students, who have more exposure to faculty and who depend more on a limited set of advisors for their career prospects (Schneider 1987). Williams et al (1992) show that the incidence of faculty/student harassment declined after a sexual harassment policy and grievance procedure was established. More research on which policies work best is in order (Paludi & Barickman 1991).

Harassment may be viewed as part of a hostile climate for women on campuses (Sandler 1986), although little research to date has made such connections. The potential connections between harassment and the choice of major, the extent of career commitment, and other long-term consequences remain to be explored.

The topic of harassment is one aspect of a larger question of whether the college environment is equitable to women (American Association of University Women 1992). This larger set of issues includes classroom interactions (Wilkinson & Marrett 1985), informal counseling of students by faculty (Pascarella & Terenzini 1991:478–80), and the broader social scene (Holland & Eisenhart 1990), including sororities and fraternities (Sanday 1990).

Coeducation and Women's Colleges

One way to assess the effect of college environments on female students is to compare all-female schools to coeducational ones. If the former are more supportive environments for women, the difference in outcomes between the two can be viewed as an estimate of the sum of all of the deleterious effect of college environment on women in coeducational schools. The research on women's colleges has great theoretical importance even though only about 1.3% of women receive degrees from such colleges today (author's calculation, based on school-level Earned Degrees Conferred data, National Center for

Educational Statistics), and less than 3% of female high school seniors even consider attending such schools (Horowitz 1993).

In a series of papers, Tidball and her colleagues document the disproportionate number of graduates of women's colleges among prominent women (as listed in *Who's Who*) (1980), women medical school students (1985), and women scientists (1986). The initial *Who's Who* research pertained mostly to students who had graduated before 1960 (Tidball & Kistiakowsky 1976), but the medical school and natural science PhD data include information on the 1970s as well. Rice & Hemmings (1988) find a decline in the advantage of women's colleges in producing achievers during the 1960s and 1970s, but because they do not control for the declining share of graduates attending such institutions, their results are suspect.

The problem with this line of research is that controls for institutional characteristics, such as selectivity, are not included, nor are controls for the attributes of incoming students available for analysis (Crosby 1994). Tidball shows that her results are not solely due to the effects of the elite seven sister colleges, but she does not control for potential selectivity of other women's schools. Tidball's results may be due in part to student self-selection in terms of socioeconomic status and desire to pursue careers, and not solely due to the college experience per se.

Crosby et al (1994) reanalyzed Tidball's data on entrants into medical school and found that the positive effect of single-sex schools disappeared after selectivity was taken into account. Stoecker & Pascarella (1991) find no effect of female schools on four student outcomes measured nine years after students' freshman year. Unfortunately, the high sample attrition in the data they employ (reported in Astin 1982 and not in their article) introduces uncertainty into Stoecker & Pascarella's conclusions. Riordan's (1992) findings are consistent with Tidball's in a study of the High School Class of 1972 in results for both 1979 and 1986. Bressler & Wendell (1980) and Solnick (1995) find more movement of women into male-dominated fields of study in single-sex than in coeducational schools during the period 1967–1971. Smith (1990) finds students in women's colleges report greater satisfaction with all aspects of the college experience except social life. Further research in this area is needed that includes individual and institutional controls and that follows students for a long period of time after college.

Single-sex schools are just one instance of a broader question of how gender inequality varies across schools. Organizational sociologists have treated schools as "loosely coupled systems" (Ingersoll 1993, 1994) but have not focused on the organizational correlates of gender inequality in the educational context. In other words, Acker's (1990) approach to gendered organizations has yet to take hold in the context of higher education. This area promises much,

since surely substantial variation exists among the several thousand colleges and universities in the United States, as well as between countries in the organization of higher education. Two exceptions are Studer-Ellis's (1995) examination of the determinants of the founding of women's colleges and Wood's (1981) analysis of the diffusion of women's studies programs (see also Pascarella & Terenzini for a review of studies on college effects).

OUTCOMES

Much of the discussion of gender inequality in the labor market has been written in response to the writings of the human capital school of economics, which holds that gender inequality stems from inadequate investments on the part of women (Jacobs 1995b). As we have seen, this is no longer the case in the United States. England (1993) has noted that working women have surpassed men in median years of schooling completed for much of the century; only during the period since the GI Bill have men surged past women. By 1990, working women once again had caught up with men in average educational attainment (author's estimate, based on the March 1993 *Current Population Survey*).

Gender differences in earnings persist despite the parity in education attained by women. Table 2 displays annual earnings by sex by years of schooling completed. Women earn less than men even with the same level of education. Indeed, the sex gap in earnings hardly varies by educational level.

The economic benefits of college have increased since the mid-1970s (Freeman 1994). The gender gap in earnings has narrowed at all educational levels, due in part to the decline in men's earnings (Bernhardt et al 1995). Yet the gender gap in earnings among college graduates remains similar to that at other educational levels.

A significant portion of the gender gap in earnings can be attributed to gender differences in majors (Gerhart 1990, Eide 1994, Fuller & Schoenerger 1991, Angle & Wissman 1981, Daymont & Andrisani 1984, Wilson & Smith-Lovin

Table 2 Median annual income of year-round full-time workers, by years of school completed and sex, 1990

	Women	Men	Women/Men
Less than 9 years	$12,251	$17,394	.70
1–3 years high school	$14,429	$20,902	.69
4 years high school	$18,319	$26,653	.69
1–3 years college	$22,227	$31,734	.70
4 years college	$28,017	$39,238	.71
5 or more years college	$33,750	$49,304	.68

U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Money income of families and persons in the united states" current population reports, series p-60, no. 174, 1991.

1983). Majors play a larger role in early-career earnings, although they may influence later career earnings indirectly through occupational tracking.

Formal schooling does not exhaust the range of possible sources of skill differences between men and women. The gender gap in wages may be due in part to gender differences in skills acquired in on-the-job training (Lynch 1994, Jacobs 1985b) and informal experience. Space does not permit an in-depth exploration of all the sources of gender inequality in the labor market. The point here is that the gender gap in earnings in the United States does not stem from the fact that women spend too few years in formal schooling. Some feminists have found reason for despair in these figures. Gender inequality can persist despite high levels of education for women. However, there are important additional effects of schooling on gender inequality besides earnings that bear mention.

Studies find that higher education results in more support for egalitarian gender role attitudes on the part of women (Pascarella & Terenzini 1991:293–97), particularly if the students took courses related to women's roles in society (Pascarella & Terenzini 1991:316). Klein (1984) finds education increases women's support for feminism. Freeman (1975) suggests that education raised women's expectations and created a sense of relative deprivation, leading them to support feminism.

Woody (1929) suggests that highly educated women leaders were indispensable to the success of the suffrage movement. Campbell (1979) found that highly educated women with small families, and especially those employed as professionals, were disproportionately represented among suffragists, based on analysis of a sample of 879 prominent women in 1914. On the other hand, Kelly (1991) reviewing the international evidence is more skeptical that additional education for women leads to greater political power.

As noted above, economists distinguish between the private returns to schooling—such as higher wages and higher household income—and the social or public returns, which may involve improvements to health, welfare, and society. Two principal nonmonetary effects of schooling for women that have been extensively researched are improved health of their infants and lower fertility. In developing countries, women with more education marry later, are more likely to use contraceptives, desire smaller families, have their first child later (but breastfeed for fewer months), and have a lower total fertility rate than do less educated women (Schultz 1993a,b). Much of the research described by Schultz compares girls with primary education to those with no education in developing countries, but the depressing effect of education on fertility is a consistent finding in affluent countries as well (Sweet & Rindfuss 1983, Martin 1995).

The 1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (1995) held in Cairo stressed the importance of empowering women in order to promote sustainable economic development and population control. Women's education is a central element in this agenda. Education may thus have significant implications for women's status with respect to gender relations throughout society, but these effects are historically contingent and depend on the character as well as the extent of women's education.

CONCLUSION

I have suggested that access, process, and outcomes are distinct aspects of higher education that need to be examined separately. The trends in these areas often do not coincide with one another, and consequently separate explanations of these facets of higher education are needed. For example, women remain a minority of faculty and are disadvantaged in terms of rank and institutional prestige. Yet as students in the United States, women represent a majority of students at nearly all levels of higher education and are not distinctly disadvantaged in terms of institutional position. Clearly, treating women's standing among the faculty and in the student body as one phenomenon will not do, since the extent of women's progress differs between these two statuses.

I remain surprised at how much mainstream research in the sociology of education ignores women, and how much of the rest considers gender interactions rather than gender inequality. In other words, gender often becomes a matter of variations on the main theme of socioeconomic or racial inequality. My first recommendation for further research, then, is that gender deserves the attention of sociologists of education. Gender presents many interesting puzzles, when gender inequality is evident as well as when it is not. We need a theory of when gender is likely to be consequential and when it is likely to be unimportant. We also need a theory of what economic, social, cultural, and political trends can be expected to affect the role of gender in the educational sphere.

Second, I believe that educational decision-making processes need more attention. Studies relying on widely available panel data sets tend to promote an input-output view of education. While this may make reasonable sense for studying certain outcomes, such as test scores, it tends to downplay individuals' views of their own motives. Moreover, this data framework abstracts away from socially embedded processes.

Third, aspects of the college experience need to be incorporated into a general account of educational inequality. As we have seen, gender inequality in the United States is now less a matter of inequality in access, and more a matter of gender differentiation in educational experiences and outcomes. Process and outcomes need to be linked to access in a general analysis of the educational

system. There are many studies in the area of educational process, but these have not been synthesized into a general account of gender disparities.

Fourth, the relationship between gender and institutional development needs further attention. Educational research focuses heavily on individuals and tends to deemphasize the role of the institutional setting. More research that highlights the institutional context pertaining to gender inequality would be welcome.

Fifth, international comparisons also warrant further research. Accounting for women's share of access across countries would seem to be the logical first step. Assessing the role of gender in the educational process across countries would appear to pose more fundamental conceptual and measurement challenges, but it should also be addressed. The study of outcomes is complicated by international variation in linkages between school and work, but this analysis is needed.

In my view, the principal challenge facing research on gender in education is to go beyond documenting specific gender effects to developing a more theoretically motivated account of the status of women in the educational system. This perspective would have to account for the relative status of women in each aspect of the educational system as well as for variation across time and space. The challenge is to situate gender inequality economically, historically, culturally, and politically. The substantial research in various fields on women in education should set the stage for the next generation of researchers to tackle some of the fundamental issues regarding gender and the educational system. In particular, the relationship between gender inequality in education and that in the rest of society is a fundamental question for future theory and research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to thank Kevin Dougherty, James Hearn, Barbara Heyns, David Karen, Demie Kurz, Brian Powell, Rachel Rosenfeld, and Susan Sturm for their constructive comments and suggestions, and Keren Polsky for her efficient research assistance.

Literature Cited

Acker J. 1990. Hierarchies, jobs, bodies: a theory of gendered organizations. *Gender Soc.* 4:139–58

Aisenberg N, Harrington M. 1988. *Women of Academe: Outsiders in the Sacred Grove.* Amherst, MA: Univ. Mass. Press

Alexander KL, Eckland BE. 1974. Sex differences in the educational attainment process. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 39:668–82

Alexander KL, Holupka S, Pallas AM. 1987a.

Social background and academic determinants of two-year versus four-year college attendance: evidence from two cohorts a decade apart. *Am. J. Educ.* 96:56–80
Alexander KL, Pallas AM, Holupka S. 1987b. Consistency and Change in Educational Stratification: Recent Trends Regarding Social Class Background and College Access. *Res. Soc. Strat. Mobility* 6:161–85
American Association of University Women. 1992. *How Schools Shortchange Girls.* Washington, DC: AAUW & Natl. Educ. Assoc.
Anderson MS, Hearn JC. 1992. Equity issues in higher education outcomes. In *The Economics of American Higher Education,* ed. WE Becker, DR Lewis, pp. 301–34. Boston: Kluwer Acad.
Angle J, Wissman DA. 1981. Gender, college major, and earnings. *Sociol. Educ.* 54:25–33
Angrist SS, Almquist EM. 1975. *Careers and Contingencies: How College Women Juggle with Gender.* New York: Dunelen
Aronowitz S, Giroux HA. 1993. *Education Still Under Siege.* Westport, CT: Gergin & Garvey. 2nd ed.
Astin AW. 1982. *Minorities in American Higher Education.* San Francisco: Jossey Bass
Astin H, Snyder MB. 1982. Affirmative action 1972–1982—a decade of response. *Change* July-Aug, pp. 26–31; 59
Bach RL, Perrucci CC. 1984. Organizational influences on the sex composition of college and university faculty: a research note. *Sociol. Educ.* 57:193–98
Barbagli M. 1982. *Educating for Unemployment: Politics, Labor Markets, and the School System—Italy, 1859–1973.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press
Becker G. 1975. *Human Capital.* Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, for the Natl. Bur. Econ. Res. 2nd ed.
Behrman JR, Pollak RA, Taubman P. 1986. Do parents favor boys? *Int. Econ. Rev.* 27(1):33–54
Behrman JR, Rosenzweig MR. 1994. Caveat emptor: cross-country data on education and the labor force. *J. Dev. Econ.* 44(1):147–71
Bellas ML. 1994. Comparable worth in academia: the effects on faculty salaries of the sex composition and labor market conditions of academic disciplines. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 59:807–21
Benavot A. 1989. Education, gender, and economic development: a cross-national study. *Sociol. Educ.* 62:14–32
Bernhardt A, Morris M, Handcock MS. 1995. Women's gains or men's losses: a closer look at the shrinking gender gap in earnings. *Am. J. Sociol.* 101(2):302–28
Betz NE, Fitzgerald LF. 1988. *The Career Psychology of Women.* Orlando, FL: Academic
Betz NE, Heesacker RS, Shuttleworth C. 1990. Moderators of the congruence and realism of major and occupational plans in college students: a replication and extension. *J. Counsel. Psychol.* 37(3):269–76
Bialecki I, Heyns B. 1993. Educational attainment, the status of women, and the private school movement. In *Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies,* ed. VM Moghadam, pp. 111–34. Oxford: Clarendon
Blau P, Duncan OD. 1967. *The American Occupational Structure.* New York: John Wiley
Borgida E, Fiske ST. 1995. Gender stereotyping, sexual harassment, and the law. Special issue. *J. Soc. Issues* 51(1):1–193
Boulier BL, Rosenzweig MR. 1984. Schooling, search and spouse selection: testing the economic theory of marriage and household behavior. *J. Polit. Econ.* 92:712–32
Bourdieu P, Passeron J. 1977. *Reproduction: In Education, Culture and Society.* Beverly Hills: Sage
Bowen HR, Schuster JH. 1986. *American Professors: A National Resource Imperiled.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press
Bressler M, Wendell P. 1980. The sex composition of selective colleges and gender differences in career aspirations. *J. Higher Educ.* 51:650–63
Brush SG. 1991. Women in science and engineering. *Am. Scientist* 79:404–19
Butcher KF, Case A. 1994. The effect of sibling sex composition on women's education and earnings. *Q. J. Econ.* 109(3):531–63
Byrne EM. 1978. *Women and Education.* London: Tavistock
Campbell BK. 1979. *The Liberated Woman of 1914.* Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Res. Press
Carnoy M, Samoff J. 1990. *Education and Social Transition in the Third World.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Chamberlain MK. 1988. *Women in Academe: Progress and Prospects.* New York: Russell Sage Foun.
Clark BR, ed. 1987. *The Academic Profession: National Disciplinary and Institutional Settings.* Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
Clark R. 1992. Multinational corporate investment and women's participation in higher education in noncore nations. *Sociol. Educ.* 65:37–47
Clifford GJ, ed. 1989. *Lone Voyagers: Academic Women in Coeducational Universities, 1870–1937.* New York: Feminist Press at City Univ. NY
Coats M. 1994. *Women's Education.* Bristol, PA: Soc. Res. into Higher Educ., Open Univ. Press

Collins R. 1979. *The Credential Society.* New York: Academic
Connell RW, Ashenden DJ, Kessler S, Dowsett GW, et al. 1982. *Making the Difference: Schools, Families and Social Division.* Boston: Allen & Unwin
Cookingham ME. 1984. Bluestockings, spinsters and pedagogues: women college graduates, 1865–1910. *Popul. Stud.* 38:349–64
Cott NF, ed. 1993. *History of Women in the United States.* Vol. 12. *Education.* New Providence, CT: Saur
Crosby F, Allen B, Culbertson T, Wally C, Morith J, et al. 1994. Taking selectivity into account, how much does gender composition matter? A re-analysis of M. E. Tidball's research. *Natl. Women's Stud. Assoc. J.* 6(1):107–18
Davies S. 1995. Leaps of faith: shifting currents in critical sociological education. *Am. J. Sociol.* 100(6):1448–78
Daymont TN, Andrisani PJ. 1984. Job preferences, college major, and the gender gap in earnings. *J. Hum. Resourc.* 19:408–34
Delamont S. 1989. *Knowledgeable Women. Structuralism and the Reproduction of Elites.* London: Routledge
de Grazia V. 1992. *How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922–1945.* Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
Durbin N, Kent L. 1989. Postsecondary education of white women, in 1900. *Sociol. Educ.* 62:1–13
Ehrenberg RG, Goldhaber DD, Brewer DJ. 1995. Do teachers' race, gender and ethnicity matter? Evidence from NELS. *Indust. Labor Relat. Rev.* 48(3):547–61
Eide E. 1994. College major and changes in the gender wage gap. *Contemp. Econ. Policy* 12(2):55–64
Einhorn B. 1993. *Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe.* London: Verso
El-Sanabary N. 1993. Middle East and North Africa. In *Women's Education in Developing Countries: Barriers, Benefits and Policies,* ed. EM King, MA Hill, pp. 136–74. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
England P. 1979. Women and occupational prestige: a case of vacuous sex equality. *Signs* 5:252–65
England P. 1984. Wage appreciation and depreciation: a test of neoclassical economic explanations of occupational sex segregation. *Soc. Forces* 62:726–49
England P. 1993. *Comparable Worth: Theories and Evidence.* New York: Aldine de Gruyter
England P, Farkas G, Kilbourne B, Dou T. 1988. Explaining occupational sex segregation and wages: findings from a fixed effects model. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 53(4):544–88
Erkut S, Mokros JR. 1984. Professors and models and mentors for college students. *Am. Educ. Res. J.* 21(2):399–417
Ethington CA, Wolfe LM. 1988. Women's selection of quantitative undergraduate fields of study: direct and indirect influences. *Am. Educ. Res. J.* 25:157–75
Farnham C, ed. 1987. *The Impact of Feminist Research in the Academy.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press
Fiol-Matta L, Chamberlain MK, eds. 1994. *Women of Color and the Multicultural Curriculum: Transforming the College Classroom.* New York: Feminist Press
Finn JD, Dulberg L, Reis J. 1979. Sex differences in educational attainment: a cross-national perspective. *Harvard Educ. Rev.* 49(4):477–503
Folger JK, Nam CB. 1967. *Education of the American Population.* Washington, DC: US Bur. Census
Fox MF. 1981. Sex, salary and achievement: reward-dualism in academia. *Sociol. Educ.* 54:71–84
Frehill L. 1996. *We just can't keep them: the myth of women's attrition from engineering.* Paper pres. Eastern Sociol. Soc. Meet., Boston, March
Freeman J. 1975. *The Politics of Women's Liberation.* New York: Longman
Fuller B. 1983. Youth job structure and school enrollment, 1890–1920. *Sociol. Educ.* 56:145–56
Fuller R, Schoenberger R. 1991. The gender salary gap: Do academic achievement, internship experience, and college major make a difference? *Soc. Sci. Q.* 72(4):715–26
Frankfort R. 1977. *Collegiate Women: Domesticity and Career in Turn-of-the-Century America.* New York: New York Univ. Press
Friedan B. 1963. *The Feminine Mystique.* New York: Dell
Freeman R, ed. 1994. *Working Under Different Rules.* New York: Russell Sage Found.
Gerhart B. 1990. Gender differences in current and starting salaries: the role of performance, college major and job title. *Indust. Labor Relat. Rev.* 43(4):418–33
Gilbert N. 1993. Examining the facts: advocacy research overstates the incidence of date and acquaintance rape. In *Current Controversies on Family Violence,* ed. RJ Gelles, DR Loseke, pp. 120–32. Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Goldin C. 1992. *The meaning of college in the lives of American women: the past one-hundred years. Work. Pap. No. 4099.* Cambridge, MA: Natl. Bur. Econ. Res.
Goldin C. 1995. Career and family: College

women look to the past. Unpubl. Ms. Dep. Econ., Harvard Univ., Cambridge, MA
Graff HJ. 1979. *The Literacy Myth.* New York: Academic
Graff HJ. 1987. *The Legacies of Literacy.* Bloomington, IN: Ind. Univ. Press
Graham PA. 1978. Expansion and exclusion: a history of women in American higher education. *Signs* 3(4):759–73
Green KC. 1989. A profile of undergraduates in the sciences. *Am. Scientist.* 77:475(6)
Greene M, Jacobs JA. 1992. Urbanism and education in 1910: evidence from the 1910 public use sample. *Am. J. Educ.* 101:29–59
Griffin C. 1985. *Typical Girls? Young Women from Schools to the Job Market.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
Gruber J. 1989. How women handle sexual harassment: a literature review. *Sociol. Soc. Res.* 74:3–9
Gruber J. 1992. A typology of personal and environmental sexual harassment: research and policy implications for the 1990s. *Sex Roles* 26:447–64
Guy-Sheftall B, Heath S. 1995. *Women's Studies: A Retrospective.* New York: Ford Found.
Hauser RM, Kuo HD. 1995. Does the gender composition of sibships affect educational attainment? Unpubl. ms. Cent. Demography & Ecol., Univ. Wisc., Madison, WI
Hearn JC. 1990. Pathways to attendance at the elite colleges. In *The High-Status Track: Studies of Elite Schools and Stratification,* ed. PW Kingston, LS Lewis, pp. 121–46. Albany, NY: SUNY Press
Hearn JC. 1992. Emerging variations in postsecondary attendance patterns: an investigation of part-time, delayed and nondegree enrollment. *Res. Higher Educ.* 33(6):657–87
Hearn JC, Olzak S. 1981. The role of college major departments in the reproduction of sexual inequality. *Sociol. Educ.* 53:195–205
Heyns B, Bialecki I. 1992. Educational inequality in Poland. In *Persistent Inequality: Changing Educational Stratification in Thirteen Countries,* ed. Y Shavit, H-P Blossfeld, pp. 303–35. Boulder, CO: Westview
Holland D, Eisenhart M. 1990. *Educated in Romance.* Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
Holland JL. 1985. *Making Vocational Choices: A Theory of Careers.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 2nd ed.
Hooper B. 1984. China's modernization: Are young women going to lose out? *Modern China* 10:317–43
Horowitz HL. 1993. *Alma Mater: Design and Experience in the Women's Colleges from Their Nineteenth-Century Beginnings to the 1930s.* Amherst, MA: Univ. Mass. Press. 2nd ed.
Hulbert KD, Schuster DT, eds. 1993. *Women's Lives Through Time: Educated American Women of the Twentieth Century.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Hurlbert JS, Rosenfeld RA. 1992. Getting a good job: rank and institutional prestige in academic psychologists' careers. *Sociol. Educ.* 65(3):188–207
Ingersoll R. 1993. Loosely coupled organizations revisited. *Res. Sociol. Organ.* 11:81–112
Ingersoll R. 1994. Organizational control in secondary schools. *Harvard Educ. Rev.* 64:150–72
Jacobs JA. 1989. *Revolving Doors: Sex Segregation and Women's Careers.* Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press
Jacobs JA. 1995a. Gender and academic specialties: trends among college degree recipients during the 1980s. *Sociol. Educ.* 68(2):81–98
Jacobs JA, ed. 1995b. Introduction. In *Gender Inequality at Work,* ed. JA Jacobs, pp. 1–22. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Jacobs JA. 1996. Gender and access to higher education. Unpubl. ms. Dep. Sociol., Univ. Penn.
Jacobs JA, Furstenberg FF. 1986. Changing places: conjugal succession and the marital mobility of women. *Soc. Forces* 64(3):714–32
Jacobs JA, Greene ME. 1994. Race and ethnicity, social class and schooling in 1910. In *After Ellis Island: Newcomers and Natives in the 1910 Census,* ed. SC Watkins, pp. 209–56. New York: Russell Sage Found.
Jacobs JA, Labov T. 1995. Sex differences in intermarriage: exchange theory reconsidered. Unpubl. ms. Dep. Sociol., Univ. Penn.
Jacobs JA, Powell B. 1987. On comparing the social standing of men and women. Unpubl. ms. Dep. Sociol., Univ. Penn.
Jencks C, Riesman D. 1968. *The Academic Revolution.* Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
Karabel J, Halsey AH. 1977. *Power and Ideology in Education.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press
Karen D. 1991. The politics of class, race and gender: access to higher education in the United States, 1960–1986. *Am. J. Educ.* 99:208–37
Kasworm CE. 1990. Adult undergraduates in higher education: a review of past research perspectives. *Rev. Educ. Res.* 60(3):345–72
Kelly GP. 1989. *International Handbook of Women's Education.* New York: Greenwood
Kelly GP, Slaughter S, eds. 1991. *Women's Higher Education in Comparative Perspective.* Dordecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Acad.

Kelly T. 1983. The historical evolution of adult education in Great Britain. In *Educational Opportunities for Adults*, , ed. M Tight, Vol. II. London: Croom Helm
King EM, Hill MA. 1993. *Women's Education in Developing Countries: Barriers, Benefits and Policies.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
Klein E. 1984. *Gender Politics.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press
Klemm LR. 1901. Translator's Introduction. In *Higher Education of Women in Europe*, ed. Helene Lange. New York: Appleton
Komarovsky M. 1971 (1953). *Women in the Modern World: Their Education and Their Dilemmas.* Dubuque, Iowa: Brown Reprints
Komarovsky M. 1985. *Women in College: Shaping New Feminine Identities.* New York: Basic
Konrad AM, Pfeffer J. 1991. Understanding the hiring of women and minorities in educational institutions. *Sociol. Educ.* 64:141–57
Koss MP, Cook SL. 1993. Facing the facts: date and acquaintance rape are significant problems for women. In *Current Controversies on Family Violence*, ed. RJ Gelles, DR Loseke, pp. 104–19. Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Langland E, Gove W, eds. 1983. *A Feminist Perspective in the Academy: The Difference it Makes.* Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
Langton N, Pfeffer J. 1994. Paying the professor: sources of salary variation in academic labor markets. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 59:236–56
Lees S. 1986. *Losing Out: Sexuality and Adolescent Girls.* London: Hutchinson
Levine S. 1995. *Degrees of Equality: The American Association of University Women and the Challenge of Twentieth-Century Feminism.* Philadelphia, PA: Temple Univ. Press
Lichter DT. 1990. Delayed marriage, marital homogamy, and the male selection process among white women. *Soc. Sci. Q.* 71:802–11
Long JS, Allison PD, McGinnis R. 1993. Rank advancement in academic careers: sex differences and the effects of productivity. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 58:703–22
Long JS, Fox MF. 1995. Scientific careers: universalism and particularism. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 21:45–71
Luebke BF, Reilly ME. 1995. *Women's Studies Graduates: The First Generation.* New York: Teachers Coll. Press
Lynch L, ed. 1994. *Training and the Private Sector: International Comparisons.* Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press.
Manski CF. 1993. Adolescent econometricians: How do youth infer the returns to schooling? In *Studies of Supply and Demand in Higher Education*, ed. C Clotfelter, M Rothschild, pp. 43–57. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
Maple SA, Stage FK. 1991. Influences on the choice of math/science major by gender and ethnicity. *Am. Educ. Res. J.* 28(1):37–60
Mare RD. 1991. Five decades of educational assortative mating. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 56:15–32
Marini MM, Greenberger E. 1978. Sex differences in educational aspirations and expectations. *Am. Educ. Res. J.* 15:67–79
Martin TC. 1995. Women's education and fertility: results from 26 demographic and health surveys. *Stud. Family Planning* 26(4):187–202
McRobbie A. 1982. The politics of feminist research: between talk, text and action. *Feminist Rev.* 12:46–57
Meyer J, Hannan M, eds. 1979. *National Development and the World System.* Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
Meyer JW, Tyack D, Nagel J, Gordon A, et al. 1979. Public education as nation-building in America: enrollments and bureaucratization in the American states, 1870–1930. *Am. J. Sociol.* 85:591–613
Mickelson RA. 1989. Why does Jane read and write so well? The anomaly of women's achievement. *Sociol. Educ.* 62:47–63
Monthly Forum on Women in Higher Education. 1995. Enrollment ratios of first-year women students at the nation's highest ranked colleges and universities. *Monthly For. Women Higher Educ.* 1(1):6–8
Moore KM. 1987. Women's access and opportunity in higher education. *Compar. Educ.* 23:23–34
Musil C. 1992. *The Courage to Question: Women's Studies and Student Learning.* Washington, DC: Assoc. Am. Coll. & Natl. Women's Stud. Assoc.
National Center for Educational Statistics. 1994. *Digest of Educational Statistics.* Washington, DC: US Govt. Printing Off.
National Council for Research on Women. 1991. *Mainstreaming Minority Women's Studies.* Washington, DC: Natl. Council for Res. Women
OECD. 1995. *Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators.* Paris: OECD
Ogburn W. 1922. *Social Change.* New York: Viking
Olneck MR, Lazerson M. 1974. The school achievement of immigrant children, 1900–1930. *Hist. Educ. Q.* 14:453–82
Paludi M, ed. 1990. *Ivory Power: Sexual Harassment on Campus.* Albany, NY: SUNY Press
Paludi MA, Barickman RB. 1991. *Academic and Workplace Sexual Harassment: A Resource Manual.* Albany: State Univ. NY

Press
Pascarella ET, Terenzini PT. 1991. *How College Affects Students*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Patai D, Koertge N. 1994. *Professing Feminism: Cautionary Tales from the Strange World of Women's Studies*. New York: Basic Books
Pauwels JR. 1984. *Women, Nazis, and Universities: Female University Students in the Third Reich, 1933–1945*. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Persell CH, Catsambis S, Cookson PW. 1992. Differential asset conversion: class and gendered pathways to selective colleges. *Sociol. Educ.* 65:208–25
Polachek S. 1978. Sex differences in college major. *Indust. Labor Relat. Rev.* 31(4):498–508
Powell B, Steelman LC. 1989. The liability of having brothers: paying for college and the sex composition of the family. *Sociol. Educ.* 62:134–47
Powell B, Steelman LC. 1990. Beyond sibship size: sibling density, sex composition and educational outcomes. *Soc. Forces* 69:181–206
Ramirez FO, Boli J. 1987. Global patterns of educational institutionalization. In *Institutional Structure: Constituting the State, Society and the Individual*, ed. GM Thomas, JW Meyer, FO Ramirez, J Boli, pp. 150–72. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Ramirez F, Weiss J. 1979. The political incorporation of women. In *National Development and the World System*, ed. J Meyer, M Hannan, pp. 238–49. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
Ransom MR. 1990. Gender segregation by field in higher education. *Res. Higher Educ.* 31(5):477–94
Reskin B. 1993. Sex segregation in the workplace. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 19:241–70
Rice JK, Hemmings A. 1988. Women's colleges and women achievers: an update. *Signs* 13(3):546–59
Riordan C. 1992. Single- and mixed-gender colleges for women: education and occupational outcomes. *Rev. Higher Educ.* 15:327–46
Roiphe K. 1993. *The Morning After: Sex, Fear and Feminism on Campus*. Boston, MA: Little Brown
Rosenberg R. 1982. *Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots of Modern Feminism*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press
Rosenfeld RA. 1987. Patterns and effect of geographic mobility for academic women and men. *J. Higher Educ.* 58(5):493–515
Rothstein DS. 1995. Do female faculty influence female students' educational and labor market attainments? *Indust. Labor Relat. Rev.* 48(3):515–30
Rubin LJ, Borgers SB. 1990. Sexual harassment in universities during the 1980's. *Sex Roles* 23:397–411
Rubinson R. 1986. Class formation, politics and institutions: schooling in the United States. *Am. J. Sociol.* 92:519–48
Sadker M, DM. 1993. *Failing at Fairness: How America's Schools Cheat Girls*. New York: Scribner
Sagaria MA. 1988. Administrative mobility and gender: patterns and processes in higher education. *J. Higher Educ.* 59:305–26
Sanday P. 1990. *Fraternity Gang Rape: Sex, Brotherhood and Privilege on Campus*. New York: New York Univ. Press
Sandler BR. 1986. *Campus Climate Revisited: Chilly for Women Faculty, Administrators, and Graduate Students*. Washington, DC: Assoc. Am. Coll.
Schneider BE. 1987. Graduate women, sexual harassment, and university policy. *J. Higher Educ.* 58(1):46–65
Schultz TP. 1993a. Returns to women's education. In *Women's Education in Developing Countries: Barriers, Benefits and Policies*, ed. EM King, MA Hill, pp. 51–99. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
Schultz TP. 1993b. Investments in the schooling and health of women and men. *J. Hum. Resourc.* 28:694–734
Schultz TP. 1987. School expenditures and enrollments, 1960–1990. In *Population Growth and Economic Development*, ed. DG Johnson, R Lee. Madison: Univ. Wisc. Press
Schwager S. 1987. Educating women in America. *Signs* 12(2):333–72
Seymour E. 1992. Undergraduate problems with teaching and advising in SME majors—explaining gender differences in attrition rates. *J. Coll. Sci. Teaching* 22:284–92
Slaughter S. 1993. Retrenchment in the 1980s: the politics of prestige and gender. *J. Higher Educ.* 64(3):250–82
Smith DG. 1990. Women's colleges and coed colleges: Is there a difference for women? *J. Higher Educ.* 61:181–97
Smock AC, Youssef NH. 1977. Egypt: from seclusion to limited participation. In *Women: Roles and Status in Eight Countries*, ed. JZ Giele, AC Smock, pp. 33–79. New York: Wiley
Sniffen MJ. 1995. US doubles estimates of rapes, attempted rapes to 310,000. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, August 17, p. A-25
Solnick S. 1995. Changes in women's majors from entrance to graduation at women's and coeducational colleges. *Indust. Labor Relat. Rev.* 48(3):505–14
Solomon BM. 1985. *In the Company of Educated Women: A History of Women and Higher Education in America*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press
Stake JE, Rose S. 1994. The long-term impact of

women's studies on students' personal lives and political activism. *Psychol. Women Q.* 18(3):403–12

Stimpson CR, Cobb NK. 1986. *Women's Studies in the United States*. New York: Ford Foundation

Stoecker JL, Pascarella ET. 1991. Women's colleges and women's career attainments revisited. *J. Higher Educ.* 62:394–406

Strenta AC, Elliott R, Adair R, Matier, Scott J, et al. 1994. Choosing and leaving science in highly selective institutions. *Res. Higher Educ.* 35(5):513–47

Stromquist NP. 1989. Determinants of educational participation and achievement of women in the third world: a review of the evidence and a theoretical critique. *Rev. Educ. Res.* 59:143–83

Stromquist NP. 1993. Sex equity legislation in education: the state as promoter of women's rights. *Rev. Educ. Res.* 63(4):379–407

Studer-Ellis EM. 1995. Springboards to mortarboards: women's college foundings in Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania. *Soc. Forces* 73(3):1051–70

Sturnick JA, Milley JE, Tisinger CA. 1991. *Women at the Helm: Pathfinding Presidents at State Colleges and Universities.* Washington, DC: Am. Assoc. State Coll. and Univ.

Sweet JA, Rindfuss RR. 1983. Those ubiquitous fertility trends: United States, 1945–1979. *Soc. Biol.* 30:127–39

Tack MW, Patitu CI. 1992. *Faculty Job Satisfaction: Women and Minorities in Peril.* Washington, DC: Geo. Wash. Univ., Clearinghouse on Higher Educ., for Assoc. for Study of Higher Educ.

Tan J, Mingat A. 1992. *Education in Asia: A Comparative Study of Cost and Financing.* Washington, DC: World Bank

Thorne AC. 1985. *Visible and Invisible Women in Land-Grant Colleges, 1890–1940.* Logan, Utah: Utah State Univ. Press

Tidball ME. 1980. Women's colleges and women achievers revisited. *Signs* 5(3):504–17

Tidball ME. 1985. Baccalaureate origins of entrants into American medical schools. *J. Higher Educ.* 56:385–402

Tidball ME. 1986. Baccalaureate origins of recent natural science doctorates. *J. Higher Educ.* 57(6):606–20

Tidball ME, Kistiakowsky V. 1976. Baccalaureate origins of American scientists and scholars. *Science* 193:646–52

Tilak JBG. 1993. East Asia. In *Women's Education in Developing Countries*, ed. EM King, MA Hill, pp. 247–85. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press

Tinsley HEA, Stockdale MS. 1993. Special issue on sexual harassment in the workplace. *J. Vocat. Behav.* 42(1):1–153

Tolbert PS. 1986. Organizations and inequality: sources of earnings differences between male and female faculty. *Sociol. Educ.* 59:227–35

Tolbert PS, Simmons T, Andrews A, Rhee J, et al. 1995. The effects of gender composition in academic departments on faculty turnover. *Indust. Labor Relat. Rev.* 4893:562–79

Tolbert PS, Oberfield AA. 1991. Sources of organizational demography: faculty sex ratios in colleges and universities. *Sociol. Educ.* 64:305–15

Touchon JG, Shavlik D, Davis L, eds. 1993. *Women in Presidencies.* Washington, DC: Am. Council Educ.

Tyack D, Hansot E. 1990. *Learning Together: A History of Coeducation in American Schools.* New York: Russell Sage Found.

UNESCO. 1967. *Access to Higher Education in Europe.* Vienna: UNESCO

United Nations. 1987. *Fertility Behaviour in the Context of Development: Evidence from the World Fertility Survey.* New York: United Nations

United Nations International Conference on Population and Development. 1995. *Population and Development.* New York: United Nations

US Bureau of the Census. 1975. *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970.* Washington, DC: US Govt. Printing Off.

US Commissioner of Education. 1900. *Report of the Commissioner of Education for the Year 1898–1899.* Washington, DC: USGPO

US Department of Education. 1995. *The Condition of Education.* Washington, DC: USGPO

US Immigration Commission. 1911. *Reports of the Immigration Commission.* Washington, DC: USGPO

Waller W. 1937. The rating and dating complex. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 2:727–34

Walsh HB, Osipow SH. 1994. *Career Counseling for Women.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum

Walsh MR. 1977. *Doctors Wanted: No Women Need Apply: Sexual Barriers in the Medical Profession, 1835–1975.* New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press

Walters PB. 1986. Sex and institutional differences in labor market effects on the expansion of higher education, 1952–1980. *Sociol. Educ.* 59:199–211

Ward K, ed. 1990. *Women Workers and Global Restructuring.* Ithaca, NY: ILR Press

Ward K, Grant L. 1995. Gender and academic publishing. In *Higher Education: Handbook of Theory and Research*, ed. A Bayer, J Smart. New York: Agathon

Ware NC, Lee VE. 1988. Sex differences in

choice of college science majors. *Am. Educ. Res. J.* 25(4):593–614

Wilkinson LC, Marrett CB. 1985. *Gender Influences in Classroom Interaction*. Orlando, FL: Academic

Williams EA, Lam JA, Shively M. 1992. The impact of a university policy on the sexual harassment of female students. *J. Higher Educ.* 63(1):50–64

Willis PE. 1977. *Learning to Labour*. Aldershot, UK: Gower

Wilson KL, Boldizar JP. 1990. Gender segregation in higher education: effects of aspirations, mathematics achievement, and income. *Sociol. Educ.* 63:62–74

Wilson K, Smith-Lovin L. 1983. Scaling the prestige, authority and income potential of college curricula. *Soc. Sci. Res.* 12:159–86

Wolfle LK, Betz NE. 1981. Traditionality of choice and sex-role identification as moderators of the congruence of occupational choice in college women. *J. Vocat. Behav.* 18:43–55

Wood DJ. 1981. Academic women's studies programs: a case of organizational innovation. *J. Higher Educ.* 52(2):155–72

Woody T. 1929. *A History of Women's Education in the United States*. New York: Science

Yarrison-Rice JM. 1995. On the problem of making science attractive for women and minorities: an annotated bibliography. *Am. J. Physics* 63(3):203–11

FEMINIST THEORY AND THE STUDY OF GENDER AND EDUCATION

SANDRA ACKER

Abstract – This paper considers the three main Western feminist theoretical frameworks – liberal, socialist and radical – and their educational applications. Examples of studies using each approach are discussed. Liberal feminists writing about education use concepts of equal opportunities, socialization, sex roles and discrimination. Their strategies involve altering socialization practices, changing attitudes and making use of relevant legislation. Critics of the liberal school point to conceptual limitations and the liberal reluctance to confront power and patriarchy. Socialist feminists analyze the role of the school in the perpetuation of gender divisions under capitalism. Major concepts are socio-cultural reproduction and to a lesser extent acceptance of and resistance to gender-based patterns of behaviour. So far socialist-feminist educational writing is mainly theoretical rather than practical and has therefore been criticized for its over-determinism and insufficient empiric foundation. Radical feminists in education have concentrated mainly on the male monopolization of knowledge and culture and on sexual politics in schools. Strategies involve putting women's and girls' concerns first, through separate-sex groups when necessary. Critics argue that radical feminism tends towards biological reductionism, description rather than explanation and also contains methodological weaknesses. Mutual criticism of perspectives seems less destructive in educational writing than in some other categories of feminist scholarship. All the theoretical frameworks are subject to the same pressures including the oppressive power of structures, the resilience of individuals, and the tension between universality (how women are the same) and diversity (how women differ on attributes like class and race).

Zusammenfassung – In diesem Artikel werden die hauptsächlich im Westen vertretenen feministischen Ansätze und deren Anwendungen im Erziehungssystem untersucht, d.h. der liberale, der sozialistische und der radikale Feminismus. Beispiele aus Studien, die jeweils einem dieser Ansätze folgen, werden angeführt. In liberal-feministischen Schriften zur Erziehung werden Konzepte wie Chancengleichheit, Sozialisation, Geschlechterrollen und Diskriminierung erörtert. Deren Strategien besagen, daß Sozialisationspraktiken zu ändern, Haltungen abzuwandeln und diesbezügliche Gesetze anzuwenden sind. Kritik an der liberalen Schule macht aufmerksam auf die begrifflichen Einengungen und auf den Widerwillen, Macht und Patriarchat zu konfrontieren. Sozialistische Feministinnen untersuchen die Rolle der Schule beim Reproduzieren geschlechtsspezifischer Aufteilungen im Kapitalismus. Kernbegriffe sind sozio-kulturelles Reproduzieren und in geringerem Maße Anpassung und Widerstand im Hinblick auf geschlechtsspezifische Verhaltensformen. Sozialistisch-feministisch begründete pädagogische Schriften blieben bis jetzt eher

International Review of Education – Internationale Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft – Revue Internationale de Pédagogie XXXIII (1987), 419–435.

theoretisch als praktisch orientiert und deswegen werden sie wegen ihrer Überdetermination und ihrer unzureichenden empirischen Basis kritisiert. Radikale Feministinnen haben sich hauptsächlich auf das Männermonopol von Wissen und Kultur sowie sexualpolitische Einstellungen im Schulalltag konzentriert. Ihre Strategien zielen darauf ab, die Bedürfnisse der Mädchen und Frauen an erster Stelle zu sehen, und wenn nötig, dies durch Trennung der Geschlechter in Gruppen zu erreichen. Kritiker behaupten, daß der radikale Feminismus zu biologischem Reduktionismus sowie zur Beschreibung eher als Erklärung neigt und methodologische Schwächen aufweist. Wechselseitige Kritik an den Perspektiven scheint in den erziehungswissenschaftlichen Schriften weniger destruktiv als in einigen anderen kategorien der feministischen Forschung zu sein. Sämtlichen theoretischen Ansätzen sind Zwänge einschließlich der oppressiven Gewalt der Strukturen, der Widerstandskraft einzelner sowie der Spannung zwischen Universalität (inwieweit sich Frauen gleichen) und der Unterschiedlichkeit (inwieweit sich Frauen durch Merkmale wie Klasse und Rasse unterscheiden) gemeinsam.

Résumé – Cet article examine les trois grandes théories féministes occidentales – le féminisme libéral, socialiste et radical – et leurs applications éducatives. On analyse quelques études se basant sur chacune de ces approches. Les textes des féministes libérales portant sur l'éducation emploient les concepts d'égalité des chances, de socialisation, de rôle et de discrimination des sexes. Leurs stratégies englobent une modification des pratiques de socialisation, un changement d'attitudes et l'usage d'une législation. Les critiques de ce courant libéral mettent en évidence les restrictions conceptuelles et les hésitations à affronter le pouvoir et le patriarchat. Les féministes socialistes analysent le rôle de l'école dans la reproduction de la distinction des sexes dans le système capitaliste. Les concepts majeurs concernent la reproduction socio-culturelle et, à un degré moindre, les codes et la résistance des sexes. Les textes des féministes socialistes relatifs à l'éducation restent encore de nos jours plutôt théoriques que pratiques. Ils ont été critiqués pour leur surdéterminisme et leur manque de connaissances fondamentales en matière de recherche pédagogique. Les féministes radicales se sont principalement concentrées, dans le domaine de l'éducation, sur la monopolisation par l'homme du savoir et de la culture, sur la politique sexuelle de la vie de tous les jours dans les écoles. Leurs stratégies consistent tout d'abord à faire valoir les intérêts des femmes et des filles grâce à l'établissement de groupes séparés de garçons et de filles s'il le faut. Selon les critiques, le féminisme radical tend vers un réductionisme biologique, une description plutôt qu'une explication et une faiblesse méthodologique. La critique mutuelle entre ces différentes perspectives semble moins destructive dans les textes relatifs à l'éducation que dans d'autres catégories de sciences féministes. Toutes ces théories partagent certains dilemmes, incluant l'accent relatif qui doit être placé sur le pouvoir oppressif des structures et la souplesse des individus, et sur la tension entre l'universalité (ce en quoi les femmes sont les mêmes) et la diversité (ce qui fait qu'elles diffèrent selon des caractéristiques telles leur classe sociale et leur race).

'What is feminism?' (Mitchell and Oakly, 1986) is a question of deceptive simplicity. Feminist theory, like feminism itself, is multifaceted and complex. My aim in this paper is to draw out the implications of certain feminist frameworks for the analysis of education. I begin by outlining the three ma-

jor forms taken by contemporary Western feminist theory. The main part of the paper makes connections between each of the three forms and educational perspectives and research. In each case I consider the typical educational objectives, the conceptual base, strategies for change and criticisms of the approach. The conclusion looks at prospects for synthesis among approaches and at some underlying tensions in all the feminist frameworks.

My perspective is that of an American sociologist of education long-settled in Britain. I shall focus on British approaches plus work from other countries that is reasonably well known in Britain, especially work from Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. Most of the discussion thus refers to Western forms of feminism, which may differ from those found elsewhere (see Acker *et al.* eds., 1984; Jayawardena, 1986).

Feminist Theory

By 'theory' I mean the construction of sets of interrelated statements about how some aspect of the world operates. Textbook definitions insist that theories lead to testable hypotheses. I should like to use the term more broadly here, to refer to perspectives which guide one's search for answers to a central series of questions and dilemmas about sex and gender. Feminist theoretical frameworks address, above all, the question of women's subordination to men: how this arose, how and why it is perpetuated, how it might be changed and (sometimes) what life would be like without it. 'Middle range' theories may be less dramatic and consider particular aspects of gender relations and specific sectors of social life such as education, the family or politics. Feminist theories serve a dual purpose, as guides to understanding gender inequality and as guides to action. There are disagreements among theorists about who is to be counted as a feminist, as well as how best to accomplish social change.

Most accounts of feminist theory identify at least two or three divisions within contemporary Western feminism. Eisenstein (1984) provides a capsule portrait of the three major approaches:

> . . . recent analysts seem to agree on the distinction between radical feminism, which holds that gender oppression is the oldest and most profound form of exploitation, which predates and underlies all other forms including those of race and class; and socialist feminism, which argues that class, race and gender oppression interact in a complex way, that class oppression stems from capitalism, and that capitalism must be eliminated for women to be liberated. Both of these, in turn, would be distinguished from a liberal or bourgeois feminist view, which would argue that women's liberation can be fully achieved without any major alterations to the economic and political structures of contemporary capitalist democracies. (pp. xix-xx)

There is considerable mutual criticism among theoretical perspectives. Liberal feminism is accused of elitism: whilst liberal strategies may enable a few token women to 'have careers' and join the ranks of the powerful, the structures of oppression survive untouched. Liberal feminists are also criticized for converting the concept of equality of outcome to equality of opportunity (O'Brien, 1983).

Liberal feminists tend to believe sex differences (biological) are really gender differences (cultural). But some radical feminists stress the validity of sex differences – accepting and celebrating women's capacity for nurture, co-operation, passionate attachment to peace in the face of men's persistent attempts at war. Eisenstein (1984) is sharply critical of the tendencies within radical feminism that imply female superiority is physiological; that reject rationality and logic as devices of men; that portray women as the inevitable victim of evil men.

In turn, socialist feminists have been criticized by radicals for their eagerness to make alliances with men (in which the women's interests are bound to be subordinate) and for the linguistic and logical contortions required to reconcile Marxism with feminism. Radical feminists charge that the socialist focus on capitalism fails to do justice to the myriad ways in which men hold power over women through control of sexuality and the threat of violence (MacKinnon, 1982).

All three 'traditional' types of feminism have been challenged by those who argue feminism has been unduly preoccupied with privileged Western white women's concerns. One strand of this critique argues for the need to understand imperialism and to inject an international perspective into Western feminism (Amos and Parmar, 1984). There are also heated debates within individual countries. For example Britain's *Feminist Review*, a journal of socialist-feminist thought, contains a series of articles about feminism and racism. On similar lines, radical feminism has been attacked by Murphy and Livingstone (1985) who object to what they see as its mistaken prioritizing of sexual oppression over that based on race and class. Bryan *et al.* (1985) suggest that rather than reject feminism simply as white ideology black women should redefine and reclaim the term.

'Hyphenated feminism' (O'Brien, 1983) has its limitations. Delmar (1986) suggests that this urge to subdivide feminism can be seen as a sclerosis of the movement, feminism degenerating into a 'naming of the parts'. Nevertheless the tripartite classification provides a useful heuristic device, which I use to construct 'ideal type' descriptions of how each feminist framework approaches the task of conceptualizing and reforming education.

Liberal Feminism and Education

Securing equal opportunities for the sexes is the main aim of liberal feminism. The intent of liberal feminists in education is to remove barriers which prevent girls reaching their full potential, whether such barriers are located in the school, the individual psyche or discriminatory labour practices.

What is the conceptual foundation for liberal-feminist educational scholarship? There are three major themes: 1) equal opportunities; 2) socialization and sex stereotyping; 3) sex discrimination.

Equal opportunities rhetoric is almost the *sine qua non* by which liberal-feminist perspectives are recognized as such. 'Equal means the same', claims Eileen Byrne (1979, p. 19), arguing that separate educational provision for girls has usually meant inferior facilities and restricted features. Yet the *same* treatment may produce unequal outcomes if, for example, prior socialization ensures the sexes typically have differential initial competence or interest in a given subject; or labour market practices mean employers will welcome equally qualified boys and girls with differential enthusiasm. The failure of schools to accomplish 'equality of educational opportunity' in social-class terms is widely acknowledged and consequently the phrase has nearly disappeared from sociological studies of class inequality, yet its meaning has been revised to be something of a code phrase for inequalities based on race and/or sex (and occasionally disablement). Some local education authorities in Britain, for example, have appointed 'equal opportunities advisers' and companies and local authorities proclaim themselves 'equal opportunity employers'. In Australia, Yates (1986) suggests that the rhetoric, in this transformed way, may persist because class differences apart, the provision of educational resources on a sex-blind basis still seems attainable.

In Britain the discourse of equal opportunity, however flawed, is virtually the only one acceptable to the general public. It is the language of central government and its quasi-governmental agencies and research teams; it is also to a large extent the choice of local government, trade unions and political parties. Terms like sexism, oppression and patriarchy are staples of feminist writing, but official documents and projects still employ them gingerly if at all. Prudent efforts to introduce feminist perspectives into the teacher training curriculum tend to use phrases like 'equal opportunities for the sexes in education' or, increasingly, 'gender and education'.

A second major concern of liberal feminists in education focuses on socialization, sex roles and sex stereotyping. Girls (and boys) are thought to be socialized (by the family, the school, the media) into traditional attitudes and orientations which limit their futures unnecessarily to sex-stereotyped occupational and family roles. At the same time, socialization

encourages patterns of interpersonal relationships between the sexes which disadvantage females, who are placed in a position of dependency and deference, and also males, who are forced to suppress their emotional and caring potential. DuBois *et al.* (1985) argue that 'sex differences' have always been a concern within American educational research; the problem is 'to analyze sex differences where research indicates they exist and not to invoke them artificially as explanations where they do not' (p. 28). In contrast, British educational work on 'sex differences' has been unevenly spread through the sub-disciplines of education; in sociology of education, for example, virtually no attention was paid to the topic before the late 1970s (Acker, 1981). 'Gender' has taken over from 'sex' in much British educational scholarship, but more as a token of good faith than as a result of a clearly understood distinction between the terms.

The sex role socialization framework is thought of as particularly characteristic of the United States and has been criticized by Arnot (1981) in Britain, Connell (1985) in Australia and Middleton (1984) in New Zealand. There is a companion set of concepts that is sometimes ignored: the notions of discrimination, rights, justice and fairness. Those who use these terms come much closer to admitting an impact of 'structures' than those confined to the 'sex role' or 'sex differences' approach. As Arnot (1981) points out, Byrne (1978) recognized the impact of policies as well as attitudes in creating a structure of disadvantage for girls, especially for those also disprivileged by rural or working class origins. Rendel's (1980, 1984) work on British academics (and much similar work in other countries) also demonstrates the point. The fact that women are only some 14% of university teachers, disappearing rapidly in the upper grades to less than 2% of professors, is unlikely, she writes, to be solely due to the women's limitations (Rendel, 1984).

Whyte *et al.*'s (1985) recent collection illustrates the merging of the three liberal themes. Attitudes figure prominently, but they are generally attitudes of teachers, seen as contributing to sex-stereotyped subject choices within schools and eventually to sex-stereotyped occupations for school leavers. The concern with access to science and technology is strong. Reports from government-sponsored projects and equal opportunities personnel of various sorts are featured, and feminist rhetoric is conspicuously absent. The tone of the book is polite rather than outraged. But neither is there recourse to arguments which assert that girls' own attitudes (however socialized) prevent their recognition of their own best interests. Instead there is attention paid to local authority recalcitrance, limits of equal opportunity legislation, vagaries of industrial tribunal proceedings in cases of women teachers.

Strategies for educational change emanating from liberal feminism follow from the conceptual base. In general, there is an attempt to alter socialization practices, change attitudes, use legal processes. The gathering

and disseminating of information and evidence is important (Middleton, 1984). Whyte (1986) notes that science teachers involved in the 'Girls into Science and Technology' project were noticeably more impressed with 'facts and figures' than with social science terminology. The promotion of 'good practice' in schools is an aim of the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) in Britain, and a number of booklets have been prepared and distributed with that object. The EOC puts informal pressure on schools and education authorities acting illegally or against the spirit of the Sex Discrimination Act. Legal remedies are used where possible, although the limits of Britain's sex-discrimination legislation in the education field are oft-noted. Weiner (1986) provides a list of liberal-feminist strategies aimed at changing attitudes of teachers and children. They include reviewing aspects of school organization such as the timetable, analyzing curriculum materials for stereotyping, persuading girls not to drop science and technology subjects, establishing teacher working parties on the issues. There has also been increasing interest in 'assertiveness training' for women teachers wishing promotion. Another strategy is providing teachers in training and those on in-service courses with ideas for combating sexism.

The liberal-feminist stance on education has attracted fierce criticism from other feminists, so much so that it is impossible to find an extended defence of the position in Britain such as is available for comparable views in debates about multiculturalism and antiracism in education (e.g. Jeffcoate, 1984). The critics generally point to the limitations of the conceptual framework, especially ideas about equality of opportunity and the reliance on socialization and sex-role models. The emphasis on individual attitudes in these approaches is seen as a kind of psychologial reductionism, blaming the victim for her (socialized) lack of perception or confidence. *Why* socialization proceeds as it does, with such apparently deleterious consequences, is unexplained (Connell, 1985). It is charged that sex equality is mistakenly approached as if solutions might be wholly educational (Arnot, 1981); that the labour market process and capitalism are regarded uncritically; that change is wrongly approached as if it were merely a matter of appealing to good will (Acker, 1984); that male frameworks such as 'career' remain unchallenged by attempts to make a few women assertive enough to succeed in them (Weiner, 1986). Liberal feminism is accused, above all, of ignoring the impact of patriarchy, power, and the systematic subordination of women by men (O'Brien, 1983; Weiner, 1986), as well as the effects of racism and class hegemony (Arnot, 1981, 1982). It is striking that in the 'official' British equal opportunity literature (e.g. from the Equal Opportunities Commission) girls are simply girls: the differential potential impacts of class, ethnicity or other attributes upon their life-chances appear a taboo topic. This avoidance would not seem, however, to be a necessary characteristic of liberal-feminist educational thought, as Byrne's (1978) approach shows.

The socialist-feminist work I am considering analyzes Western capitalist states, rather than the Eastern socialist countries or those in the Third World. In the long run, the aim is to remove oppression (in part by abolishing capitalism) but the immediate task is to elucidate the processes involved. Most socialist-feminist theoreticians have focused on women's position within the economy and the family. For those concerned with education, the key question is 'how is education related to the reproduction of gender divisions within capitalism' (Arnot and Weiner, 1987).

The development of socialist-feminist perspectives within education has been strongly influenced by neo-Marxist trends within the sociology of education. A major concept used in this body of literature is 'reproduction'. Theorists have analyzed how schooling, by a variety of mechanisms, perpetuates (reproduces) class divisions within the work-force. Socialist-feminist sociologists of education have used these theories as a starting point for a 'political economy perspective' (Arnot, 1981) calling attention to the schools' role in reproducing a sexual as well as a social division of labour, in the family as well as the workplace.

Jane Gaskell (1986) for example, in Canada, looks critically at the notion of 'skill', often seen as a consequence of formal education and as a determinant of occupational placement and its rewards. Yet 'skill' is a socially constructed category. Apprenticeships for 'skilled' trades have been mostly held by males who have been organized sufficiently to limit access to training and practice. In contrast the skills of office work, arguably no less difficult to learn, are defined as part of every woman's 'natural' equipment, easy and taken for granted. Training for office work, though not for 'male crafts', is extensive in the Canadian high school, supplemented by easy access through evening classes at schools and colleges. Entry is uncontrolled and the result is a large pool of labour trained at no cost to the employers. The differentiation process within the school is important not only because it trains girls in office skills such as data processing but because it fails to train them in allied areas such as computer science or management that might allow alternative careers. In this analysis, the partnership between education and the economy clearly operates to confirm large numbers of girls and women in restricted, low-paid sectors of employment.

Other socialist-feminist analyses have explored the links between school and motherhood. Miriam David (1984), for example, notes multiple ways in which British primary schools operate with the expectation of *mothers'* participation in school activities. Even before children start school, mothers, especially in the middle classes, are expected to educate the children — give them cultural capital — if they are to benefit fully from school-

ing itself. Schools, especially in situations of declining resources and in socially advantaged areas, rely on unpaid help from mothers (some of whom are themselves trained teachers) ranging from repairing books to assisting with classroom routines. School hours and holidays in Britain place dramatic restrictions on the kinds of paid employment mothers of young children can pursue. So schools make use of, and perpetuate, a sexual division of labour in the home.

Much of the socialist-feminist work in education consists of theoretical arguments, historical research or policy analysis. To date there have been relatively few empirical studies of school processes. In part this is due to the difficulty of subjecting 'reproduction theory' to the kind of hypothesis testing which makes up the classic scientific method. Thus socialist-feminist research, along with neo-Marxist research in sociology of education generally, can be accused of substituting the 'apt illustration' for rigorous testing (Hargreaves, 1982). The most promising concept to guide empirical work is probably the 'gender code' (MacDonald, 1980). A few ethnographic studies are beginning to show the operation of class and gender codes (e.g. Connell *et al.*, 1982; Russell, 1986), especially in career guidance or subject choice exercises whereby schools and the labour market can be most obviously linked. But there is still difficulty with the macrosociological nature of the theory and the microsociological level of most school-based research. The extent to which any such school practices actually are required for the reproduction of the sexual and social division of labour is undemonstrated and probably undemonstrable.

A category of empirical research sometimes called 'cultural studies' comes partially and rather uneasily under the socialist-feminist wing. In recent years, sociologists of education have sought to give greater weight to ways in which individuals and groups resist or contest dominant ideologies and processes of social control. In this vein, several studies have begun to chart girls' cultures. Some are explicitly concerned with class and ethnic variations (e.g. Fuller, 1983; Griffin, 1985). Yet not all of these can be placed clearly within the socialist-feminist framework, despite the resistance theme. Arnot (1981) has pointed out that although the studies of girls' *culture* moved the focus beyond the liberal-feminist one on individual girls' *attitudes*, the roots of gender differentiation remain buried.

It is in strategies for educational action that socialist-feminist writing appears most underdeveloped. This is demonstrated indirectly by Weiner's (1986) comparison of equal opportunities (liberal) and antisexist (radical) educational strategies. She has no separate category of socialist-feminist strategies. Weiner remarks in passing that Marxist analyses have been theoretical and academic rather than classroom-oriented. Although reproduction theories can sometimes appear to forestall any social change, socialist-

feminist writers do at least gesture towards 'an educational praxis, a radical pedagogy' (Middleton, 1984, p. 49). This may mean (eventually) the potential development, with teachers and pupils, of strategies of resistance or moves towards a curriculum which challenges the dominant hegemony.

Theorizing itself, of course, can be regarded as a strategy which calls attention to the role of schooling in mediating and reproducing gender, class and other divisions. Yet if this is to be effective, theorists will have to develop ways of talking to the teachers rather than to each other (Yates, 1986, p. 128). I have found that whilst teachers in training (and to a lesser extent those on inservice courses) repeat socialist-feminist statements for instance from Barrett (1980), they are far more excited by radical feminists' appeal to personal experience or liberal feminists' to equity.

After a series of critiques from black British women (e.g. Amos and Parmer, 1981; Carby, 1982) socialist-feminist writings on education show increasing awareness that gender, race and class interact in complex ways to shape girls' lives in and out of school (Brah and Deem, 1986; Brah and Minhas, 1985). Some of the generalizations in the feminist literature about marriages and the family, or the descriptions of girls' conformity and resistance in schools, or the arguments about single-sex schools may need reworking insofar as they have in the past taken middle class white British experience as an unquestioned departure point.

Another line of criticism points to the social determinism implied in 'reproduction' accounts. Capitalism (or patriarchy) become reified. Society is seen as a 'field of play of pre-given and essential interests or needs' (Culley and Demaine, 1983, p. 170). Culley and Demaine (1983) argue that if any attempt by the State to improve matters can be dismissed as 'really' for control purposes and ultimately reproductive, constructive political action becomes impossible. Connell (1985) recommends moving towards a theory of practice that would avoid voluntarism and pluralism (as in liberal feminism) on the one hand and overdeterminism by 'categories' on the other; Culley and Demaine (1983) suggest concentrating on specific struggles and practices in schools and local education authorities where outcomes depend on an array of influences, some under teacher control, rather than on external forces alone.

Radical Feminism and Education

Like socialist feminists, radical feminists want to see a fundamental change in the social structure, one which will eliminate male dominance and patriarchal structures. 'The goal of a feminist education', writes Mary O'Brien (1983, p. 13) 'is not equality in knowledge, power and wealth, but the aboli-

tion of gender as an oppressive cultural reality'. Unlike socialist feminists and liberal feminists writing about education, radical feminists have made few attempts to relate school life to the economy or to the family. Their analyses do sometimes use a concept of 'reproduction' (Mahony, 1985, p. 66) but what is being reproduced is the domination of men over women, denying girls and women full access to knowledge, resources, self-esteem and freedom from fear and harassment.

Two major concerns characterize this body of literature: 1) the male monopolization of culture and knowledge; and 2) the sexual politics of everyday life in schools. The major exponent of the first theme is Dale Spender (1980; 1981; 1982; see also Spender and Sarah, eds., 1980). Spender argues that what we 'know' is dangerously deficient, for it is the record of decisions and activities of men, presented in the guise of *human* knowledge. For centuries, women's contributions and understandings have been ignored or disparaged, notwithstanding female resistance. Spender wishes to uncover the logic of male dominance and the contribution schools make towards it; ways in which gatekeeping processes silence women and allow men to dominate decision-making in educational (and other) contexts; the role of language in controlling the ways in which women conceptualize themselves and their world. There are obvious implications here for the school curriculum and also for women teachers' and girls' access to power and policy-making within education. The Women's Studies movement in higher education also builds on (although not exclusively) the radical-feminist analysis of knowledge. Radical-feminist perspectives have been extended into the adult education field by Jane Thompson (1983).

The second main theme concerns the sexual politics of daily life in educational institutions. Here, too, Spender has made a significant contribution by delineating two aspects of the problem: teacher attention unequally divided between the sexes to the advantage of boys (Spender, 1982) and the potential although not unmixed benefits of single-sex schooling for girls (Spender, 1982; Spender and Sarah, 1980). Both these issues have been approached from other perspectives as well, but they are most closely associated with radical-feminist ones, as the basic reason for concern is the dominance of males over females in mixed-sex settings; moreover, they are examples of the radical feminist dictum that 'the personal is political'. Recently British radical-feminist writing has become more insistent about the extent to which boys (sometimes aided by male teachers) oppress, demean and harass girls (and sometimes women teachers). These accounts are painful to read. They see schools, especially mixed secondary schools, as amplifiers of male tendencies towards violence. According to Pat Mahony (1985) it is not simply that girls receive less teacher time, but that their classroom contributions are met with systematic ridicule from boys and their existence

outside classrooms is filled with verbal and nonverbal abuse and physical molestation. Carol Jones (1985) describes one London secondary school which was covered with woman-hating graffiti and pornographic drawings, populated by boys boasting of watching videos of violence towards women; characterized by a stream of sexual abuse from boys to girls. 'Male violence – visual, verbal and physical sexual harassment – was part of daily school life' (p. 30). Jones adds that girls and teachers had developed some strategies for resistance. Sexual harassment and abuse can take different forms when combined with racism (Suleiman and Suleiman, 1985) or directed against those (of both sexes) who breach norms of heterosexuality (Anon., 1986).

Exposing these practices through publications is clearly one radical-feminist strategy. Weiner (1986) points out that radical feminists have successfully legitimated discussions of sexuality and sexual harassment in schools, topics which were formerly ignored. Antisexist strategies for teachers or girls are recommended or summarized in Jones (1985), Mahony (1985) and Weiner (1986). What runs through these is a concern to put girls and women at the centre of concern. This means believing their complaints, and according their perspectives validity. Revisions of curricula, texts and the extension of scholarship on gender have a similar rationale. There are also attempts at pedagogical change, especially in higher and adult education, intended to develop non-hierarchical, less competitive, participatory teaching methods. A number of proposed strategies involve (sometimes temporary) separation: single-sex schools, colleges, sets, discussion groups, and youth clubs. A central unresolved problem with these is how to educate and re-educate the boys and who should do it (Mahony, 1985, p. 91).

Radical feminism attracts considerable criticism. With regard to education, Middleton (1984) argues radical feminism is the least articulated of the three perspectives, that it is descriptive rather than explanatory. Radical feminists would reply that there is a clear explanation – the universality of patriarchy or male dominance – and that male power and control over women is not simply ideological but material (Mahony, 1985, p. 68). The critics' response is to accuse radical feminism of biological reductionism or essentialism. The problem here lies in answering in non-biological terms the question of *why* men wish to dominate women. A number of critics (e.g. Connell, 1985; Murphy and Livingstone, 1985) charge that radical-feminist analyzes with their generalizations about (all) women and (all) men direct attention away from divisions which cut across or complicate women/men categories such as class, race, nationality, age. There is an issue here to which I shall return in the conclusion – the similarity yet diversity of women. However, radical-feminist educational accounts are increasingly trying to consider racism along with sexism (e.g. Bunch and Pollack, eds., 1983; Weiner, ed., 1985).

Certainly some radical feminists in education, including Spender, make sweeping statements about 'men' and 'women' and analyses like Mahony's or Jones's stress particularly unpleasant aspects of masculinity. Mahony (1985, p. 71) attempts to counter charges of essentialism by developing a concept of the social (rather than biological) construction of masculinity ('social maleness'). In one sense this returns us to a socialization approach (with its defects): boys behave badly because they have learned to do so. Why has socialization encouraged this pattern? Mahony suggests it persists because men benefit from being powerful. But why should 'being powerful' automatically be a rewarding experience unless one has been socialized to believe this?

British radical-feminist writing on education *is* accessible and popular. It avoids the dullness of some liberal-feminist research and the opacity of some socialist-feminist analysis. Perhaps this stems from a belief that 'change is possible and teachers and pupils can make it happen' (Mahony, 1985, p. 93), even when such a hope appears to contradict the conception of patriarchy as pandemic and powerful.

Radical-feminist scholarship is also open to criticism on methodological grounds. Feminist methology tries to break free from the male biases in research paradigms criticized by Spender and others (Stanley and Wise, 1983) and as such it opens up important new possibilities and unearths data ignored by conventional approaches, such as the evidence of sexual harassment in schools. But I believe some standards have to be set beyond personal validation of data. It is unlikely that all teachers favour boys all of the time, that all schools are as riddled by sexism as the one in Jones's study or the worst of Mahony's examples. The dilemma of the 'apt example' surfaces just as it did for reproduction and resistance research. Mahony uses this technique deliberately to ring an 'alarm bell' (p. 36) — and it works — but it is still necessary to know under what conditions such findings will and will not obtain, if oppression is to be fought most effectively.

Feminist Theoretical Frameworks: Problems and Prospects

Are we moving towards a synthesis of feminist educational approaches? Deep conceptual divides remain. But it seems to me that, with a few exceptions, feminist theoretical writing about education manages to be constructively critical without the vitriol sometimes found in other spheres of feminist commentary. Possibly this can be traced to the tradition of pragmatism in much educational thought: the immediate goal of making conditions better overrides some of the theoretical disputes. Many writers work in educational institutions themselves and thus sustain some commitment to

educational change through educational means (directly through their teaching, indirectly through teaching of teachers and prospective teachers and through the production of scholarship). The tension between education-as-reproductive and education-as-liberating is encountered daily. Additionally, in Britain, education has been rather peripheral to feminist theory. Mitchell and Oakley's (1986) book, for example, has no separate chapter on education and barely a mention of it elsewhere; Segal's (1987) lengthy critique of Dale Spender's work totally ignores all Spender's books and articles on education. Possibly pragmatism and marginality encourage educational scholars and activists into alliances across theoretical divides. As Sally Miller Gearhart (1983) points out, alliances may be built on the coincidence of the goals of liberal feminists with the strategies of radical (or socialist) feminists. The dominance of equal opportunities discourse in British public policy means that under an equal opportunities hat a socialist or radical feminist heart may beat!

For educational theorists as well as for other feminists, certain dilemmas remain. One of these dilemmas is the relationship between *structure and agency*. Should women be seen as immobilised by reproductive social and economic structures, by tradition-bound institutions, by discrimination, by men? Or are they active agents, struggling to control and change their lives? Even more problematic is the issue of *universality and diversity*, one of the paradoxes of feminism:

> rooted in women's actual situation, being the same (in a species sense) as men; being different, with respect to reproductive biology and gender construction, from men. In another complication, all women may be said to be 'the same', as distinct from all men with respect to reproductive biology, and yet 'not the same', with respect to the variance of gender construction. Both theory and practice in feminism historically have had to deal with the fact that women are the same as and different from men, and the fact that women's gender identity is not separable from the other factors that make up our selves: race, religion, culture, class, age (Cott, 1986, p. 49).

The history of struggles for women's education shows the tensions between strategies emphasizing sameness and difference, structures and agency. The contemporary arguments I have reviewed again show these tensions. But tensions can be productive as well as destructive. It is through these very dilemmas, through attempts to solve the unsolvable, through exchanges among feminist frameworks that feminist theory moves ahead.

References

Acker, S. 'No-Woman's-Land: British Sociology of Education 1960-1979'. *Sociological Review.* 29 (1981), No. 1, pp. 77-104.

Acker, S. 'Women in Higher Education: What is the Problem?' In Acker, S. and Warren Piper, D. (eds.) *Is Higher Education Fair to Women?* Guildford: Society for Research into Higher Education and Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984, pp. 25-48.

Acker, S., Megarry, J., Hoyle, E. and Nisbet, S. (eds.) *World Yearbook of Education 1984: Women and Education.* London: Kogan Page, 1984.

Amos, V. and Parmar, P. 'Resistances and Responses: The Experiences of Black Girls in Britain'. In McRobbie, A. and McCabe, T. (eds.) *Feminism for Girls.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, pp. 129-143.

Amos, V. and Parmar, P. 'Challenging Imperical Feminism'. *Feminist Review.* 17 (1984), pp. 3-19.

Anon. 'Miss Is a Lesbian: The Experience of a White Lesbian Teacher in a Boys' School'. *Teaching London Kids.* 23 (1986), pp. 2-4.

Arnot, M. 'Culture and Political Economy: Dual Perspectives in the Sociology of Women's Education'. *Educational Analysis.* 3 (1981), No. 1, pp. 97-116.

Arnot, M. 'Male Hegemony, Social Class and Women's Education'. *Journal of Education.* 164 (1982), No. 1, pp. 64-89.

Arnot, M. and Weiner, G. *Gender and Education Study Guide.* Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987.

Barrett, M. *Women's Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis.* London: Verso, 1980.

Brah, A. and Deem, R. 'Towards Anti-Sexist and Anti-Racist Schooling'. *Critical Social Policy.* 6 (1986), No. 1, pp. 66-79.

Brah, A. and Minhas, R. 'Structural Racism or Cultural Difference: Schooling for Asian Girls'. In Weiner, G. (ed.) *Just a Bunch of Girls.* Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1985, pp. 14-25.

Bryan, B., Dadzie, S., and Scafe, S. *The Heart of the Race: Black Women's Lives in Britain.* London: Virago, 1985.

Bunch, C. and Pollack, S. (eds.) *Learning Our Way.* Trumansburg, NY: The Crossing Press, 1983.

Byrne, E. *Women and Education.* London: Tavistock, 1978.

Carby, H. 'White Women Listen! Black Feminism and the Boundaries of Sisterhood'. In Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. (ed.) *The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70's Britain.* London: Hutchinson, 1980, pp. 212-235.

Connell, R.W. 'Theorizing Gender'. *Sociology.* 19 (1985), No. 2, pp. 250-272.

Connell, R.W., Ashenden, D.J., Kessler, S. and Dowsett, G.W. *Making the Difference: Schools, Families and Social Division.* Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1982.

Cott, N. 'Feminist Theory and Feminist Movements: The Past Before Us'. In Mitchell, J. and Oakley, A. (eds.) *What Is Feminism?* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 49-62.

Culley, L. and Demaine, J. 'Social Theory, Social Relations and Education.' In Walker, S. and Barton, L. (eds.) *Gender, Class and Education*. Lewes: Falmer, 1983.

David, M.E. 'Women, Family and Education'. In Acker, S. *et al.* (eds.) *World Yearbook of Education 1984: Women in Education*. London: Kegan Page, pp. 191-201.

Delmar, R. 'What Is Feminism?' In Mitchell, J. and Oakley, A. (eds.) *What Is Feminism?* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 8-33.

DuBois, E.C. Kelly, G.P., Kennedy, E.L., Korsmeyer, C.W. and Robinson, L.S. *Feminist Scholarship: Kindling in the Groves of Academe*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985.

Eisenstein, H. *Contemporary Feminist Thought*. London: Unwin, 1984.

Fuller, M. 'Qualified Criticism, Critical Qualifications'. In Barton, L. and Walker, S. (eds.) *Race, Class and Education*. London: Croom Helm, 1983, pp. 166-190.

Gaskell, J. 'Conceptions of Skill and the Work of Women: Some Historical and Political Issues'. In Hamilton, R. and Barrett, M. (eds.) *The Politics of Diversity*. London: Verso, 1986, pp. 361-380.

Gearhart, S.M. 'If the Mortarboard Fits . . . Radical Feminism in Academia'. In Buch, C. and Pollack, S. (eds.) *Learning Our Way*. Trumansburg, NY: The Crossing Press, 1983, pp. 2-18.

Griffin, C. *Typical Girls?* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985.

Hargreaves, A. 'Resistance and Relative Autonomy Theories: Problems of Distortion and Incoherence in Recent Marxist Analyses of Education'. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*. 3 (1982), No. 2, pp. 107-126.

Jayawardena, K. *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*. London: Zed Books, 1986.

Jeffcoate, R. 'Ideologies and Multicultural Education'. In Craft, M. (ed.) *Education and Cultural Pluralism*. Lewes: Falmer, 1984, pp. 161-187.

Jones, C. 'Sexual Tyranny: Male Violence in a Mixed Secondary School'. In Weiner, G. (ed.) *Just a Bunch of Girls*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1985, pp. 26-39.

MacDonald, M. 'Socio-Cultural Reproduction and Women's Education'. In Deem, R. (ed.) *Schooling for Women's Work*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 13-25.

MacKinnon, C. 'Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory'. *Signs*. 3 (1982), pp. 515-544.

Mahony, P. *Schools for the Boys? Co-Education Reassessed*. London: Hutchinson, 1985.

Middleton, S. 'The Sociology of Women's Education as a Field of Academic Study'. *Discourse*. 5 (1985), No. 1, pp. 42-62.

Mitchell, J. and Oakley, A. (eds.) *What Is Feminism?* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

Murphy, L. and Livingstone, J. 'Racism and the Limits of Radical Feminism'. *Race and Class*. 26 (1985), No. 4, pp. 61-70.

O'Brien, M. 'Feminism and Education: A Critical Review Essay'. *Resources for Feminist Research*. 12 (1983), No. 3, pp. 3-16.

Rendel, M. 'How Many Women Academics 1912-1976?' In Deem, R. (ed.) *Schooling for Women's Work*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 142-161.

Rendel, M. 'Women Academics in the Seventies'. In Acker, S. and Warren Piper, D. (eds.) *Is Higher Education Fair to Women?* Guildford: Society for Research into Higher Education, and Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984, pp. 163-179.

Russell, S. 'The Hidden Curriculum of School: Reproducing Gender and Class Hierarchies'. In Hamilton, R. and Barrett, M. (eds.) *The Politics of Diversity*. London: Verso, 1986, pp. 343-360.

Segal, L. *Is the Future Female?* London: Virago, 1987.

Spender, D. *Man Made Language*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.

Spender, D. (ed.) *Men's Studies Modified: The Impact of Feminism on the Academic Disciplines*. Oxford: Pergamon, 1981.

Spender, D. *Invisible Women: The Schooling Scandal*. London: Writers and Readers, 1982.

Spender, D. and Sarah, E. (eds.) *Learning to Lose: Sexism and Education*. London: The Women's Press, 1980.

Stanley, L. and Wise, S. *Breaking Out: Feminist Consciousness and Feminist Research*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983.

Suleiman, L. and Suleiman, S. '"Mixed Blood – That Explains a Lot of Things" – An Education in Racism and Sexism'. In Weiner, G. (ed.) *Just a Bunch of Girls*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1985, pp. 77-88.

Thompson, J. *Learning Liberation: Women's Response to Men's Education*. London: Croom Helm, 1983.

Weiner, G. 'Feminist Education and Equal Opportunities: Unity or Discord?' *British Journal of Sociology of Education*. 7 (1986), No. 3, pp. 265-274.

Weiner, G. (ed.) *Just a Bunch of Girls*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1985.

Whyte, J. *Girls Into Science and Technology: The Story of a Project*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986.


Whyte, J., Deem, R., Kant, L. and Cruickshank, M. (eds.) *Girl Friendly Schooling*. London: Methuen, 1985.

Yates, L. 'Theorising Inequality Today'. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*. 7 (1986), No. 2, pp. 119-134.

وحدة بحوث الريف

[illegible] لعلم الاجتماع الريفي
في الجمهورية العربية المتحدة





١٩٧١

My copy

المركز القومي للبحوث الاجتماعية والجنائية

وحـــدة بحوث الريف

الحلقة الدراسية لعلم الاجتماع الريفي في الجمهورية العربية المتحدة





١٩٧١

محتويات الكتـــاب

الصفحة

موضوعات الحلقـة

كلمة الافتتاح

للاستاذ الدكتور احمد خليفة رئيس مجلس ادارة المركز ورئيس الحلقة

جرت العادة انه فى بداية الاجتماعات والمؤتمرات والحلقات لابد من افتتاح ، ولكن تختلف فى اعتقادى الصيغة التى يفتتح بها العمل العلمى عن غيره من الاعمال .

وتجربتنا فى المركز بدات بالطريقة او الاسلوب التقليدى ، فعندما كنا نفتتح ندوة او مؤتمرا او حلقة علمية ، كان لابد من بعض الطقوس التى نبدأ بها هذا العمل ، ولكن مع مضى الزمن تبين لنا ان العمل العلمى يستحق الا نضيع دقيقة قبل ان نبداه فى اية مجاملات او فى اى احتفالات ، ولهذا تلاحظون مثلا ان هذه الحلقة ــ رغم اهميتها البالغة ــ ربما لم يسمع عنها وتحاشينا بكل الطرق ان يعلن عنها او ان نؤذن بمقدمها باى صورة من الصور ، لاننا نعتقد ــ وبعد تجربة طويلة ــ ان العمل العلمى الجاد يجب أن يجرى فى صمت على الاقل فى هذه المرحلة التى يتبادل فيها العلماء والباحثون والاساتذة الراى .

ولكن تظل هناك ضرورة لطلقة البداية ان صح التعبير ، او تظل هناك ضرورة لان تقص الشريط ايضا ــ ان صح التعبير ــ حتى ندخل جميعا الى ساحة العلم ، ولادرى كيف ادعى لنفسى هذا الحق فى أن أقص الشريط . ولكن يبدو ايضا ان هناك ضرورة فى ان يكون هناك حامل للمقص . ولا أتبين امامى من يريد ان يتحمل هذه المسئولية ، ولهذا لن تكون هناك كلمة افتتاحية بمعنى الكلمة ، فتلكم علماء وباحثون وتعلمون ان الكلمات الافتتاحية فى الندوات العلمية دائما يلقيها رجل له قدره العلمى الكبير ودائما هى مجموع فلسفة البحث او الدراسة المرتقبة ، ودائما يعطى هذا الشرف لمن يستطيع ان يدعى الاستاذية باى صورة من الصور .

واقول ان الريف هو قمة التحدى بالنسبة لمجتمعنا العربى . وفى مجامع كالمجتمع العربى ربما يعيش اكثر من ثلثيه فى مناطق ريفية . لابد أن نبدأ بتصور مدى ضخامة المسئولية وان نبدأ فى الاتجاه بافكرنا ومشاعرنا ومسئولياتنا نحو المجتمع الريفى .

وفى اعتقادى ــ وانتم جئتم هنا لتصححوا الاعتقادات ــ فى اعتقادى ان

(٣٩) Mayone Stycos «The Potential Role of Turkish Village Opinion Leaders in a Program of Family Planning» Pub. op. Qua. Vol. XXIX (Spring 1965) PP. 120 - 131.

(٤٠) Asghar Fathi «Leadership and Resistance to change: A Case from Underdeveloped Area» R.S. Vol. 30 (June 1965) No. 2 PP. 204 - 212.

(٤١) حسن الساعاتى ، علم الاجتماع فى مصر ودوره فى التغير الاجتماعى ، حوليات كلية الاداب جامعة عين شمس ، المجلد الخامس ، القاهرة ١٩٥٦ .

(٤٢) نقلا عن فرانسكويتث ، اخصائيو علم الاجتماع فى الشرق الاوسط فى حسن الساعاتى اعداد وتقديم ، التكنولوجيا والمجتمع ، القاهرة ، دار المعرفة ، ١٩٥٩ ، ص ١٤٢ .

(٤٣) المصدر نفسه ، الصفحة نفسها .

(٤٤) نقلا عن جدعون جوبرج ، البروق الريفية الحضرية ، محمد الجوهرى وزملاؤه ، المرجع السابق ، ص ١٢١ .

(٤٥) انظر جاك بيرك ، فى بلدنا النيل : القرية والتاريخ ، ترجمة السيد ابراهيم سوريال ومراجعة الدكتور يوسف مراد ، مطالعات فى العلوم الاجتماعية ، القاهرة ، دار المعارف خريف ١٩٥٩ ص ٦٠ — ٧٠ .

(٤٦) هنروط اليسوعى ، الفلاحون ، ترجمة الدكتور محمد السيد غلاب ، لا يوجد .

(٤٧) انظر حامد عمار ، « التنشئة الاجتماعية فى قرية مصرية : سلوا محافظة اسوان ، فى لويس كامل مليكه ، اعداد وتقديم قراءات فى علم النفس الاجتماعى فى البلاد العربية ١٢٠ — ١٢٢ .

(٤٨) انظر تفصيل ذلك فى H.*Ammar, Growing up in An Egyptian Village : Silwa, Province of Aswan, London Routledge & Kegan Paul 2nd. (ed.) 1966.

(٤٩) محمد عاطف غيث ، القرية المتغيرة ، المصدر السابق .

(٥٠) محمد عاطف غيث ، دراسات فى علم الاجتماع القروى ، القاهرة ، دار المعارف ١٩٦٧ .

(٥١) انظر لويس كامل مليكه ، الجماعات والقيادات فى قرية عربية ، سرس الليان ، ١٩٦٢ ، ص ١ .

(٥٢) محمد محيى الدين نصرت ، ومرزوق عبد الرحيم عارف ، انتشار المعلومات الجديدة فى الريف ، دراسة تطبيقية فى ريف الجيزة ، المجلة الاجتماعية القومية ، المجلد السادس (يناير ١٩٦٩) العدد الاول ص ١٢٢ — ١٥٢ .

البحث الثانى

بعض الاتجاهات الانثروبولوجية فى الدراسات القروية

للدكتور حسين محمد فهيم
مركز البحوث الاجتماعية بالجامعة الامريكية بالقاهرة

خلفية تاريخية : Hist. Background

وجدت المجتمعات القروية منذ قديم الزمان ، ومع ذلك فلم تهتم بها الانثروبولوجيا الاجتماعية الا حديثا جدا . ويرجع ذلك فى حقيقة الامر الى اسباب اكاديمية واخرى سياسية . فعندما اتخذت الانثروبولوجيا الاجتماعية لنفسها مكانة اكاديمية مستقلة فى انجلترا فى اواخر القرن الماضى ركزت اهتماماتها على دراسة محصلة المادة الوصفية التى جمعت عن تلك المجتمعات البدائية — والتى سميت كذلك على أساس مقارنتها بالمجتمعات الغربية التى افترض انها تمثل حالة متحضرة — لكى تبرهن على صدق الافتراض القائل بضرورة تطور المجتمع الانسانى ونظمه الاجتماعية فى خط واحد ذى ثلاث مراحل أساسية يبدأ بالمرحلة الهمجية ثم البربرية وينتهى بالحالة المتحضرة التى كان يمثلها المجتمع الغربى حينذاك .

وازاء النقد الذى تعرض له الاتجاه الافتراضى لتطور المجتمع الانسانى عامة اتجهت الاهتمامات الانثروبولوجية الى الدراسات الحقلية للمجتمعات البدائية كوسيلة لفهم المجتمع الانسانى عامة حيث اعتقد الانثروبولوجيون فى ذلك الحين ان تلك المجتمعات تمثل فى حقيقة أمرها الاشكال الاولية للحياة الانسانية لانعزالها عن العالم المتحضر . فقد كان كل مجتمع يمثل أيضا فى حد ذاته نسقا متمايزا ذا طبيعة محدودة تسهل معها الدراسة المركزة الشاملة التى تعتبر حجر الزاوية فى الطريقة الانثروبولجية التقليدية لدراسة المجتمعات الانسانية . وقد وجد الانثروبولوجيون الاجتماعيون البريطانيون ان ما تسيطر عليه انجلترا من مستعمرات فيما وراء البحار يعد مجالا خصبا لاجراء تلك الدراسات التى لقيت بدورها تشجيعا من السلطات البريطانية التى استعانت بالمادة العلمية لوصف وتحليل حياة شعوب هذه المستعمرات فى توجيه ادارة شئونها وفقا لما تقتضيه غالبا المصالح الاستعمارية .

المميزة للمجتمع القروى وقد اختلف الانثروبولوجيون كما سبق ان اوضحنا فى تحديد ابعـاد هذه العـلاقة الا ان التصور التقـالى لطبيعة العلاقة القـائمة بين الجزء والكل لا زال يشكل اساسا منهجيـا فى الدراسات القروية الانثروبولوجية . ومع ذلك فقد اوضحت الدراسات التى اتخذت البعد الثقافى اساسا تحليليا مفارقات ومتناقضات كثيرة عند المقارنة بين المجتمعات القروية المختلفة . فبينما وجد باحثون أن ثقافة الريفيين تختلف اختلافا متباينا عن ثقافة الحضر كما هو الحال مثلا فى المجتمع القروى ببولندا والتشيك قبل الحرب ، وجباحث ون اخرون ان هناك وحدة ثقافية مشتركة بين جزئى المجتمع القروى الامر الذى يصعب معه تطبيق المفهوم الغربى الخاص بتقسيم المجتمع القروى الى نموذجين احداهمـا ريفى والآخر حضرى اذ يختلف كلاهما عن الآخر اختلافا متباينا ويشكل كل منهما عالمـا مختلفا عن الآخر (مرجع ١٤) . ويتضح ذلك مثلا اذا فحصنا مجتمعات الشرق الاوسط نجد أن السكان الريفيين والحضريين يعتمدون على ثقافة مشتركة فى كثير من الامور الهامة فى حياتهم اليومية - اذ أن العلاقة والاتصال بين الريف والحضر - فى حقيقة الامر - اعمق بكثير مما توحى به النظرة السطحية وان اختلفت طبيعة هذه العلاقة أو درجة ذلك الاتصال .

وكما أوضحت الدراسات الحقلية للمجتمعات القروية عجز التقسيم الثنائى لانماط الوحدات المكونة للمجتمعات القروية عن اعطاء صورة صحيحة عن واقع الحياة فى تلك المجتمعات ، فقد بينت ايضا أن تصور المجتمع القروى على انه يمثل مرحلة انتقال من النموذج البدائى الى النموذج الحضرى - كما قال ردفيلد (٣٠) - تصور خاطىء ، اذ ان فكرة التطور من البدائية الى الحضرية لا يناسب المجتمع القروى وبالتالى لا تصلح اساسـا لفهمه . فالمجتمعات القروية لم تتكون على أساس عملية تحويل متدرج من حالة بدائية الى حالة حضرية وانما تكونت تلقائيا لحظة تكوين المدن . ويرى فوستر (مرجع ١٣) ان المجتمع القروى الذى يمثل نموذجا للحياة تمتد نشأته الى الحضارات الانسانية القديمة يكون فى حد ذاته شكلا اجتماعيا ثقافيا له ذاتيته ولا يعتبر باية حال نقطة وسـط أو مرحلة انتقال بين شكلين أو نموذجين مختلفين من النمـاذج المجتمعيـة .

وبالاضافة الى هذه الملاحظات النقدية للاسس المنهجية التى بنى عليها تصور العلاقة بين القرية والمدينة هناك نقطتين اخرتين . تتعلق النقطة الاولى بأهمية النظر الى هذه العلاقة على اساس انها علاقة تبادلية اى انها لا تسير فى اتجاه واحد أو تتجه عادة من المدينة الى القرية . وتختص النقطة الثانية بعجز التحليل الرأسى Vertical Analysis عن اعطاء صورة واضحة وكاملة لطبيعة ومدى كثافة العلاقات التى تربط القرية بالمجتمع بأسره . ولهذا يستلزم

الامر - كما أوضح اوبلر Opler (٢٦) - اضافة بعدا تحليليا جديدا وهو البعد الافقى Horizontal Dimension الذى يشير الى وصف وتحليل علاقة القرى المدروسة بالقرى المجاورة لها . وازاء هذا التطور فى مستويات التحليل وجد الانثروبولوجيون ضرورة اضافة وسائل جديدة لطريقة دراساتهم للبعد الممتد عند دراساتهم للمجتمع القروى . فقد وجدوا ضرورة الاستعانة بمفاهيم ومناهج العلوم السلوكية الاخرى كعلم الاجتماع وعلم النفس لتسهم فى تحليل متكامل للعلاقات المتداخلة المركبة التى لم يواجه الانثروبولوجيين مثلها من قبل ابان دراساتهم للمجتمعات البدائية . كما وجد الانثروبولوجيون أيضا ضرورة الاستعانة بالمصادر والوثائق التاريخية للكشف عن التطورات والاحداث التى تعرضت لها القرية او المجتمع القروى بصفة عامة وهذا امر لم يسبق ان احتاج اليه الانثروبولوجيون من قبل ابان دراساتهم للمجتمعات البدائية .

هذا ويجد المتتبع لتطور الاتجاهات الانثروبولوجية لتصور العلاقة بين الجزء والكل فى المجتمع القروى انه الى جانب تأكيد البعد الثقافى وما أثاره من جدل فهناك عدة محاولات جديدة لتأكيد أبعاد أخرى تتعلق بالتسويق او الطبيعة الإيكولوجية التى تقوم على اساسها تلك العلاقات ، الا ان الاتجاه السائد الآن هو تصور العلاقة فى ضوء برامج التنمية التكنولوجية والتغير الاجتماعى الموجه فى مجالات الحياة المختلفة . ومع ذلك فلا تزال المشكلة قائمة ولا زال الانثروبولوجيون يحاولون بطريقة أو بأخرى أن يطوروا عامة من مفاهيمهم ووسائلهم المنهجية التى تتفق مع طبيعة نموذجهم الدراسى الجديد (المجتمع القروى) ؛ الا انهم يواجهون مرة أخرى - وكان التاريخ يأبى الا ان يعيد نفسه - مشكلة احتمال اختفاء هذا النموذج خلال السنوات القادمة نتيجة للاحداث والتطورات التكنولوجية الهائلة نتيجة لتضاؤل الاختلافات بين القرية والمدينة . ولذلك بدأ كثير من الانثروبولوجيين يوجهون اهتماماتهم الان نحو دراسة المدن والحياة الحضرية . وهكذا يواجه الانثروبولوجيون أزمة أكاديمية ثانية تهدد مجال دراستهم الجديد الذى لم يمض على اكتشافه سوى عشرون عاما وربما تشير تكرار هذه الأزمة الى صدق ما استهل به مالينوفسكى كتابه الشهير الذى أصدره عام ١٩٢٢ حين قال : « ان الانثولوجيا فى موقف محزن وعصيب اذ انه فى اللحظة التى تبدأ فيها نشاطها لتحقيق الاهداف التى تصبو اليها تضيع مادة بحثها بسرعة فائقة يستحال معها استعاضتها » (مرجع ٢٤) .

الدراسات القروية الانثروبولوجية وعلم الاجتماع الريفى :

بعد هذا العرض الموجز لبعض الاتجاهات الانثروبولوجية السائدة بصدد تعريف المجتمع القروى وطريقة دراسته قد يكون من المفيد استكمالا لهذا المقال ان نوضح بعض اوجه التشابه والتباين بين وجهة النظر الانثروبولوجية

والسيولوجية لدراسة المجتمع القروى خاصة وان المجتمع الريفى هو موضوع البحث فى هذه الحلقة . فمن الناحية التاريخية ، نجد ان علم الاجتماع الريفى قد نشأ منذ أوائل هذا القرن كاحد فروع علم الاجتماع العام الذى يستخدم المفاهيم والمناهج السيولوجية لدراسة وفهم طبيعة المجتمع الريفى ونظمه الاجتماعية بهدف الاستفادة من ذلك فى رسم وتنفيذ السياسة الريفية . وبذلك يختلف علم الاجتماع الريفى عن « الانثروبولوجيا القروية » اذ جاز لنا ان نستخدم هذه العبارة لنشير الى الدراسات القروية الانثروبولوجية فى نشأته المبكرة وفى اتجاهه التطبيقى منذ البداية .

وعلى الرغم من ان المجتمع القروى يمثل الوحدة الدراسية لكل من علم الاجتماع الريفى والانثروبولوجيا القروية الا أن هناك عدة اختلافات جوهرية من ناحية موضوعات البحث وطريقة جمع المادة وتحليلها . وهذا ولا شك شىء طبيعى اذ انه عند دراسة الظواهر الريفية يمارس الباحث الاتجاه النظرى والمنهجى العام الذى يرتبط بتخصصه الاكاديمى . فالاختلاف بين الانثروبولوجيا القروية وعلم الاجتماع الريفى من ناحية الموضوع والمنهج مرده فى حقيقة الامر الى التباين القائم بين الدراسات الانثروبولوجية والسيولوجية عامة . فبينما يهتم علم الاجتماع الريفى مثلا بمسائل او ظواهر الهجرة الريفية او السمات الديموجرافية او النظم الاجتماعية الريفية تهتم الانثروبولوجيا القروية — كما اوضحنا ذلك سلفا — بموضوعات تختص بالقرى الريفية ودرجة تكاملها من الداخل او الخارج الى جانب التركيز على دراسة اوجه الثقافة الريفية وابعادها . وهناك مع ذلك موضوعات مشتركة كالتى تختص بتحديد الخصائص الريفية او دراسة مشاكل التغير الاجتماعى او برامج التنمية الا انه من الملاحظ انه عند المقارنة بين النمط الريفى للحياة والانماط الاخرى يركز علم الاجتماع الريفى عادة على المدينة (حيث ركز علم الاجتماع اهتماماته) مما ادى الى ظهور كثير من التصنيفات الثابتة للمجتمعات وافتراض الانتقال الحتمى من وضع الى آخر تحت تأثير عمليات التحضر او التصنيع ، بينما يتجه الانثروبولوجيون الى اتخاذ المجتمع البدائى (المجال التقليدى للدراسة الانثروبولوجية) اساسا لفهم ودراسة طبيعة المجتمع القروى .

اما من ناحية التباين المنهجى فيتضح ذلك فى طريقة جمع المادة وتحليلها . بينما يتجه الانثروبولوجيون الى الدراسة الحقلية المركزة الشاملة لوحدة الدراسة يركز السيولوجيون على وسائل المسح والاستخبار والاعتماد على الوثائق التاريخية والاحصاءات هذا ونجد الآن

ان كلا من الدراستين ، ولهذا يتجه الباحثون الى الجمع بين الوسائل السيولوجية والانثروبولوجية فى دراسة الظواهر الريفية بقصد الحصول على دراسة متعمقة تهتم بالعرض الوصفى والتحليل الكمى .

ولعل من النقاط الجوهرية فى المقارنة بين علم الاجتماع الريفى والانثروبولوجيا القروية هى طبيعة الاعداد الاكاديمى للباحثين او المتخصصين فى كل فرع . فمنذ نشأة علم الاجتماع تبنته كليات الزراعة او معاهد الاقتصاد الزراعى حتى انه فى حالة وجود قسم مستقل للاجتماع الريفى فلا بد ان يرأسه عادة استاذ اقتصاد زراعى . وسارت الأمور على هذا النحو على اساس الفكرة القائلة بان فهم اسلوب الحياة الريفية يتطلب خلفية زراعية من جانب الباحث (مرجع ١) ، الا ان الانثروبولوجيين لا ياخذون بهذا المبدأ ولا يتطلب الاشتغال بالدراسات القروية وفقا لذلك اعداد اكاديميا معينا . فالدراسات الانثروبولوجية القروية تشير الى اهتمام خاص بين مجموعة من الانثروبولوجيين يقومون بها وفقا للمبادىء العامة والاساسية التى يحددها لهم اتجاهم الانثروبولوجى .

الاتجاه الانثروبولوجى ودراسة المجتمع القروى المصرى :

يجب الا تنهى هذا المقال دون الاشارة الى وجهة نظرنا بصدد الاتجاه الانثروبولوجى ودراسة المجتمع القروى المصرى ، ولو ان هذا الموضوع يحتاج الى دراسة منفردة تقوم اساسا على الدراسة التحليلية النقدية للدراسات الاجتماعية والثقافية الجارية للقرية المصرية سواء قام بها باحثون مصريون أم اجانب . وعلى اية حال فيمكن لنا أن نقدم هنا وجهة نظر مبدئية تتلخص فى النقاط التالية :

اولا : لا شك ان مصر بلد زراعى حيث يبلغ نسبة سكانه الذين يقطنون فى قرى ٥٩ ٪ من مجموعة السكان حسب تعداد ١٩٦٦ . ويشتغل القرويون المصريون او « الفلاحون » اساسا بالزراعة ولو ان عددا كبيرا منهم يعمل فى مهن اخرى . وبصفة عامة يشترك هؤلاء الافراد فى اسلوب معين من الفكر والعلاقات الاجتماعية تختلف عادة فى شكلها وجوهرها عن اسلوب حياة المدينة . وايا كانت درجة البعد النسبى بين القرية والمدينة فالقرية ليست وحدة منعزلة تماما عن المدينة ولا عن القرى المحيطة بها ، وان اغفال دراسة هذا المركب من ملاقات الاتصال يؤدى ولا شك الى فهم ناقص لطبيعة مكونات الحياة الريفية المصرية . هذا ويجب ان نؤكد ايضا ان الاتجاه نحو دراسة احدى القرى المصرية باعتبارها نموذجا ممثلا امر يجانبه الصواب للتباين الكبير بين هذه القرى العديدة التى قد تبدو من اول وهلة متشابه الخصائص والمكونات .

13. ——————, 1965 — «Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good». A.A., 67 : 293 - 315.

14. ——————, 1967 — «What is a Peasant». in Potter (ed.), Peasant Society : A Reader. Boston, Little Brown Series in Anthropology.

15. FRIEDLE, E. 1963 — «Studies in Peasant Life». Biennial Review of Anthropology, Standford University Press.

16. HAMMEL, E.A. 1962 — «Social Rank and Evolutionary Position in a Coastal Peruvian Village». S.J.A.. 18 : 199 - 215.

17. ——————, 1964. — «Territorial Patterning of Marriage Relationships in a Coastal Peruvian Village». A.A. 66 : 66 - 74.

18. HONIGMANN, J. 1964. — Survival of a Cultural Focus. In Ward Good Enough (ed.) Exploration of Cultural Anthropology. New York. Mc.Graw Hill.

19. KAPLAN, D. & B. SALER. 1966. — «Foster's Image of Limited Good». Anthropological Interpretations. A.A., 68: 202 - 206.

20. KENNEDY, JOHN. 1966. — «Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good : A Critique». A.A. : 68 (9) : 1212 - 1225.

21. KROEBER, A. 1948. — Anthropology. New York : Harcourt, Brace and Co.

22. LEWIS, OSCAR. 1953. — A Critique of the Folk-Urban Conceptualization of Social Change : Tepoztlan Restudied. Rural Sociology, 18 (2) : 12 - 36.

23. LOPREATO, JOSEPH. 1962. — «Interpersonal Relations: The Peasant's View».

24. MALINOWSKI, B. 1930. — Argonants of the Western Pacific (1922), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, P. XV.

25. NAROLL, R. & F. NAROLL. 1960. — Social Development of a Tyrolean Village. A.Q. 35 : 103 - 120.

26. OPLEV, M. 1956 — «The Extention of an Indian Village». J.A.S. (16) : 5 - 10.

27. PITT-RIVERS, J. 1959. — «The Closed Community and Its Friends». K.A.S. Papers 16 : 5 - 15.

28. ——————, 1960. — «Interpersonal Relations in Peasant Society : A Comment». Human Organization 19 : 180-183.

29. REDFIELD, ROBERT, 1930. — Tepoztlan : A Mexican Village. Chicago University Press.

30. ——————, 1941. — The Folk Culture of Yucatan, Chicago, Chicago, University Press.

31. ——————, 1953. — Peasant Society and Culture, Chicago, Chicago University Press.

32. STEWARD, J. 1950. — Area Research, Theory and Practice .Social Science Research Council Bulletin. No. 63 New York.

33. SOFUE, T. 1960. — «Japanese Studies by American Anthropologists : Review and Evaluation». A.A. 62: 306 - 317.

34. WITFOGEL, K. 1957. — «The Theory of Oriental Study». in Fried. (ed.). Readings in Anthropology, Vol. 2. (See also : Oriental Despotism. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1957).

35. WOLF, ERIC. 1955 — «Types of Latin American Peasantry : A Preliminary Discussion». A.A. 57 : 252 - 271.

36. ——————, 1966. — Peasants. Prentice Hall, I.N.C. Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey.

وقد شملت الدراسات الحقلية للمجتمعات البدائية أنحاء متعددة من العالم واستمرت ركيزة أساسية للانثروبولوجيا الاجتماعية واهتماماتها النظرية حتى منتصف القرن الحالي حين بدأ الانثروبولوجيون يحسون بأزمة تهدد الموضوع الرئيسي لدراساتهم وتبطل معها قيمة منهجهم التقليدي . فقد دخل العالم - بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية خاصة - عصرا جديدا اتسم بالتطور الهائل في وسائل المواصلات والاتصال الامر الذي اضمحلت معه امكانية العزلة والاستقلال الذاتي الذي اتصفت بها هذه المجتمعات البدائية . وقد ترتب على ذلك ان تلاشت بعض ملامح الصورة التقليدية للمجتمعات البدائية .

وقد استتبع ذلك ان فتر حماس واهتمام كثير من الانثروبولوجيين بتلك المجتمعات البدائية واخذوا يتطلعون الى مجال آخر يمارسون فيه دراساتهم البنائية الوظيفية من خلال منهجهم الانثروبولوجي التقليدي . وقد وجدوا هذا الحقل ممثلا في المجتمعات الريفية التقليدية في آسيا والشرق الاوسط وامريكا اللاتينية التي كانت قد دخلت في ذلك الوقت حلبة السياسة الدولية بانضمامها الى هيئة الامم المتحدة ولانها بطبيعتها مجتمعات ذات امكانيات بشرية واقتصادية واستراتيجية هائلة . ومرة اخرى نجد ان الاهتمامات الانثروبولوجية ؛ الاكاديمية - شأنها في ذلك شأن العلوم الاخرى - تعكس متطلبات العصر وترتبط بالاهداف السياسية لبعض الدول الكبرى .

وبهذا تحول الاهتمام في الانثروبولوجيا الاجتماعية منذ أوائل الخمسينات من الدراسات البدائية الى الدراسات القروية وخاصة في الولايات المتحدة الامريكية التي اهتمت اهتماما شديدا - لاغراض سياسية اساسا - بالبلاد الزراعية التقليدية النامية . وتمشيا مع هذا الاهتمام اعتمدت الحكومة الامريكية والمنظمات الاكاديمية اعتمادات مالية كبيرة لتطوير الدراسات القروية في جامعاتها ومعاهد البحوث فيها الامر الذي دفع بالدراسات القروية دفعة قوية تمثلت في العدد الهائل من دراسات القرى التي شملت جهات عديدة من العالم خاصة في البلاد النامية .

ومن الناحية الاكاديمية البحتة فان التحول من دراسة المجتمعات البسيطة (اى المجتمعات البدائية) الى المجتمعات المركبة (اى المجتمعات القروية) قد نتج عنه بعض المسائل النظرية والمشاكل المنهجية التي جذبت انتباه عدد كبير من الانثروبولوجيين المشتغلين بالدراسات القروية . وعلى الرغم من حداثة اهتماماتهم بالدراسات القروية فهم في الحقيقة جادون في تطوير المفاهيم والاسس النظرية والمنهجية لهذا المجال الجديد في الدراسات الانثروبولوجية . ويتضمن هذا المقال محاولة موجزة ومبسطة لعرض بعض الاتجاهات

thesis statement

2 divisions
1) definitions
2) approaches

الانثروبولوجية في موضوعين من اهم موضوعات الدراسات القروية حيث يختص الموضوع الاول بمشكلة تعريف الخصائص المميزة للمجتمع القروي بينما يتعلق الموضوع الثاني بالوسيلة المنهجية لدراسة هذا المجتمع . ولا شك ان الموضوعين مرتبطان ؛ الا انه لغرض الايضاح قد تناولنا في هذا المقال الاتجاهات الانثروبولوجية في معالجة كل موضوع على حدة مع الاشارة للدراسات المرتبطة بتلك الاتجاهات .

تعريف المجتمع القروي

ان مشكلة تحديد صفات مميزة لذلك النموذج الانساني الذي يمكن ان يطلق عليه كلمة « القروية »«Peasantry» من اولى الموضوعات التي واجهها واختلف بشأنها الانثروبولوجيون المهتمون بالدراسات القروية . وتعتبر الفقرة الوحيدة التي اوردها كروبر Kroeber في كتابه الانثروبولوجيا «Anthropology» (مرجع ٢١ - الذي اصدره عام ١٩٤٨ وضمنه عرضا وافيا لموضوعات ومسائل الانثروبولوجيا في ذلك الحين) اساسا ارتكزت عليه كل محاولات التعريف التي قام بها الانثروبولوجيون فيما بعد . فقد اوضح كروبر ان القرويين هم اولئك الريفيين (المزارعين) الذين لا يستطيعون الحياة دون الاتصال والاعتماد على الاسواق والمراكز الحضرية . فالقرية ليست وحدة قائمة بذاتها وانما هي تمثل مجتمعا جزئيا ذا ثقافة جزئية . وقد استمد كروبر هذا الوصف من تصوره لطبيعة المجتمع القروي الاوروبي .

each on its own? →

هذا ويتفق الانثروبولوجيون على ما احتوته هذه الاشارة العابرة عن المقصود بالقروية من حيث تأكيد فكرة جزئية واعتمادية المجتمع القروي المحلي مقابل فكرة كلية واستقلالية المجتمع البدائي ، بيد انهم يختلفون بشأن التفصيلات الخاصة بطبيعة العلاقة بين الجزء (القرية) والكل (المدينة او الدولة) وطبيعة مهنة القرويين . يعتبر ردفيلد Redfield (مرجع ٣٠) مثلا ان المجتمع القروي نموذجا يمثل طريقة معينة في الحياة الانسانية تعتمد اساسا على الزراعة بينما يحاول فيرث Firth (مرجع ٨) ان يدخل ضمن فئة القرويين صناع الحرف اليدوية والصيادين وكل من يزاول مهنة ذات انتاجية محدودة . فقد وجد ان كلمة « القروي » بالمعنى الغربي لا يطابق واقع المجتمعات الشرقية كما اتضح له ذلك من خلال دراسته الحقلية في قرى في جنوب شرق آسيا حيث وجد ان الصيادين مثلا ينتمون الى فئة اجتماعية مماثلة للمزارعين بل هم احيانا يكونون اعضاء اسرة واحدة . هذا ويختلف معه وولف Wolf (مرجع ٣٤ - ٣٥) حيث يميل الى استخدام اصطلاح